

SARASWATI BHAVANA

STUDIES

VOL - II


THE
PRINCESS OF WALES
ARASVATI BHAVANA STUDIES

EDITED BY
GAṄGĀ NATHA JHĀ
AND
GOPI NATHA KAVIRAJA

Vol. II.

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CONTENTS.

	Pages.
I. PARĀŚURĀMA MIŚRA <i>alias</i> VĀNĪ RASĀLARĀYA:	
By Gopī Nātha Kavirāja ...	...1—4
II. INDEX TO BOOKS 1—VI OF ŚABARA'S BHĀṢYA:	
By the late Col. G. A. Jacob	...5—28
III. STUDIES IN HINDU LAW;—(2) ITS SOURCES:	
By Gaṅgā Nātha Jhā	29—63
IV. A NEW BHAKTI SŪTRA: By Gopī Nātha	
Kavirāja	...65—81
V. THE SYSTEM OF CHAKRAS ACCORDING TO	
GORAKṢA NĀTHA: By Gopī Nātha	
Kavirāja	...83—92
VI. THEISM IN ANCIENT INDIA:	
such By Gopī Nātha Kavirāja	...93—111
charita	
tion of HINDU POETICS: By Baṭuka Nātha Śarmā	113—128
rescinda SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ASTROLABE:	
advocac By Padmākara Dvivedī	...129—136
persuad	
Shah J SOME ASPECTS OF VĪRA ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY:	
cause, By Gopī Nātha Kavirāja	137—158
by aboy YĀYA KUSUMĀNĀJALI (English Translation):	
Emr By Gopī Nātha Kavirāja	...159—191
XI. THE DEFINITION OF POETRY:	
By Nārāyaṇa Śāstrī Khiste	...193—197
XII. SONDALA UPĀDHYĀYA:	
By Gopī Nātha Kavirāja	...199—200

I. PARAŚURĀMA MIŚRA ALIAS VAṆI RASĀLA RAYA.

BY GOPINATH KAVIRAJ.

It is well known that some of the Moghul Emperors and even some minor Mahomedan kings of India were great patrons of Sanskrit Learning. They encouraged Sanskrit poets, philosophers and men of science, and in several cases went so far as to get Sanskrit works translated into Persian. Some of these are known to have signified their appreciation of these men of letters by conferring titles upon them.

Kavindrāchārya Sarasvatī of Benares was the object of such royal honours. It is related in the Gādhivamśānu-charita how he went to Delhi, at the head of a large deputation of pandits, in order to get the oppressive pilgrim tax rescinded, how he succeeded by means of his eloquent advocacy in carrying the whole Imperial Court with him and persuading the learned audience as well as the Emperor Shah Jehan himself as to the strength and justice of his cause, and how ultimately he secured his triumph not only by abolition of the tax but also by obtaining from the Emperor the distinguished title of Sarvavidyānidhāna, literally "the repository of all sciences." Kavindrāchārya was in possession of a huge collection of Sanskrit Mss*, and we still find on the cover of each and every work belonging to this

* A Catalogue of this collection originally in possession of the late Mm. Pandit Vindhyaes'vari Prasāda Dvivedin, Assistant Librarian, Government Sanskrit Library, Benares, has now been printed and published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series.

collection, his name and the title obtained from the Moghul Emperor written in bold and beautiful character.

The great Jagannātha, whose Rasagaṅgādhara and Bhāminivilāsa have earned for him an immortal renown in the history of Sanskrit Poetry and Rhetoric, was another protege of the same Emperor and the recipient of similar distinctions. The title of Paṇḍitarāja by which this author is more generally known to the posterity is also supposed to have been received from the same source.

It appears that of all the Moghul Emperors, many of whom were patrons of Sanskrit Learning, none was so fond of conferring titles on worthy scholars as Shah Jehan. In the course of my examination of Manuscript collections I have come across a very interesting work which records incidentally the history of another scholar appreciated by the same Emperor in the same fashion. I am speaking of Paraśurāma Prakāśa (fols. 1-170; and 171—293), a work on Dharmaśāstra in two sections (viz. Āchāra Ullāsa and Sraddha Ullāsa), by one Khaṇḍe Rāya Paṇḍita, son of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita of the famous Dharmādhikārī family of Benares. The Ms is dated in Saṃvat 1697 (=1640 A.D.). The work was written at the request of one Paraśurāma Miśra (whence its name), the scholar whose name stands at the top of the present paper and whose brilliant parts were recognised by the Emperor Shah Jehan.

As regards the parentage etc. of Paraśurāma all that we find recorded in this work is that he was the son of Horila Miśra and grandson of Sūryākara, a Śākadvīpi Brāhmaṇa of the Parāśara gotra, ruling over the city of 'Yamunāpura'. This city was the home of many brave warriors and excelled in all the arts of luxury. Sūryākara was a devotee of Viṣṇu, but his son Horila used always to be surrounded by a band of Brahmachārins and Sannyāsins. He was a man of

stern morality, and the work in question describes him as 'समुत्पादितधर्मसेतुः'— an epithet which may mean either that he was the author of a work named "Dharmasetu" or more probably that he brought about a religious revival among his subjects who had in all likelihood forsaken, or become lax in, the observance of their traditional āchāra under the influence of Mahomedan domination.

Paraśurāma was a religious man, learned and generous. He is said to have been the author of ritualistic tracts on Vedic and Smārta works (श्रुतिस्मृतिविधानकृत्). But none of these tracts are known by name. He was a brilliant controversialist (उद्ग्रहवादप्रखरतरवचोवीचिवादीन्द्रजेता) and a keen student of fine arts (चञ्चत्कलानामध्येता). But above all he had the wonderful gift of writing charming and graceful poems—an art of which he was a professed master and which brought him renown from the Imperial Court. For it is said, he won, by reason of his sweet speech, the title of *Vāṇī Rasāla Rāya* from the Emperor of Delhi, evidently Shah Jehan.

वाणीरसालरायेति पदवीं मानपूर्वकम् ।

स्ववाङ्माधुर्यसन्तुष्टात् सार्वभौमादवाप यः ॥

The occasion on which the title was conferred upon him is not definitely known. But we read in this connection :
 सोत्कण्ठं यस्य वाणीं विबुधपतिसुधाजित्वरीं पावनीं तां
 श्रुत्वा दिल्लीमहत्त्वान् मनसि गुरुमदं प्राप तापं जहौ च ।
 या गन्धर्वैर्लिलोक्त्यां सदसि सुमनसां गीयते स्तूयतेऽहैः
 पृथ्वीपालार्तिहन्ता जगति विजयते रायवाणीरसालः ॥

This shows that the Emperor of Delhi had been once deeply in sorrow, when the sweet and holy music of Paraśurāma's rolling poetry brought solace to his heart and elevated his spirits. When could it be? Was it on the death of the Emperor's beloved Begum Mumtaz? If it was, the historic interest of the document which in itself is beyond question would be very great indeed.

“अग्नाविष्णु मवाक्रीमंष etc.” (T.S. 1.1.12.1),—427.

“अग्निचयन, arranging or preparing the sacrificial fire. place,—189.

“अग्निचिता पक्षिणो नाऽशितव्याः” (‘must not be eaten’)—577.

“अग्निचिद्वर्षति न धावेत् etc.” (‘Should not go out when it is raining’. T.S. 5. 4. 9. 2),—577-8.

“अग्निं वै सृष्टम् etc.”,—576.

“अग्निं चित्वा सौत्रामण्या यजेत” (T.S. 5. 6. 3. 4),—507, 514.

“अग्निरिदं हविरजुषतावीवृधत” (T.B. 6. 5. 10.2),—252

अग्निष्टुत्, a modified form of अग्निष्टोम (Śatap. x iii. 7. 1. 3),—162.

अग्निहोत्रन्याय,—648.

“अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति (or जुहुयात्) स्वर्गकामः”,—89, 622.

“अग्निहोत्रं जुहोत्योदनं पचति” (where the boiling of the rice must come first, tho’ mentioned last),—537.

“अग्नीदग्नीन्विहर etc.”,—551.

“अग्नीधे ददाति” (T. B. 1. 1. 6 9),—404.

अग्नीषोमीय पशु, one of the 3 animals to be sacrificed at the jyotiṣṭoma; it is killed on the day preceding the sacrifice. [Śatap. iii, 6. 4. & Jhā]—373, 422, 443, 453.

अग्नीषोमीयमेकादशकपालं निर्वपेत् श्यामाकं” &c, 596.

“अग्नीषोमीयमेकादशकपालं निर्वपेद्ब्रह्मवर्चस्कामः” (T.S. 2. 3. 3. 3),—191.

अग्नीषोमीयरशना,—378.

“अग्नीषोमीयस्य स्थानेऽग्नीषोमीयः पुरोडाशः”,—432.

“अग्नेस्तृणान्यपचिनोति”,—225*.

अग्न्युप्राये लिखितं दृष्ट्वा अग्न्योऽयमिति बुद्धिर्भवति (?), 146, 779.

“अङ्गादङ्गात्संभवसि etc.” (Kauṣītaki 2. 11),—512.

अङ्गानि तु विधानत्वात्प्रधानेन उपदिश्येरन्”,—514.

अङ्गापूर्वभेद, a different apūrva connected with each subsidiary of a sacrifice,—131.

“अङ्गिरसो वा इत उत्तमाः सुवर्गे लोकमायंस्तेऽप्सु दीक्षातपसी प्रावेशयन् etc. (T.S. 6.1.1.2 modified),—321.

“अङ्गिरसो वा इत उत्तमाः सुवर्गे लोकमायंस्ते यज्ञवास्त्वभ्यायन् etc.” (T.S. 2. 6. 3. 2), 454.

अजामित्व. See “ जामि वा एतद्यज्ञस्य etc. ”

“ अजनादि यजमानो यूपं नावसृजेत् etc.”,—560.

“ अञ्जलिना सकृन्प्रदाव्ये जुहोति ” (T.S. 3. 3. 8. 4),—107, 731.

अतिचर, to pass by, offend, be unfaithful to (in this case to a wife),—767.

अतिभार, great obscurity, inexplicitness,—183, 302, 512, 513, 588, 593.*

अतिरात्र, a soma sacrifice [See Eggeling's note in vol. 2, p. 398, and Preface to vol. 3, pp. xvii—xx.]—383—6.

“ अतिरात्रे गृह्णाति षोडशिनं नतिरात्रे गृह्णाति षोडशिनं ”
(See Jhā on the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, p. 237),—205.

“ अतिहायेडो बर्हिः प्रतिसमानयति ”,—460, 542.

“ अथ कस्मात्स्वरूनाम् । एतस्माद्वा एषोऽवच्छिद्यते etc.” [Satap. iii, 7. 1. 24],—468.

“ अथ यस्य पुरोडाशौ क्षायत etc.”,—680.

“ अथातोऽग्निमग्निष्टोमेनैवाऽनुयजति etc.”,—189.

“ अथैतस्याष्टरात्रस्य विश्वजिदभिजितौ etc.”,—748.

अदाभ्यग्रह [See Eggeling's note vol 2, p. 424],—188, 379, 380.

“ अदृष्टा ऽदसमुदायस्य शक्तिः etc.”,—34.

“ अदृष्टो योऽश्रुतो वार्यः etc.”,—137.

अधिकारन्याय,—598.

अधिरथ ‘ on a cart ’, a cartload (T.S. 6. 2. 1. 1),—610, 612, 614.

* This seems rather to mean undue application. In Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on 3.4.33 Thibaut renders it “excessive weight (?)”. See Vol. 2, p. 300.

अध्वरकल्पा (इष्टि), name of a small and optional sacrifice.
(See Goldstücker),—547.

“ अध्वरस्य पूर्वं etc. ”,—565.

“ अध्वर्युर्गृहपतिं दीक्षयित्वा etc. ”,—405, 537.

“ अनङ्वाहौ युनक्ति, ”—443.

“ अनतिदृशं स्तृणाति etc ” (T.S. 2. 6. 5. 2),—436.

अनवानता यष्ट्यं [अनवानत्, ($\sqrt{\text{अन्}}$) ‘ without drawing breath ’. See Śatap. 1. 3. 5. 13 and xi. 1. 6. 31],—361.

“ अनाविष्टफले कर्मणि स्वर्गः फलम् ”,—500.

अनारभ्यवादाः (Sūtra 3. 6. 14). “ Vedic text not connected with any context ” (Kunte). “An injunction concerning sacrifice or Vaidik rites) not connected with the books or chapters which treat authoritatively on sacrifice etc in the regular order” (Goldstücker),—371-2, 727

अनारभ्यविधि,—366—9.

अनारभ्य धूयते,—326 ; with उच्यते,—366, 464; with आस्तातं,—624. अनारभ्याधीयते ‘ in no particular connection we read etc ’,—181; with अधीत,—366.

अनारभ्योऽर्थः,—381.

अनुग्रहवाद,—463.

अनुदितहोम, an offering made before sunrise,—(Ait. Br. V. 30.31, vol 3, pp. 182, 191), — 198, 203-4, 554.

‘ अनुपूर्वं स्वरुभिः पशून्समज्य etc. ’,—469.

“अनुबन्ध्या (अनूबन्ध्या)”, In connection with the concluding offering of the soma sacrifice, a barren cow called *anubandhyā* (lit. ‘to be bound afterwards’) is offered to Mitra and Varuṇa” (Eggeling’s note on Śat : 2, 4.4.14). See also Goldstücker,— 125, 373 (अनुबन्ध्य).

अनुमति (Śatap. 5. 2. 3. 2 & 4; T.S. 1. 5. 1. 1.) “the approval or favor of the deities personified” (Eggeling),—516.

अनुमान, defined,—10.

अनुयाजाः, ‘after-offerings’ [“oblations of clarified butter made

subsequently to the chief sacrifice just as प्रयाजाः or 'fore offerings' are made antecedently to the same." Eggeling, Vol. I, p. 80. See, too, 1. 8. 2. 1],—456, 509, 563.

अनुवचन, recitation of certain texts in conformity with injunctions (प्रेष) spoken by other priests (MW). See Goldstücker.—408.

अनुवाक्या (See याज्या),—256.

अनुवाद explanatory repetition,—87.

अनुषङ्ग, the connection of words in one part of a sentence with a subsequent part which requires them in order to complete the sense; one of the 3 principles of the interpretation of mantras. (See Goldstücker also),—134.

'अन्तर्वेदि' (adverb). 'Within the sacrificial ground' (MW. and Goldstücker); 'inside the altar' (Kunte, and Eggeling in 1.2.2.2). It is the opposite of वहिर्वेदि—392.

अन्त्यजनपदवासिन्,—173.

"अन्यतरापायेऽन्यां कुर्वीत" (Smṛti),—768.

"अन्यदुपदधाति",—689.

"अन्या इष्टका उपदधाति",—574

अन्यायश्चानेकशब्दत्वम् 1. 3. 26. (p. 77)

(Cf. अन्यायश्चानेकार्थत्वम् in vol 2, pp. 32, 38, 51, quoted in Bhāmātī 1. 3. 17).

अन्यार्थमपि कृतं etc. (See Maxims),—220, 491.

अन्येषु कालेष्वविहितत्वात्कृतमप्यकृतं स्यात् (See Marims iii),—649.

अन्वाचय, 'laying down a rule of secondary importance',—750 (See Goldstücker),

अन्वाहार्य (T.S. 1. 7. 3. 1), boiled rice presented to the priest at the New and Full moon sacrifices. (See Goldstücker, and also Eggeling on 1. 2. 3. 5),—314, 412.

"अपः प्रणयति etc. " (T.B. 3. 2. 4. 1),—477.

अपच्छेद, the breaking up of a procession of priests from the

- हविर्धान । [See Jhās Prābhākara Mimāṃsā, pp. 231, 243 ; Kunte, on 6. 5. 4.9 and Goldstücker],—721 etc.
- अपनये, in 6. 5. 17 and 18, means, according to Kunte, a change (of the deities of a model sacrifice),—708.
- अपर आह, a different view propounded,—675.
- “ अपरेण वेदिम् ” ‘to the west of the altar’ (?)—395.
- “ अपशवो वा अन्ये etc. ” (T. S. 5. 2. 9. 4),—103.
- “ अपश्यन्ह स्म वै पुरा ऋषयः etc. ”—529.
- अपसुब्रह्मण्य (ad i) ‘without the subrahmanya priest’—in opp. to ससुब्रह्मण्य [See the abridged St. Petersburg, Vol V, p. 244 and Com. on Āpast. Śrauta xii. 23. 13],—353.
- “ अपहतं रत्नः ” (V. S. 1. 11),—250.
- “ अप ह वा एष स्वर्गाल्लोकाच्छ्रियते etc. ” (T. S. 2. 2. 5. 4 reads अव वा etc.),—195, 437, 649, 650, 654.
- अपूर्व, 109, 112—13 ; that connected with a प्रकृति does not belong to a विकृति sacrifice,—428.
- अपूर्वं कल्पयित्वा फलमवगम्येत फलं च कल्पयित्वा अपूर्वम्,—497.
- “ अपो नाभिनन्दन्तोऽवभृथमभ्यवयन्ति ” (Tāndya Br. 5. 9. 3),—715.
- अपौरुषेयः शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः,—11.
- अप्रतिषिद्धं.....तन्न बाधितव्यम्—545.
- अप्रसह्यकारिन्,—101.
- अप्राणिनः पृष्ठी पञ्चम्यर्थे भवति यथा शाकस्य देहि शाकादेहि,—468.
- अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत्,—644.
- अभाव, as a pramāṇa,—10 [It is accepted by the Bhāṭṭas, but not by the Prābhākaras, See Jhā, p. 72].
- “ अभिक्रामं जुहोत्यभिजित्यै ” (T. S. 2. 6. 1. 4),—233.
- अभिधारण, sprinkling of घृत,—456-7.
- “ अभिचरता प्रतिलोमं होतव्यम् ” (T. S. 3. 4. 8.),—542.
- अभिजित् (आभिमुख्येन जयादभिजित्), like उद्भिद् and विश्व-जित्, is the name of a sacrifice,—85, 87.

अभिमर्शन, 'touching',—390—1.

अभियुक्तवचन,—757.

अभिषेचनीय [See Satap. 5. 3. 3. and footnote on p. 68; also p. xxvi of same vol], —577.

“अभीवर्तो ब्रह्मसाम” (T. S. 7. 5. 1. 6 with अभि०),—492; 624 (अभीवर्ते).

अभीषु, rein, bridle,—487, 530.

“अभीषू वा एतौ यज्ञस्य यदाधारौ,”—487, 530.

अभ्यसूय (Nom. v. असूय), to be indignant at,—768.

अभ्यातानाः N. of certain war songs (अभ्यातन्, to aim at, shoot. M. W.),—328.

अभ्युदयेष्टि, a sacrifice to be offered at the untimely rise of the Moon which vitiates a sacrifice (See Goldstücker),—701, 703, 706; (अभ्युदितेष्टि)—704, 710.

अभ्युञ्जीत 'filled'—with soma juice (Sat : 3. 2. 1. 29, 31),—267.

“अमावास्यामपराह्णे पिण्डपितृयज्ञेन चरन्ति”—525.

“अमाषममांसं बहुसर्पिषं व्रतं व्रतयन्ति”—694.

“अमुष्मै कामाय यज्ञा आह्नियन्ते”—507.

अम्बुनि मज्जन्ति अलावूनि etc.,—11, 496.

“अयज्ञिया वै वरकाः कोद्रवाः etc.”—662.

“अयज्ञो वा एष योऽस्त्मा” (T. S. 1. 5. 7. 1)—103.

“अरत्निमात्रे विधृती करोति”—429.

“अरुणया पिङ्गाद्यैकहायन्या etc.” (T. S. 6. 1. 6. 7),—2, 25 451.

अर्के चेन्मधु विन्देत etc.,—42.

अर्थकर्मन्, an action performed with a view to apūrva—a principal action, as opposed to गुणकर्म—478, 480.

अर्थक्रम, sequence as determined by the sense,—537, 586.

अर्थविषया हि प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिर्न बुद्ध्यन्तरविषया

[“Which means that it is the *object* that is perceived and not the *cognition*,—it is not the perception that is

perceived but the object." Jhā's *Prābh. Mīm.*, p. 26, and see context],—9.

अर्थापत्ति, defined,—10.

अर्थकादेकं वाक्यं, 132.

"अर्धतृतीयानि शतानि दीक्षिष्यन्ते etc.,"—758.

"अर्धमासानां वा एतद्रूपं यत्पञ्चदशिनः" (Śatap: xiii-2.5.1),—445.

अलम्बुसाः [=देशविशेषाः Nāgesa, vol. i. p. 52; Mahābhā-
sya, i. p. 14].,—492.

अवकीर्णिन्, who has violated his yow of chastity,—769.

अवकल्प, to be possible, natural, suitable.

अवकल्प्यते 143, etc.

अवकल्पिष्यते 141, etc.

अवकल्पेत 143, etc.

अवलकृत 148, etc.

This verb occurs scores of times.

अवगारेण 'menacing,'—324.

अवत्त (अवदो), 'cut off'—674--5.

"अवदायावदाय ध्रुवां प्रत्यभिधारयति"—343.

अवभृथ 'expiatory bath' (Śat: 4. 4. 5. and Śābara vii. 3. 12)
—118, 480, 716, 718.

"अवभृथादुदेत्य वत्सत्वचमाच्छादयति"—747, cf अवयुत्या-
नुवाद of Bhāmati 1. 1. 23 (p. 148). Amalānanda however
(p. 121) has अवयुत्यवाद and defines it as एकदेशस्य
विभज्यकथनम्.

अवयुत्यवाद, a particular statement which narrows the
application of a general statement (Kunte on 3. 7. 33). It
implies the *seclusion* (or *separating off*) of a certain number
from a class.

It differs from परिसंख्या—402, 404.

अविचार्य (✓—चि), without having investigated or enquired
into,—3.

"अविज्ञातेन गर्भेण हतेन भ्रूणहा भवति",—608, 610.

“अवी द्वे धेनू द्वे” (T. S. 5. 6. 21),—443.

“अवीवृधेतां महो ज्यायो क्राताम्” (T. B. 3. 5. 10. 3),—292

अवेष्टि a sacrifice connected with the Rājasūya (?). In. 9.

4. 3. 10 Eggeling renders “propitiatory oblation”,—172—3, 192.

अवैद्य (in sūtra), unlearned,—626.

अव्यक्त = सामान्यनिमित्त ‘a general cause’ (?). See Kunte's note on 3. 5. 33,—356.

अव्यपदेश्य, ‘indeterminate,—10.

अश्मकाः, N. of a warrior tribe (?) (T. S. 2. 3. 7. 4),—78.

“अश्व ऋषभो वृष्णिः etc.”,—446.

अश्वकर्ण as an example of अवयवाः set aside by समुदाय,—752.

अश्वप्रतिग्रहेष्टि, a sacrifice to be offered as a penalty for accepting the gift of a horse, or as Kunte puts it (under sūtra 5.2.3) for ‘giving away horses.’ [See. T. S. 2. 3. 12. 1],—329—331, 557—8.

अष्टका, an oblation to the manes on the 8th day after full moon. It is enjoined in smṛiti only, not in Śruti, but a Vedic mantra ‘यां जनाः प्रतिनन्दन्ति etc.’ is used with it. [For the mantra see Pāraskara Grhya, p. 183 and for the translation, 3. 2 2 (p. 338) in vol. xxix of Sacred Books of the East],—64, 65.

“अष्टसु प्रक्रमेषु ब्राह्मणोऽग्निमादधीत etc.”,—623.

“अष्टावुपभृति गृह्णाति” (T. B. 3. 3. 5. 5),—461, 464.

असति निमित्तविधाते नैमित्तिकं कर्तव्यम्—339.

“असत्रं वा एतद्यदहन्दो मम” (T. S. 7. 3. 8. 1),—103.

“असन्तृणो etc” (T. S. 6. 2. 11. 3),—301.

अस्माभिः कान्तारात्रिर्गतेर्देवदत्तस्य गृहे स्निग्धं भुक्तं तेन वयम-
रुक्ताः कृताः,—459.

अस्व, not possessed of property,—615.

अहर्गण, a series of days,—725, 748.

“अहिस्त्वां दशति”—479.

to battle (āji)—“यदाजिमीयुस्तदाज्यानामाज्यत्वम्;’ e, too, *Satap Br. X. 1. 2. 6* and note.],—87, 88.

आज्य (घृत) [according to the पूर्वपक्ष in sūtra 1. 4. 10 this synonym of घृत is given to consecrated (संस्कृत) butter only: but this is shown to be incorrect by an example from common life. It is therefore a जातिशब्द and not a संस्कार-शब्द],—94.

“आज्यभागाभ्यां प्रचर्य” etc,—346.

आज्यावेक्षण, impossible for a *blind* man, and he is therefore disqualified as a sacrificer,—628.

“आज्येन पूषमनक्ति”,—428.

आतञ्चन, sour curds etc. for coagulating milk (see *Satap. xi. 1. 4. 1* and footnote, and *T. S. 2. 5. 3. 5*),—702—3.

आतिथ्येष्टि the ‘guest offering’ to Soma (*Satap. iii. 4. 1*),—460, 464, 485.

आत्मा वै पुत्रनामासि etc” (*Kauṣ Up. ii. 11*),—512.

आत्रेय an ācārya (or priest ? see *Vedic Index*),—501, 565, 622.

आत्रेयीं हत्वा भूणहा भवति” under sūtra 6. 1. 7.

आत्रेयीं is said to mean आपन्नगर्भा, a meaning which is rejected under sūtra 9,—608, 610.

“आदित्यो वा सर्व ऋतवः etc”—760.

आधान (= अग्न्याधान), the setting up of the sacrifice,—175.

“आधानं पौर्णमास्यां चेत् etc.”—527.

“आधायैवंजातीयकं होतव्यम्”,—766.

आनमन, ‘conciliation, propitiation (of the Gods etc.)’-?,—748.

आनमयितव्य,—750.

आन्ध्राः, said to apply the term Rājā to a Kṣatriya even though he is not engaged in the protection of the people and the cities,—172-3.

आपेक्षिक ‘relative’ (as opp. to नैयमिक ‘absolute’; see *Kumārila*, p. 674)—211.

“आमनमस्या मनस्यदेवाः” (T. S. 2. 3. 9. 3; see Kunte on 3. 6. 7),—368.

आमनहोम, ‘an offering at which T. S. 2. 3. 9. 1, 2 are recited’ (M. W.). It is a part of the सांग्रहायणी sacrifice (but in Nyāyamālāvistara this is written सांग्रहणी),—519.

आमिन्ना, curds (formed by mixing sour milk with hot milk),—157, 448-9, 459.

“आमिन्ना पशुः”,—596.

आमिन्ना वैश्यस्य (व्रतं)” (T. S. 6. 2. 5. 3),—495, 623.

“आयुर्दा अग्ने आयुर्मे देहि” (T. S. 1. 5. 5. 3),—418.

आराच्छिष्टधर्मवत्, — 380.

आरावुपकारक, —117, 140, 141.

आरुणिन्याय, 215, 451. See J.R.A.S. for 1914, p. 299.

आरे भग्ने इन्द्रबाहुर्वद्धव्यः (When a spoke is broken, a flag is to be hoisted. So Kunte),—643.

“आर्त्तं वा एते संवत्सरस्याभिदीक्षन्ते” (T. S. 7. 4. 8. 1),—715.

आर्यावर्तनिवासिन्, —172; 173.

आर्यावर्तनिवासिभ्यः प्रमाणमितरेभ्य आचारेभ्यः, —175 (Āpast. Śrauta xxiv. 5. 2. 7).

“आर्वेयं वृणति etc.”,—629, 775.

आलेखन, N. of an ācārya, 708.

“आवपनं वा उत्तमा चितिः,” 574.

“आशास्तेऽयं यजमान etc” (T.S. 3. 5. 10. 4),—639.

आशिरवत् (आशिरं=सोमसंस्कारार्थं दधि, footnote by editor), —727.

आश्रमरथ्य, N. of an ācārya,—707.

आश्रयिन्, having support—defendant,—447.

“आश्ववालः प्रस्तरः etc” (T.S. 6. 2. 1. 5),—486.

“आश्विनं गृहं गृहीत्वा etc” (Cf. Śatap. 4. 2. 5. 12),—374, 378, 527.

“आश्विनो दशमो गृह्यते”,—542, 586.

- उज्जिति, N. of mantras beginning with the words अग्निरेकाक्षरेण etc. in V.S. ix. 31,—419.
- “उज्जिती र्यजमानं वाचयति” (Śat v. 2. 2. 16, and note),—419.
- “उत यत्सुन्वन्ति सामिधेनीस्तन्वाहुः”,—393.
- उत्कर्ष, omission, putting off (नियतानामनुत्कर्षः sūtras 6. 5. 38, 39),—716.
- उत्तरार्धात्स्विष्टकृते समवद्यति” (Cf. T.S. 2. 6. 6. 5),—342, 348, 454.
- “उत्तरेऽग्नौ पयोग्रहान् जुहति etc.”—347. See J.R.A.S. for 1914, pp. 300 and 733.
- “उत्ताना वै देवगवा वहन्ति”, ‘the cows of the gods walk on their backs’ [Jhā’s transn. in *Tantravārtika*, pp. 325-8. The sūtra is *Apast. Śrauta*, xi 7. 6. which reads हि instead of वै],—78.
- “उत्तिष्ठन्वाह अग्नीदग्नीन्विहर” (T.S. vi. 3. 1. 2),—251.
- उत्सर्ग, ‘throwing into the sacrificial fire,—396 ; presentation (to a god etc.),—703, 719, 774.
- उत्सूत्रिक (“उत्सूत्रिका पक्षव्यावृत्तिः”) = ‘Not contained in’, or, ‘apart from, the sūtra’, (?),—776 [See Kielhorn’s explanation of the उत्सूत्र of *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol I, p. 12, in his article on Māgha ii 112 in *J.R.A.S.* 1908, p. 499. The word recurs, too, in Vācaspatimiśra’s *ṭikā* on *Yogabhāṣya* iv. 15 and in *Bhāmati* 2. 2. 171 and *Tattvadīpana*],—325.
- उदमेघ, N. of a man (*Kāśikā* 6. 3. 7),—172, 352.
- उदवसानीयेष्टि, a completing oblation consisting of a cake baked on five pans and offered to Agni (Śatap. iv. 5. 1. 13, and footnote) ,—718.
- उदितहोम, an offering made after sunrise [Ait. Brāh. v. 30, 31 (Vol. 3, pp. 182, 191)],—198, 203—4, 554.
- “उद्गाता आत्मने वा यजमानाय वा यं कामं कामयते etc”,—417.
- “उद्गातारो नापव्याहरेयुः etc.”—353.
- “उद्गीथ उद्गातृणां etc.”,—407.
- उद्भिद्, N. of a sacrifice,—85-87.

उद्धृषभयज्ञ [ज्येष्ठमासस्य पौर्णमास्यां बलीवर्दानभ्यर्च्य धावयन्ति ।
सोऽयमुद्धृषभयज्ञः ॥ Mādhava on 1. 3. 15 to 23],—73, 74.

“उपक्रमप्रभृति अपवर्गपर्यन्तमाह”,—640, 665.

उपक्रान्तस्य समापनं कर्तव्यम्, holds good even in the case of
काम्येष्टि,—640, 641.

उपग, an assistant singer,—401.

उपग्रेह (?),—639.

उपदंशन and उपदंशित, apparently used in the sense of
‘indication’ and ‘indicated’,—a sense which it seems
impossible to derive from दंश् । The dhātupāṭha gives a
root दंश्, meaning ‘to speak’ (भाषार्थः) and ‘to shine’
(भासार्यः), and Monier Williams gives also the meaning ‘to
show’ as derived from a prākṛta word. Śābara has clearly
used the word in this last sense.

“उपनयंस्तिष्ठमिर्जुहुयात्”,—765.

उपभृत्, one of the 3 sacrificial spoons—460, 564.

उपमान, defined—10.

उपरवाः, four ‘sounding-holes’ over which the soma is pressed,
so called from their increasing the sound of the pressing
stones. [See Śatap. 3. 5. 4, T.S. 1. 3. 2, with com. and
Āpastamba Śrauta XI. 11. 1 etc],—427.

उपवर्ष, an ancient commentator,—13.

उपवेश, a ‘shovelling-stick’, a shovel,—(see Śatap. 1. 2. 1. 3
and note),—473, 699.

“उपव्ययते देवलक्ष्ममेव तत्कुस्ते” (T.S. 5. 11. 1),—234.

उपशय, one of the 11 sacrificial posts,—(T.S. 6. 6. 4. 4; for
the number eleven see Śatap. iii. 7.1.22 and iii. 7.2.1.)—94.

उपसदिष्टि The upasadiṣṭis consist of 3 offerings of ghee to
Agni, Soma, and Viṣṇu, and are performed daily for
3 days ordinarily, but sometimes for 6 or even 12 [Śatap.
3. 4. 4: and see my note in J.R.A.S. for 1912, p. 745],—
518, 559.

- “उपस्तृणात्याज्यं हिरण्यशकलं etc” (cf. Ait. Br. ii. 14),—458.
- उपस्था (आत्मनेपद), ‘to worship’ [“इन्द्र उपस्थातव्यः”, “इन्द्रमु-
पतिष्ठेत”, “उपस्थेयमेदात्”, “गार्हपत्ये उपस्थीयमाने”],—
287.
- उपस्थान, ‘worship’,—418.
- “उपह्वयोऽनिरुक्तः etc”,—200, 206.
- “उपहृत उपह्वयस्व”, thou who art invited (to drink) invite
thou,—358.
- उपहोमाः,—565.
- उपांशु, in a low tone,—430.
- उपांशुयाज, ‘a low-voiced oblation’—at which the prayers are
uttered in a low tone [Eggeling on Śatap. 1. 7. 2. 8, and
2. 4. 3. 8.],—89, 144, 342—3, 547, 705.
- उपाकरण, the bringing in and preparing of an animal for
sacrifice [see Kunte on 3. 6. 18. and Jhā, p. 291],—375.
- उपाधि, 502—3.
- उपाय (= उपनयन) in sutra 6. 2. 22 (p. 647).
- ‘उपास्मै गायता नरः’ (R. V. ix. 11. 1),—299.
- “उपोप्तेऽन्यग्रहाः साद्यन्ते” (T.S. 6. 5. 2. 2) (उपवप् to fill up
with earth),—378.
- उभयतोदन्त, having teeth on both jaws [See Śatap. 1. 6. 3. 31
and उभयादन्त in Vedic Index where it is rendered ‘having
incisors in both jaws’],—744.
- उभयमिह चोदनया लक्ष्यते अर्थान्तर्यञ्च (quoted in Nyāyamañjarī
p. 268),—5.
- उभाभ्यां बाहुभ्यामिषूनस्यति नच यौगपद्येन । यदा दक्षिणेनास्यति
तदा सव्येन धनुःपृष्ठं नमयति एवं यदा पुरुषप्राधान्यं तदा
यागस्य फलस्य वा गुणभावो गम्यते,—637.
- “उल्मुकैर्ह स्म पूर्वे etc”,—127, 753. Āpast. Śrauta xix, 27. 17.
- “उष्णिक्कुसौ धार्ये”,—570.
- ऊर्ध्वपात्र (यज्ञपात्रे उलूखलादौ, so Vācaspatyam. See-Yājñi :
Smṛti i. 182),—152.

“ऊषपुटरैपयन्ति (वाजपेये) [Cf Satapatha v. 2. 1. 16 when we find अथैननूषपुटरैरनूदस्यन्ति which Sayana explains thus :— “ऊषपुटैः । ऊषक्षेत्रपांसव ऊषाः तानश्वत्थपत्रैः पुटीकृत्य तैः पुटैर्यूपेऽवस्थितं यजमानमभिलक्ष्योदस्यन्ति ऊर्ध्वान् प्रतिदिशं प्रक्षिपेयुः” । Eggeling renders it ‘bags of salt,’ and they are *thrown up* to the sacrificer who, with his wife, is mounted on a ladder placed against the यूप. See, too, Vedic Index, S. V. ऊष],—411.

ऊह, ‘modification’,—change made in a mantra etc. when transferred from an original (प्रकृति) to a modified (विकृति) sacrifice,—128.

ऋक् comprises mantras divided into metrical feet [यत्र पादकृता व्यवस्था स मन्त्र ऋग्नामा’],—128.

“ऋग्भिः प्रातर्दिवि देव ईयते etc” (T.B. iii. 2. 9. 1),—279.

ऋजीष, the soma plant after the juice has been extracted, —489. [Egg: in Sat. iv. 4. 5. 3 renders it soma-husks]

ऋणत्रय of the 3 highest castes (T.S. 6. 3. 10. 5),—651.

ऋतव्याः, a particular kind of bricks (T.S. 5. 3. 1. 1),—542.

“ऋत्विग्भ्यो दक्षिणां ददाति ”,—404.

ऋत्विज् (ऋतौ यजन्ति ते ऋत्विजः) (See Vedic Index),—402-3.

“ऋद्धिकामा उपेयुः ”,—634.

“ऋषयोऽपि पदार्थानां नान्तं यान्ति पृथक्त्वशः”,—125.

“एकं वृणीते द्वौ वृणीते etc” (Āpast Śr. 24. 5. 7),—629, 775.

एकदेशत्व, the being apart of a whole and representing it (e. g. जाघनी, the tail of an animal, in Satap. iii. 8. 5. 6, stands for the whole animal),—299.

एकपात्र, having one and the same cup (from which to drink soma),—359-60.

“एकयूपे एकादशपशवो नियोज्याः ”,—528.

एकवाक्यत्व,—131-3.

एकवाक्यभाव,—438.

“एकविंशतिमनुब्रूयात् प्रतिष्ठाकामस्य” (T.S. 2. 5. 10. 2),—570.

“एकविंशेनातिरात्रेण प्रजाकामं याजयेयुः” (Cf. T.B. 2. 2. 4. 7),—544, 571.

“एकस्मै वा अन्या इष्टयः कामायाह्रियन्ते”,—504.

“एकादशप्रयाजान्यजति” (T.S. 6. 3. 7. 5),—568.

“एकादशानुयाजान्यजति” (T.S. 6. 3. 4. 6),—568.

“एका दीक्षा तिस्र उपसदः etc.”,—712.

“एका देया षड्देया, etc.”,—751.

“एकाष्टकायां क्रयः सम्पद्यते” (T.S. vii. 4. 8. 2),—714.

“एकाष्टकायां दीक्षेरन् etc.” (T.S. 7. 4. 8. 2),—714.

“एको मम” ‘one for me’ (Sat. 1. 5. 4. 12),—540.

“एतद्वै देवानां रूपं यदुदगयनं etc.”,—770.

“एतद्वै दैव्यं मधु यदधृतम्”,—79.

“एतया निषादस्थर्पति याजयेत्”,—632, 768. Āpast. Sr. ix. 14. 12.

“एतया पुनराधेयसंमितया इष्टया etc.”,—718.

“एतस्माद्यज्ञादन्ये यज्ञक्रतवो विह्रियन्ते”,—583.

“एतावता वाव ऋत्विज आनेया अपि वा सर्वस्वेन”,—750.

“एतावता हैनसाऽयुक्तो भवति” 439—40, 646.

“एतावता हैनसाऽवियुक्तो भवति”,—328.

“एते असृग्रामिन्दवः etc.” (R.V. ix. 62. 1),—297—8, 636, 640.

“एतेन राजपुरोहितौ सायुज्यकामौ यजेयाताम्” (Cf. Tāṇḍya Br. xix. 17. 4),—298, 615, 730.

“एवमसौ तस्मै त्रैवर्णिकायोपनतः etc.” said of the Śūdra: उपनत = ‘Surrendered,’ ‘allotted to’),—746.

“एष वाव प्रथमो यज्ञो यज्ञानां यज्ज्योतिष्टोमः”,—199, 304, 581.

“एष वै देवरथः etc.” (T. S. 2. 5. 6. 1),—511, 588.

“एष वै हविषा हविर्यजते etc.” (T. S. 3. 3. 4. 2),—188, 573.

Āpast. Śrauta xiv. 13. 2.

“एषा वा अनाहिताग्नेरिष्टिर्यच्चतुर्होतारः”,—762—5.

ऐडप्राशिन्नसौविष्ट्रदादीनि,—338.

पेतिशायनाऽऽचार्य,—327, 607. [cf. the पेतशायन of Ait. Bv. vi. 33, and see Vedic Index].

पेदमर्थ्य (in sūtra),—85.

पेन्द्रं दध्यमावास्यायाम्” (T.S. 2. 5. 4. 1),—377.

“पेन्द्रं पयोऽमावास्यायाम्”,—377.

पेन्द्रवायवग्रह (Satap. iv. 1. 3, and iv. 1. 5. 19),—348, 378.

The same with प्रजाकामः (T.S. 2. 2. 1. 1),—191, 500, 656.

“पेन्द्राग्नमेकादशकपालं निर्वपेत्” (T.S. 2. 2. 1. 2),—256, 580. 595.

पेन्द्राग्नमृतुपात्रेण गृह्णाति” (T.S. 6. 5. 4. 1),—275.

पेन्द्रीन्याय,—240.

“पेन्द्रा गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठते” (T. S. 1. 5. 8. 3),—284.

“पेभिरग्ने सरथं etc.” (R. V: 3. 6. 9),—271.

औत्पत्तिक original, eternal, constant, 7,—649.

औद्गात्र (the chapter relating to udgātr priest and which contains directions for the श्येन sacrifice),—410.

औदुम्बर्याः सर्ववेष्टनं (The covering of the whole of the sacrificial post with cloth, as enjoined in *smṛti*, clashes with vedic direction which directs the mere *touching* of the post. (See p. 143 of transn. of Tantravārtika),—66, 68.

औपवसथ्येऽहनि, ‘on the day preceding the soma sacrifice’ [उपवसथ = ‘a preliminary fast-day’, the day of preparation previous to a sacrifice. For a fanciful explanation of the word see Satapatha Br. 1. 1. 1. 7 and Eggeling’s note],—374, 377.

औपानुवाक्य काण्ड, the Upānuvākya section of T.S. (See Tait, Āraṇyaka 1. 22. 11, and Com.),—573, 575.

कटे भुंक्ते कांस्यपात्र्यां भुंक्ते,—107.

“कण्टकैर्वितुदन्ति”—411.

“कतमानि वा एतानि ज्योतीषि etc.” (T. B. 1. 5. 11, 1),—535.

कदर, N. of a tree that may be the substitute for खदिर,—671—2.

- “कदाचनस्तरीरसि etc.”,—285 (T.S. 1. 5. 8. 4).
 “कपालेषु पुरोडाशं श्रपयति”—452 (T. S. 2. 3. 6. 2).
 “कपालेषु श्रपयति etc.”—214.
 कपिञ्जल (see Eggeling's note on Śatap. xiii. 5. 1. 13.),—443.
 कंवलनिर्णयनवत्, (see Maxims),—160.
 करणमन्त्र is “that which regulates sacrificial operations. That which is mostly chanted in the course of a sacrificial operation is an अकर्मकरणमन्त्र” (Kunte on 3. 8. 25),—425—6.
 कर्मकर, a servant,—664—5.
 “कर्णायाम्या अवलिप्ता रौद्राः”,—445.
 (V.S. XXIV. 3).
 कर्माणि of 2 kinds, viz गुण (subsidiary) and प्रधान (primary or principal),—113, 114.
 कलज्जन्याय,—644.
 कल्पसूत्र of inferior authority to श्रुति,—72, 73.
 “कवतीषु स्तुवते etc” (Cf T.S. 7. 5. 5. 2),—122.
 कश्चिच्चक्षुष्मान् स्वयं रूपं पश्यति etc,—22.
 “काकोऽप्यागच्छन्निवार्यते” = काकदधिघातकन्याय,—246.
 काण्डक्रम = स्थानं,—537.
 काण्डानुसमयन्याय,—558.
 कास्येष्टि being unconnected with another sacrifice may be performed whenever there is a desire for the worldly advantage to be obtained by it,—430.
 कारण (sūtra 1. 4. 21), ‘instigator’ not cause. See Jhā's transn. 99.
 कारीरी, a sacrifice to produce rain,—197.
 कार्षापणे दत्ते पादोऽपि दत्तो भवति,—751.
 कार्ष्णाजिनि (in sūtras),—501, 757.
 काष्ठं दह्यमानस्य तृणस्य नोपकारे वर्तते तृणान्तु काष्ठस्योपकुर्यात्,—699.

काष्ठाहरण,—501—2.

“किं ते कृण्वन्ति काकेटेषु गावः”,—58(R.V. iii. 53. 14).

“किमत्र भद्रं तन्नौसह”,—427 (T.S. 1. 3. 2. 1.)

किमृषिणा देवदत्तपव भोजयितव्यः,—47.

कुटुरु, ‘a cock’,—207.

कुण्डपयिनामयनम्, ‘one of the great sacrifices lasting a whole year, at which the Agnihotra is to be offered for a whole month’ [Thibaut’s note on Vedānta sūtra 3. 3. 40 (p. 250), and see Tāṇḍya Br xxv. 4, and Āśvalāyana Śrauta xii. 4],—190, 422, 526.

“कुर्यात्क्रियेत कर्तव्यं भवेत्स्यादिति पञ्चमम्”, the first line of a śloka giving विधिलक्षणं (quoted in Bhāmati 3. 4. 21),—490.

For these ‘one day’ sacrifices, see Eggeling, Vol. 3, p. xii. कुलाययज्ञ, an Ekaha sacrifice at which a king and his priest may belong to different Kalpas,—297—8, 730.

कुशल, defined as cleverness in cutting कुश grass (?),—752.

“कूटं दक्षिणा” (‘कूटं हि निषादानामेवोपकारकं न आर्याणाम्’ Āpast. Śraut ix. 14. 14). Kunte reads कूटा ‘a hornless cow’, as in T. S. 1. 8. 9. 1,—633.

कूर्म (The puroḍaśa became a tortoise, and was running away! T. S. 2. 6. 3. 3.: Śatap 1. 6. 2. 3. 4),—455.

कृतभाण्डादि,—744—5.

कृत्वाचिन्ता,—126, [274], 339, 718, 774, 779.

कृष्णं, the black part of the eye,—415.

“कृष्णविषाणया कण्डूयति”,—638 (T.S. 6. 1. 3. 8).

कृष्णविषाणा, ‘the horn of a black antelope’ (used by the priest for scratching himself and finally thrown into the चात्वाल) (T. S. 6. 1. 3. 8),—478—9.

“कृष्णाजिनेन दीक्षयति” (T. S. 6. 1. 3. 2),—578.

“कृष्णा भौमाः etc.” (V.S. xxiv. 10),—445.

क्लृप्ति, N. of 6 mantras beginning with the words आयुर्यज्ञेन कल्पतां in V.S. ix. 21. (See Śatap. 5. 2. 1. 3 on which

Eggeling says—"This term, literally 'success, accomplishment', is technically used to denote the succeeding formulas containing the verb 'kṛp' 'to succeed, prosper,' 'as well as the oblation made therewith.",—419.

फलप्रीत्यजमानं वाचयति" (Sat. V. 2. 1. 3, and see above).—419.

"केशश्नश्च वपते etc." (T.S. 6. 1. 1. 2),—413, 487.

"कैकेयो यज्ञं विवित्सन्दात्भ्यमुवाच etc.",—507.

कोद्रवाः,—602.

ऋत्वर्थ, something which serves the sacrifice ऋतवे यः स ऋत्वर्थः

पुरुषाय यः सपुरुषार्थः),—435, 436.

क्रम, sequence of words in a sentence as determining its meaning,—256, 283; 284 (स्थान = क्रम).

क्रयविक्रयसंयुक्ता हि स्त्रियः, पित्रा विक्रीयन्ते भर्त्रा क्रीयन्ते,—610; but see 612.

क्रीतराजक, one who has purchased soma,—66, 68, 711. (See p. 143. of Transn. of Tantravārtika).

"क्रीते सोमे मैत्रावरुणाय दण्डं प्रयच्छति" (T.S. 6. 1. 4. 2),—478.

क्लोमन्, 'the right lung',—400.

"क्लोमा चोर्ध्वं वैकर्तनंच शमितुस्तद्वाहणाय दद्यात् etc." (Ait. Br. vii. 1),—400.

क्वचिन्मुष्करा भविष्यन्ति",—777.

क नु खलु मुशलिनो माणवका गङ्गामावतरेयुः,—479.

क्षामेष्टिन्याय,—680.

"क्षौमे वसानावग्निमादधीयाताम्",—298, 615.

III STUDIES IN HINDU LAW—

(2) ITS SOURCES.

BY GANGA NATHA JHA

We have seen in a general way how the centre of gravity of authority has been shifting from point to point. In the present chapter we shall go into fuller detail and proceed to consider (a) what are the sources of Hindu Law, according to the writers of the original authorities, and (b) also in what manner the varying and variable position in the scale of authority of each of these sources has been appraised and determined by the writers of the later digests. We shall try our best to deal with the subject chronologically; and as anything like a thorough examination of the relative antiquity of our numerous authorities will take us away from our main subject, it has been thought proper to accept their chronology as more or less determined by a consensus of opinion of writers whose word carries weight among scholars.

Jaimini, the writer of the *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra* (1. 1. 2), has emphatically declared that the Vedic Injunction is the only trustworthy source of our knowledge of Dharma, i. e. of what is *right*, i. e. what is conducive to good, temporal and spiritual (*Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* 1. 1. 2); though he knew of the later 'law-books,'—'*Smṛtis*,' and customs yet he had no hesitation in declaring that these are to be relied upon only so far as they are not repugnant to anything declared in the *Veda*.

Coming to the strictly legal writers we find—

I. *Bodhāyana* (1. 1. 1—6) naming—(a) *Veda*, (b) the *Smṛti*, and (2) '*Śiṣṭāgama*,'—the '*Āgama*,' teaching, of the '*Śiṣṭas*,' 'cultured' men;—i. e. 'those who are free from ill-

feeling, devoid of vanity, possessed of sufficient grain, not greedy, devoid of hypocrisy, haughtiness, avarice, stupidity and anger;—those who have studied, in the right manner, the Veda along with its supplements and are well versed in making deductions out of them’.

[There is no mention of ‘custom’ here at all. It is ‘scripture’ pure and simple; but no longer the Veda only, but also the *Smṛti*, and the deductions therefrom and teachings based thereupon by persons with very special qualifications.]

Parāśara 1. 20—‘at the beginning of each Kalpa, there appear Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva and also the propounders of (1) *Śruti*, (2) *Smṛti* and (3) *Sadāchāra*’.

कल्पे कल्पे क्षयोत्पत्तौ ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेश्वराः ।

श्रुतिस्मृतिसदाचारनिर्णेतारश्च सर्वदा ।

To the same end we have Āpastamba (1. 1. 2—3) declaring that the ‘convention or opinion of those versed in Dharma’ and ‘also the Veda,’ are the authority. It only means that when those learned in Dharma are agreed in regard to the righteousness of a certain course of action, that is to be accepted as authoritative.

This is made clear by Vasiṣṭha (1. 4—6)—‘In the event of the aforesaid (i. e. *Śruti* and *Smṛti*) not being available, the practice of cultured men is the authority,—the ‘cultured man’ being defined as one who is entirely unselfish, having no desires of his own.

The same opinion is expressed more definitely by Gautama (1. 1. 1—2)—‘Veda is the source of Dharma, also the *Smṛti* (Recollection) and *Śīla* of those learned in the Veda’.

[In all this ‘custom’ begins to be admitted; but only that of the ‘cultured’.]

The next step in advance is taken by Manu (2. 6)—

वेदोऽखिलो धर्ममूलं स्मृतिशीले च तद्विदाम् ।

आचारश्चैव साधूनामात्मनस्तुष्टिरेव च ॥

Also *Vyāsa*—

धर्ममूलं वेदमाहुः ग्रन्थराशिमुक्त्वा त्रिमम् ।

तद्विदं स्मृतिशीले च साध्वाचारं मनःप्रियम् ॥

By this the sources of Dharma are (1) *Veda*, (2) *Smṛti*, (3) *Sadāchāra* and (4) '*Svasya priyam*'.

[What is exactly meant by these terms we shall see later on.] The same is recapitulated in Manu (2. 12)—

वेदः स्मृतिः सदाचारः स्वस्य च प्रियमात्मनः ।

एतच्चतुर्विधं प्राहुः साक्षाद्धर्मस्य लक्षणम् ॥

This is slightly improved upon by Yājñavalkya (I. 7)—

श्रुतिः स्मृतिः सदाचारः स्वस्य च प्रियमात्मनः ।

सम्यक् सङ्कल्पजः कामो धर्ममूलमिदं स्मृतम् ॥

By which the sources of law are five-fold :—(1) *Veda*, (2) *Smṛti*, (3) *Sadāchāra*, (4) *Svasya priyam* and (5) *Samyak-saṅkalpaja Kāma*. [For the exact signification of these, see below].

Thus the sources of Law are (1) '*Śruti*', (2) '*Smṛti*' (3) '*Sadāchāra*';—'practices of the good' (with regard to these there is unanimity among all old authorities), (4) '*Svasya priyam*' or '*ātmanastuṣṭih*', 'self-satisfaction'—In regard to the fourth also Manu and Yājñavalkya are agreed. In Manu however we find one thing more, which is not found in Yājñavalkya—viz '*Śīla*'; and Yājñavalkya speaks of '*Samyakasaṅkalpajah kāmah*', which is not found in Manu. Viramitrodaya on Yājña° has identified these two.

We shall see now what these terms mean according to the Commentators and the more important Digest-writers.

(A) ŚRUTI.

Medhātithi on Manu (2.6,—The word . 'Veda' stands for the Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda or Atharva Veda, along with their respective Brāhmaṇas. There are 21 Recensions of the Ṛgveda, 100 of the Yajurveda, 1,000 of the Sāmaveda and 9 of the Atharvaveda. The Vedic character of the Atharva cannot be denied, because, like the other Vedas, this also is not the work of a human author, it helps to make known man's duties, it is free from mistakes; it prescribes the Jyotiṣtoma and such other rites exactly in the same manner as the other Vedas do. [This is denied by Viramitrodaya on Yājñavalkya; see below]. Though there are certain texts that forbid the study of the Atharva veda, yet all that this means is that one should not confuse the teachings of the Vedas with those of the Atharva; for instance, at the performance of rites in accordance with the three other Vedas, one should not use Mantras of the Atharva Veda.

This 'Veda' is the 'root' i.e. cause, of dharma, in the sense that it *makes it known*, and it does this by means chiefly of such passages in the *Brāhmaṇas* as contain injunctive expressions; sometimes also by means of *Mantras*. And the other parts of the Veda—the *Arthavāda* or Declamatory Passages—have their use in eulogising what is enjoined by the corresponding injunction, Mantras and names help in indicating the details of the acts prescribed.

Sarvajñanārāyaṇa on Manu 26: When Manu speaks of the 'entire Veda,' he means to include the *Arthavādas*, commendatory and condemnatory exaggerations, also.

Kullūka on Manu 26: 'Veda' stands for the Ṛk, Yajus, Sāman and Atharvan; the whole of this, including the injunctions, Mantras and *Arthavādas*, the last also serving the purpose

of helping the injunction by persuasion. Both Mantras and Arthavādas serve the useful purpose not only of persuasion, but also of reminding the agent of the details of the action undertaken. The authority of Śruti and the rest also rests upon the fact of their having their source in the Veda.

Rāghavānanda on Manu 2.6, Rk. Yajus, Saman & Atharvan are the authority for Dharma.

Viśvarūpa on Yājñā : 1. 3-7. 'Śruti' is to be taken, not in the strictly limited sense of the 'Mantra and Brāhmaṇa texts', but for all the fourteen 'Sciences'—the Four Vedas, their six 'subsidiaries' or 'limbs', Purāṇa, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, the Dharmaśāstra.

Mitākṣarā on Yājñā 1.7 :— 'Śruti' is Veda.

(1) *Aparārka on Yājñā. 1.7:*

'Śruti' is *Veda*—(*Aparārka on Yājñā. 1.7*);—it is the only determining factor in all matters relating to the Agnihotra and other rites. As Vyāsa says, this is the only *pure* authority, (i. e. entirely trustworthy, all the rest being 'adulterated', i. e. of doubtful authority;—that law is the highest which is learnt from the Veda, what is propounded in the Purāṇas and other works being of a lower grade.

Says Manu—'The Veda embodies all knowledge' (2.7);—'The learned man should enter upon his own duties, resting upon the authority of the 'Revealed Word' (2.8);—'The Veda should be known as the Revealed Word, Śruti' (2.10).

Viramitrodaya-Tīkā on Yājñā. 1-7: 'Śruti' is *Veda*—as Manu (2.10). It is the sole authority in regard to *Agnihotra* and such rites.

Viramitrodaya Paribhāṣa p p. 8-25: This stands for 'Veda', which, according to Āpastamba's definition, is

as Bodhāyana, Āśvalāyana, and Āpastamba, and also the 'authors' of the Mimāṃsāsūtras, Jaimini and the rest.

Nṛsiṃhaprasāda-Saṃskāra-Sāra Ms : The Veda is the main authority for Dharma. Any inconsistencies that may be found in it can be easily explained away. This authority belongs not only to the Injunctions, but also to Mantras, names and declamatory passages.

Smṛtichandrikā (P. 3): The Veda is authoritative as it is independent of human authorship.

(B) SMṚTI.

Medhātithi on Manu 2.6.:—'Smṛti' is Recollection and 'Śīla' denotes freedom from love, hatred and such improper feelings, this latter according to some proper regard to Medhātithi, is a means of *accomplishing Dharma* and not a means of *knowing it*; and it has been separately mentioned in the present connection only with a view to emphasise its importance. Not satisfied with this, he has taken the two terms 'Smṛti' and 'Śīla' in the compound as inter-related; and as together standing for a single *means of knowing Dharma*, in the shape of 'Recollection during that state of the mind when it is calm, free from all disturbing influences of love, hatred and so forth',—i. e. 'Conscientious Recollection'. The authority of 'Smṛti' thus becomes qualified. Even though a certain writer may be a *Ṛṣi* versed in Veda, yet if his 'recollection' and its compilation comes about at a time when his mind was perturbed by discordant feelings, much trust cannot be placed upon such 'Recollection.' This again has to be taken along with 'Sādhunām'; so that we have a threefold condition for the trustworthiness of a writer of Smṛti,—(1) he must be *learned* ('*tadvyidām*'), (2) he must be 'conscientious', 'free from love and hatred' ('*Śīla*'), and (3) he must be 'righteous' ('*Sādhunām*'), be habitually engaged in carrying out the injunctions of the Veda. The upshot of

the whole is that when a person is found to be recognised and spoken of by all wise and learned persons as endowed with the said three qualifications—and a certain compilation is also recognised as made by that person,—the word of such a person as found in his recognised work, should be recognised as an authoritative exponent of Dharma. So that even at the present day if there were such a person and he were to compose a work, then for all later generations that work would be regarded just as highly as those of Manu and others. This is the reason why Medhatithi is averse to the practice of enumerating the authoritative 'Smṛtis'. (Trans. P. 204).

Sarvajña Nārāyaṇa on Manu 2.6: In cases where no Vedic texts are available, the law can be determined with the help of the *Smṛti* of persons learned in the Veda—the term '*Smṛti*' standing for the reflections over a certain subject, as also the treatises embodying those reflections.

Kullūka on Manu 2.6: The *Smṛti* of '*persons learned in the Veda*' is authoritative,—this last qualifications being added for the purpose of indicating that the authority of *Smṛti* is due to its having its source in the Veda.

Rāghavānanda on Manu 2.6: This stands for the work of Manu and others. It stands here for only such *Smṛti* as is not incompatible with the Veda. All the rest are to be rejected whenever they are found to be repugnant to any direct text of the Veda. But where there is no such repugnance, we are justified in assuming that the *Smṛti* must be based upon a Vedic text now lost to us; and it is on this assumption that its trustworthiness rests.

Nandana on Manu 2. 6. The '*Smṛti of men learned in the Veda*'. This stands for *Smṛtis*, *Purāṇas* and *Itihāsas*.

Viśvarūpa on Yājñia 1.7: '*Smṛti*' and '*Dharmaśāstra*' are synonymous terms.—“How do we know that the *Smṛtis* are

all based upon the *Veda*, from which they derive their authority? Certainly we do not find Vedic texts in support of everything that is ordained in the *Smṛtis*. As for the Vedic texts that are found to support some *Smṛti* assertions, such support is found also in the case of the heterodox scriptures."—The simple answer to this question is that in the face of the direct assertion of Manu and other *Smṛti*-writers that their work is 'based on the *Veda*', we have no justification for thinking otherwise. They being great Vedic scholars, could not have lied on this point. As a matter of fact also we find that every one of the injunctions contained in the *Smṛtis* has its source in the *Veda*; in some cases the connection is *direct*, in others *indirect*; for instance we have the single Vedic injunction 'one should study the *Veda*'; now studying is not possible without *teaching*, hence the injunction of teaching is implied by the former;—the *teaching* cannot be done without some one to teach;—this implies the receiving and initiating of a pupil;—this implies the necessity of having children,—this again that of *marrying* and so on; most of the other injunctions may have their source traced in the single Vedic text.

(1) *Apārarka* on *Yājñ* 1-7: '*Smṛti*' is that ordinance which, in matters relating to *Dharma*, has its source in the *Veda*;—its authority is 'adulterated', i. e., not so absolute as that of *Śruti*;—it supplies us with information regarding the duties of all castes and the four life-stages;—one should carefully do all that has been ordained, *Smṛtam*, by persons most learned in the *Veda* and eschew what is forbidden by them. [This writer like Kumārila makes a distinction between '*Smṛti*' and '*Purāṇa*.']—There are chances of our going astray in the matter of interpreting a Vedic text and learning the law from it; but there is no fear of any such mistake being committed by the *Smṛti*-writers who are thoroughly well-versed in the Vedic lore. [From this it would seem that this writer flourished

during the transition period, when the centre of gravity was beginning to shift from the Veda towards the Smṛti.]

Mitākṣarā on Yājñā 1-7: 'Smṛti' is Dharmaśāstra.

Vīramitrodaya on Yājñā 1-7: 'Smṛti' is 'Dharmaśāstra'—'Legal Ordinances';—(Manu 2-10);—it is the sole authority regarding the *Aṣṭaka* and such rites.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā—pp. 8-25: 'Of persons learned in the Veda';—this has been added with a view to make clear that the authority of the Smṛtis does not rest upon themselves, it is derived entirely from the fact of their having their source in the Veda. The name 'Smṛti' stands for the legal ordinances, 'Dharmaśāstra', compiled by Yājñavalkya and others.

Madanapārijāta, p. 11: Manu is the most important of the expounders of law. Among others, some are mentioned by Yājñavalkya (see above). But this list is not exhaustive. Though all these 'expounders' do not always agree, yet, on the main principles they are all agreed; and the differences, if any, are confined to minor points; and these latter discrepancies can always be explained.

Nṛsiṃhaprasāda-Saṃskāra MSS: "How can any authority attach to the Smṛtis of Manu and others, which being of human origin are open to the suspicion of the possibility of all those defects to which human writers are liable; and for this reason these cannot be regarded as authoritative in the same manner as the Vedas are, whose authority is above suspicion".—The answer to this is that in as much as these Smṛtis are found to be mere reproductions of what is contained in the Veda, they must be regarded as duly authoritative. The very name 'Smṛti', 'Recollection', implies that they only reproduce what the authors have learnt elsewhere; and as Manu and others are known to have been

learned in the Veda it stands to reason that knowing as they did that the Veda was the sole authority on Dharma, when they proceeded to note down for the benefit of others what the laws were that regulated *Dharma*, they could not but have drawn upon the Veda. It is true that they are found to contain many rules that we cannot trace to the Veda as known to us; but if they were mere reproductions of whatever is found in the Veda, no one would care for them. So we are led to the inference that as on most of the points dealt with by them, their assertions are found to be based on the Vedic texts, the other points also must have had their source in the Veda; but in those Vedic texts that have become lost to us. We have the Veda itself testifying to the trustworthy character of at least one Smṛti-writer, Manu;—‘Whatever Manu has said is wholesome.’

Smṛtichandrikā pp. 1 *et seq.*—The ordinances composed by Manu and other writers, being based on the Veda, are our sole authority on Dharma. That the Smṛtis have their source in the Veda is deduced from the fact that they only expound what is contained in the Veda. Says Bhṛgu—‘Whatever Dharma has been expounded by Manu has all been set forth in the Veda’. Śaṅkara also says that ‘the Smṛtis have their source in the Veda’. But this refers to only what the Smṛti says regarding spiritual matters, and not to what they lay down regarding temporal matters; as is distinctly declared in the Purāṇa—‘All these (smṛtis) have their source in the Veda—save those portions that deal with visible (temporal) matters’.

Question—“When the Smṛti itself only expounds whatever is already set forth in the Veda and is on that account, based upon the Veda, then the Veda itself being sufficient for all purposes, what is the use of the Smṛti or *Dharmaśāstra*?”—The Smṛti Chandrikā quotes Marichi as

giving the answer to this question—‘The requisite texts of the Veda are difficult to understand and are scattered about in various places ; and all these are collected and explained by the Smṛtis.’

The Purāṇas are also included under Smṛti, as the Veda itself names ‘Itihāsa-Purāṇa’ along with ‘the four Vedas’. Viṣṇu also places the Purāṇas on the same footing as ‘Manusmṛti’, ‘Veda and its subsidiary sciences’, ‘Science of Healing.’

This establishes the authority of the authors of the Grhyasūtras also ; since all that these do is to lay down practical manuals setting forth the details of the various rites along with the necessary mantras belonging to that individual Vedic recitation to which the manual is inferred to appertain. As says Devala—‘Manu and others are the expounders of the Law ; the authors of the Grhyas are the expounders of the practical application of Law.’

Sanskāra Mayūkha P. 2

The Smṛti includes the *Āyurveda* Smṛtis also, and also Purāṇa, also the astronomical ‘Saṃhitās,’ compilations of Varāha Mihira and others ; as also the Saṃhitā texts which are included in the Skandapurāṇa.

Now we have got to determine what works are entitled to be classed under ‘Smṛti’ or ‘*Dharma Śāstra*’, which latter is what is meant by ‘Smṛti.’

The original Smṛti writers are thus enumerated by Yājñavalkya (1.4-5)—(1) Manu, (2) Viṣṇu, (3) Yama, (4) Aṅgiras, (5) Vaśiṣṭha, (6) Dakṣa, (7) Saṃvarta, (8) Śātātapa, (9) Parāśara, (10) Apastamba, (11) Uśanas, (12) Vyāsa, (13) Kātyāyana, (14) Bṛhaspati, (15) Gautama, (16) Śaṅkha-Likhita, (17) Hārta, (18) Atri, and (19) Yājñavalkya himself.

The following is from Parāśara (Āchāra 12-15), where Vyāsa relates to his father the Smṛtis he has already learnt.

Kālikā, (13) Māheśvara, (14) Śāmba, (15) Saura, (16) Parāśara, (17) Mārīcha, and (18) Bhārgava.

In place of 'Nānda', the *Brahmavaivarta* has *Vāsiṣṭha-Laiṅga*.

The *Saṃskāramayūkha* also reproduces the lists of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (for *Purāṇas*) and of *Kūrmapurāṇa* (for *Upapurāṇas*).

Vīramitrodaya Paribhāṣā, pp. 10-24.

The knowledge of 'Veda' implies also the knowledge of certain other branches of study, which is essential to the proper understanding of the Veda. These have been thus enumerated by Yājñavalkya—'There are fourteen departments of knowledge and of Dharma. The four (1-4) Vedas along with (5) *Purāṇas*, (6) *Nyāya*, (7) *Mīmāṃsā*, (8) *Dharma Śāstra*, (9-14) the six 'Limbs' or subsidiary sciences of the Veda'.

Here 'Nyāya' stands for the system propounded by Gautama and others, dealing with such subjects as the means of knowledge and so forth;—'*Mīmāṃsā* for the system of interpretation propounded by Jaimini and that of philosophy propounded by Bādarāyaṇa; '*Dharma Śāstra*' for the ordinances of Manu and others; and 'Limbs of the Veda' for (a) Phonetics, (b) Rituals, (c) Grammar, (d) Etymology, (e) Prosody and (f) Astronomy.

There is a diversity of opinion regarding the lists of recognised '*Purāṇas*' and '*Dharma Śāstras*', as shown above.

Smṛtichandrikā, p. 5.

'*Purāṇa*'—the Brahma and the rest;—'*Nyāya*'—Reasoning; '*Mīmāṃsā*', discussion relating to the exact meaning of Vedic passages;—'*Dharma Śāstra*', the *smṛtis* of Manu and others; and the four Vedas with the six 'subsidiary sciences' are the 'means' of knowing Dharma; and also of *Dharma* itself, through that knowledge.

(C) SADĀCHĀRA.

Medhātithi on Manu 2-6

‘Sādhūmām āchārah’, ‘Practice of good men’ also has to be construed with ‘Vedavidām’, ‘learned in the Veda’, and the two qualifications ‘Goodness’ and ‘Vedic learning’, come under ‘culture’. When in regard to any action, there are no Vedic or Smṛti declarations available, but cultured people are found to do it as ‘Dharma’, something *right*—then that action is to be regarded as ‘enjoined in the Veda’ in the same manner as any thing laid down in the Smṛti.—What are meant by ‘practices’ here are such customs as the tying of the bracelet during marriage, the keeping of an exact number of hairlocks on the head, the exact manner of receiving guests and so forth.—Each of such practices has to be taken on its own merits ; it is not possible to assume Vedic texts corroborating those either severally or even collectively ; as the rightness or wrongness of a certain practice varies with circumstances, e.g. a certain cultured man may be very assiduous in attending upon his guests—never leaving them for a single moment unattended, and so forth. This may be quite agreeable to one guest who likes constant attendance ; but there may be another to whom all this close attendance is disagreeable ; he would prefer much rather to be left alone to himself. There is no such variation possible in regard to what is prescribed in the Smṛti ; and herein lies the difference between what is prescribed in the ‘Smṛti’ and what can be learnt from the ‘Practices of the cultured’.

Sarvajñanārāyaṇa on Manu 2-6.

In cases where we find no guidance either from Vedic texts or Smṛti or the *Sīla* of learned men, we have to be guided by the ‘Āchāra’, Practice, of ‘Sādhus’, persons engaged in the performance of acts in accordance with the Veda.

‘Āchāra’ really stands for the recalling and practising of what has been done by the good men of the past i. e. *Usage* or *Custom*.—This is regarded as inferior to ‘*Śīla*’ on account of the possibility of suspicion regarding the correctness of tradition upon which it is based.

Kullūka on Manu 2-6.

‘Āchāra’ stands for the *practice* of dressing oneself in blankets or tree-bark and so forth. ‘*Sādhūnām*’, of the Good i. e. of righteous persons.

Rāghavānanda on Manu 2-6.

Such practice as binding of the bracelet during marriage and so forth, which is current among ‘*Sādhus*’, i. e. people free from ill feeling.

Nandana on Manu 2-6.

Nandana takes ‘Āchāra’ by itself and offering no remarks about it, and construes ‘*Sādhūnām*’ with ‘*Atmanastuṣṭi*’.

Viśvarūpa on Yājñā 1-7.

‘*Sādāchāra*’ stands for those *religious* or *spiritual* (as distinguished from temporal or worldly) acts that are done by such men as are free from selfishness and devoid of hypocrisy and other defects.—This is mentioned apart from ‘*Smṛti*’, (1) because there is no compilation of the said practices, as there is of the ordinances; and (2) the trustworthiness of *practices* is doubtful, which is not the case with *Smṛti*.

Aparārka on Yājñā. 1-7.

‘*Sādāchāra*’ is the practice of *cultured* people, i. e. such people as are free from ill-will, vanity, possessed of sufficient fund (i. e. not in want of living), not greedy, free from hypocrisy, haughtiness, avarice, stupidity and anger; those who have studied the Veda and its supplements in the right manner, and are expert in making deductions there-

from (Bodhāyana),—the supplements being the Itihāsas, Purāṇas, and also Grammar and the other subsidiary sciences; 'those expert in making deductions therefrom' are those versed in the Smṛtis,—the latter being regarded as *indicative* of the Veda. When the texts speak of '*Sadāchāra*' as an authority what they refer to is the fact that the customs obtaining in *Brahmāvarta* and other civilised land are all based on the Veda (and not that custom *qua* custom is to be accepted as in itself authoritative); any custom that is repugnant to any clear text of the Veda is to be rejected. Vaśiṣṭha's declaration that 'all the customs current in *Āryāvarta* are authority' means that *most* of them are so; as is clear from another declaration of Vaśiṣṭha that customs of the cultured are to be accepted as authority only on points where no Veda or Smṛti texts are available.

Mitākṣarā on Yājñna. 1-7.

'*Sadāchāra*'—practice of the *cultured*, not of the *uncultured*.

Vīramitrodaya on Yājñna. 1-7.

'*Sadāchāra*' is thus defined in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*: 'Good men, free from all defects, are called *Sat*, and their practice, *Ācharaṇa*, is what is called '*Sadāchāra*'. It is the sole authority in regard to the *Holākā* and such observances.

Vīramitrodaya Paribhāṣā pp. 8-29.

Gautama declares that such local, tribal and family customs as are repugnant to the scriptures are not authoritative;—'Scripture' here stands for '*Veda, Smṛti and Purāṇa*'. This *Āchāra* stands for positive virtues, as distinguished from '*Śīla*', which stands for the negative ones.—If we connect '*Sādhunām*' with *āchārah*', then the meaning comes to be that the practices of even those not learned in the Veda are to be accepted as authority, when these are men free from all weaknesses and defects; it is in this sense that in the

case of *Sūdras*, the practices of one's ancestors become an authoritative source of knowledge of *Dharma*.

Parāśara Mādhava p. 100.

'Sadāchāra'—e. g. Holākā, Udvr̥ṣabha.—Those who expound' or 'determine' these are the elders of each family or tribe.

Madana Pārijāta pp.11-12.

Dharma depends upon 'Āchāra'.—[But this term is used here in a very wide sense, being defined as]—'Āchāra is the name of that course of conduct which is enjoined in Śruti and Smṛti and which is prescribed by the Good'.—This āchāra is to be learnt from persons born in Madhyadeśa and other countries:—(a) The tract of land between Sarasvatī and Dṛśadvatī—Brahmāvarta; (b) between Himālaya and Vindhya and between Gaṅgā and Yamunā, West of Prayāga—Madhyadeśa ;—(c) between Himālaya and Vindhya and the Eastern and Western Oceans—Āryāvarta.

Nṛsiṃhaprasāda—Saṃskāra.

"It is difficult to believe that the endless practices or customs that have grown, and are still growing up from time to time, should be all based upon Vedic texts. Even Manu's declaration cannot be taken as testifying to the authority of each and every custom. For if their authority rested upon the trustworthy character of the 'cultured' persons among whom it is current, then there would be an interdependence; the people would be 'cultured' because they follow those practices and the practices would be authoritative because they are followed by those persons. Further, customs and practices are found to vary in different parts of the country; and certainly all of these cannot be authoritative."

It is not each and every practice of the 'cultured' that we regard as authoritative; that alone can be regarded as a

trustworthy guide which is done by the cultured people as 'Dharma', that which they do knowing it to be 'righteous'.

And certainly the many misdeeds of well known great men that are cited could not have been done by them as 'dhorma'; and when the learned regard an act as 'dharma' they must do so on the strength of some Vedic text known to them; hence these Practices and Customs also must be inferred to have their source in the Veda.

Smṛti Chandrikā p. 5.

'Āchāra' stands for the tying of the bracelet and such practices.

Ibid p. 6

The 'Śiṣṭas', 'cultured', are defined by Manu (12-109)—

धर्मेणाधिगतो यैस्तु वेदः सपरिवृंहणः ।

ते शिष्टा ब्राह्मणा ज्ञेयाः श्रुतिप्रत्यक्षहेतवः ॥

The परिवृंहण of the Veda being the subsidiary sciences, Itihāsa and Purāna. As says Brhaspati.—

इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपवृंहयेत् ।

[This occurs in the Mahābhārata also.]

On questions where we find no Śruti or Smṛti text we are to be guided by the words of the 'Pariṣad', 'Assembly'. Says Manu (12-108).—

अनाम्नातेष्वपि धर्मेषु कथं स्यादिति चेद् भवेत् ।

यं शिष्टा ब्राह्मणा ब्रूयुः स धर्मः स्यादशङ्कितः ॥

This 'Assembly' should consist of at least 10 'cultured' men—as declared by Gautama—

अनाम्नाते दशावरैः शिष्टैरुहवद्भिः अलुब्धैः प्रशस्तं कार्यम् ।

That is, what these people say is 'good' and should be done. Bodhāyana also prescribes the same number—

दशावरा परिषत् ।

Yājñavalkya says—

चत्वारो वेदधर्मज्ञाः पर्वत् त्रैविद्यमेव वा ।

सा ब्रूते यं स धर्म स्यादेको वाऽध्यात्मवित्तमः ॥

by which the assembly should consist either (1) of four men versed in the Veda and the Dharmaśāstra, or (2) of those men each versed in three Vedas, or (3) of only one man who is the best 'knower of the philosophy of the Self.'

Manu also (12-110 & 112) at (1) *ten* or (2) *three* of those who are fully learned in the three Vedas.

The opinion of this 'Assembly' is as authoritative as the Veda itself,—says Yama. Manu (4-178) sanctions the authority of 'Family Custom'.—

येनास्य पितरो याता येन याताः पितामहाः ।

तेन यायात् सतां मार्गं तेन गच्छन्न रिष्यति ॥

But this can be a guide only in matters where the scriptures are found to be at variance with one another,—as is clear from the words of Sumantu—

यत्र शास्त्रगतिभिन्ना सर्वकर्मसु भास्त ।

तस्मिन् कुलक्रमायातमाचारं त्वाचरेद् बुधः ॥

Śaṅskāramayūkha p. 1.

That '*Sadāchāra*' is authoritative which is not repugnant to *Veda* and *Smṛti* texts.

(D) ŚILA—SAMYAK SAṆKALPAJA-KĀMA.

(Mentioned in Manu 2-6)

Medhātithi on Manu 2-6

Medhātithi takes the two terms '*Śila*' and '*Śruti*' as inter-related,—the two together standing for 'conscientious recollection' (see under '*Smṛti*'), so that according to him '*Śila*' is not a distinct means of knowing Dharma. He also suggests another explanation of '*Śila*' by which it pertains to all acts ;

the meaning that whatever one does one should do with the mind free from all 'love and hate'.

Sarvajña Nārāyaṇa on Manu 2-6

In cases where neither Vedic nor Smṛti texts are available one's duty can be determined on the basis of the '*Sīla*' of a large number of persons learned in the Veda, i. e. their 'natural inclination', 'temperament'. In support of the authority of this we have the Vedic text which declares that 'whatever the learned man *feels* is to be regarded *saintly*'.—wherever this is not available, we have to be guided by the '*āchāra*', practice, of '*Sādhus*'.

Kullūka on Manu 2-6.

'*Sīla*' stands for 'devotion to Brahman' and such other qualities enumerated by Hārīta (vide above). According to Govindarāja however it stands for 'freedom from love and hate'.

Rāghavānanda on Manu 2-6.

'*Sīla*' is conduct, action, of those learned in the Veda, i. e. those who know that the injunctions contained in the Veda are to be acted up to ; or it may stand for the thirteen qualities spoken of by Hārīta (see above).

Nandana on Manu 2. 6.

Nandana defines it as 'that excellent quality of the soul which makes a man respected among the wise', as defined in the Mahābhārata ; as an example is cited that magnanimity which was shown by Yudhiṣṭhira when he asked for the life of his stepbrother Nakula before that of his brother Bhīma and Arjuna, when all had been devoured by the alligator.

Yājñavalkya (1.7) speaks of *Samyaksankalpajah kāmah*, determination or judgment after full reflection.

• *Aparārka on Yāja 1.7.*

This means 'that desire to act in a certain way which arises from rightful volition', i.e. the determination to attain a certain object by a definite means in accordance with the Scriptures !

According to *Viṣvarūpa* this helps only in determining one out of a number of optional alternatives.

• *Vīramitrodaya on Yājñ 1.7.*

'Samyaksañkalpā' is such volition as is free from love, hatred and such aberrations.—'Kāma', a well-considered vow. Or this may be the same as what Manu has called 'Śīla', which has been described in the *Mahābhārata*—as consisting in knowledge and sympathy, in thought, word and act, towards all living beings ;—this is called a 'source of Dharma' in the sense that it is helpful in the man possessed of this quality being better able to understand what is said in the Veda.—Hārta has described 'Śīla' as consisting in the ten following qualities—'Devotion to Brāhmaṇas, Gods and Pitṛs, sympathy, freedom from jealousy, kindly disposition, friendliness, sweet words, mercy and calmness.'—This is to be accepted as authoritative only in regard to those cases of doing (such acts as the helping of a Brāhmaṇa) which are not covered by the Vedic injunctions bearing on the subject. According to others, however, it is the authority in regard to such determinations as 'I shall not drink water except with food.'

Another interpretation of the whole verse—'Samyak' qualifies 'Śruti', and means 'duly understood' ; and it also qualifies 'Smṛti', where it means 'based upon the Veda' ;—'Svaya' is to be taken by itself and construed with 'āchārah', the meaning being 'the practice or custom of one's own ancestors' ;—'priyam ātmanah' means 'self-satisfaction' ;—*Samyak-*

saṅkalpajah kāmah means the desire to act in a certain way after proper reflection; this would vary with different individuals; some men would be satisfied by the mere assertion of a trustworthy person, while others would want corroborative texts.

Mitākṣarā on Yājñ. 1.7.

Such desire as is not repugnant to the scriptures, e. g. in such cases as the determination not to drink water except with food.

Viramitrodaya Paribhāṣā p. 10

This means a 'well-considered vow' such as 'I shall not drink water except with food'; or it may stand for the 'desire to do good and so forth which arises from a proper, i. e. philanthropic, determination'; in this sense it stands for the same thing as the '*Śīla*' in Manu's text.

Viramitrodaya Paribhāṣā p. 8-25.

The term '*Śīla*' stands for the thirteen qualities enumerated by *Hārīta*. It stands, it will be seen, for the negative virtues, and is as such distinguished from '*Āchāra*', practice or custom, which stands for the positive ones.

On *Yājñ. 1.7* the *Viramitrodaya* identifies the *Śīla* of Manu with the '*Samyak saṅkalpaja Kāma*' of *Yājñavalkya*.

Smṛti Chandrikā p. 5.

'*Śīla*' connotes freedom from love, hatred and so forth.

(E) ĀTMANASTUṢṬI-SVASYA PRIYAM

Medhātithi on Manu 2-6.

This 'self-satisfaction' is meant to be of those only who are 'learned in the Veda and good' (*Vedavidāṃ Sādhūnām*), the idea of this being that the 'source of Dharma' is based upon the trustworthy character of the persons concerned. When the 'learned and good' feel satisfied regarding the righteous-

ness of a certain action, that action must be accepted as right ; because such men can never feel satisfied with anything that is *wrong*.—The older treatises however have explained the meaning to be that in cases of optional alternatives that alternative should be adopted in regard to which the man's own mind feels satisfied.—There is yet another explanation by which what is meant is that 'whenever one is doing anything he should keep his mind tranquil and calm ; and in this sense like '*Sila*', 'freedom from love and hate', this 'self-satisfaction' also pertains to '*all acts*.'

Sarvajña Nārāyaṇa on Manu 2.6.

In cases where we have no other means of ascertaining the right course of action, we are to be guided by 'self-satisfaction'; i. e. we should do that the doing of which makes us feel easy at heart and satisfies the conscience. This is inferior to '*Sila*' and '*Āchāra*' as it pertains to the mind of a single individual and hence is lacking in that corroboration by others which is available in the case of the other two.

Kullūka on Manu 2.6

'Self-satisfaction' is authoritative only in regard to the choice of alternatives.

Nandana on Manu 2.6

Nandana construes this with '*Sadhūnam*', by which explanation the meaning is that the self-satisfaction of exceptionally righteous persons is to be regarded as trustworthy.

Viśvarūpa on Yājñia 1.7.

'Self-satisfaction' meant here is such as is not incompatible with Vedic texts, and is not due to restlessness ;—the taking to renunciation, for instance, during a time when the family is in trouble, would not be 'lawful', even though one may feel self-satisfaction in it.....'*Svaya cha priyam ātmanah*' may also mean 'Liberation.'

Mitākṣarā on Yājñā. 1.7.

'Self-satisfaction' serves to determine which one of several sanctioned alternatives has to be adopted, e. g. the performance of Upanayana in the 7th or the 8th year.

Aparārka on Yājñā. 1.7.

It is that which brings satisfaction to one's own mind. This is to be accepted as authority only in regard to cases that are distinctly declared to be subject to such authority, in such texts as 'when one feels that there is a load in his mind until a certain act is done, that act he shall do.'

Viramitrodaya on Yājñā 1.7.

'*Svasya priyam*' means 'self-satisfaction'; i. e. the satisfaction regarding the propriety of a certain act, in the mind of such men as are steeped in Vedic tradition. This same idea is expressed by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila in the verse एतेन वैदिकानेक &c.—'Trustworthiness belongs to the self-satisfaction of such persons as have their minds steeped in the moral grandeur of the Veda'. This 'self-satisfaction' must be that of the enquirer himself, and he cannot go about seeking for that of all Vedic scholars.—This is the sole authority in regard to such questions as to whether or not the performance of the expiation of a certain sin shall be repeated; this having been declared by Bṛhaspati—'One should go on doing an act until his mind becomes *lightened*',—i. e. free from the incubus of the sinful act committed....Others, however, have held that 'self-satisfaction' is what determines which of the several equally authoritative alternative courses of action he shall adopt.

Viramitrodaya Paribhāṣā pp. 8—25

'*Sādhūnām*' in Manu has to be construed with '*tuṣṭih*'; the sense being that when there is a doubt as to what is

‘right’, that course of action is to be accepted as ‘right’ with regard to which there is satisfaction among ‘good men’, i. e. men whose mind is steeped in Vedic lore. Such is the explanation given by the *Kalpataṛu*; this view has the support also of a Taittiriya text, which says—‘When there are doubts regarding what is *right*, one should act in the manner that those Brāhmaṇas act who are impartial, judicious, trustworthy and highly righteous.’— This implies the authority also of the *Paṛṣad*, ‘Council’ or ‘Assembly’.... This ‘self-satisfaction’ is authoritative only in the determining of one out of a number of optional alternatives, and then too it is authority only for the man himself; and the ‘self-satisfaction’ of one man can have no authority for another.

Nṛsiṃhaprasāda-Saṃskāra-Ms.

Mere self-satisfaction is not authoritative. What is meant that when a cultured and learned man feels *satisfied* that a certain course of action is *righteous*, that satisfaction itself is to be regarded as a trustworthy guide.

Smṛti Chandrikā P. 5

This is authority only in determining one of several optional alternatives.

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY.

Manu (2.10)—“The Veda is to be known as *Śruti*, Revealed Word, and the *Dharma Śāstra*, Legal Ordinances, as *Smṛti*; in all matters these two do not deserve to be criticised.”

According to Medhātithi, ‘Custom’ also is included under ‘*Smṛti*’ here. Kullūka does not accept this view; according to him the text puts the *Smṛti* distinctly above *Custom*, which means that *Custom* contrary to *Smṛti* is to be rejected.

Manu (2.14) says—‘Whenever there is conflict between two Vedic texts, both are to be regarded as lawful’; the same

with two Smṛti texts, adds Medhātithi; i. e. the two courses of action laid down by the conflicting texts are to be treated as optional alternatives.

Viṣvarūpa on Yājñavalkya 1.7.

According to Manu, in all purely spiritual matters the Veda is the highest authority; the Smṛti writers themselves regard the authority of the Smṛti as extremely weak in comparison with that of the Śruti; all which leads to the conclusion that when Smṛti conflicts with Śruti, it is to be rejected.

Aparārka on Yājñā. 1.7.

In the determining of Dharma, says Vyāsa, the Veda is the only pure source of knowledge, 'pure' i. e. whose authority is beyond suspicion,—all the rest are 'mixed'—i. e. their authority is open to doubt.—Hence that is the *highest* Dharma which is learnt from the Veda; what is declared in the Purāṇa and other works is the *lower* Dharma. All other works of human origin are to be rejected in the matter of Dharma.....Vasiṣṭha says that "Dharma is that which is prescribed by Śruti and Smṛti; and it is in the absence of these that the 'Practice of the Cultured' is to be accepted as authoritative."

Sanṣkāramayūkha p. 1.

The order is (1) Śruti, (2) Smṛti, (3) Sadāchāra, (4) *Svasya priyam* (5) Samyaksāṅkalpaja kāma. Among Smṛtis Manu is most authoritative, as says Aṅgiras—मन्वर्थविपरीता तु या स्मृतिः सा न शस्यते (i. e. not to be honoured). Also the Veda itself—यद् वै मनुर्वदत् तद् भेषजम् ।

Smṛti Chandrikā Pp. 15-17.

Says Manu (2-14)—'श्रुतिद्वैधं तु यत्र स्यात् तत्र धर्मावुभौ स्मृतौ', i. e. where two Śruti texts are mutually contradictory, both are right; i. e. the two courses laid down are to be

treated as optional alternatives. The same rule applies to cases of conflict between two *Smṛti* texts; says Gautama 'तुल्यबलविरोधे विकल्पः'—When there is conflict between Śruti and Smṛti the latter is to be rejected; so also when custom conflicts with Smṛti, the former is rejected, as is clear from Vasiṣṭha's words—'श्रुतिस्मृतिविहितो धर्मः तदभावे शिष्टाचारः प्रमाणम्'। The same applies to the opinion of the Assembly also. When there is conflict between Manu and another *Smṛti*, the former is to be accepted, as says Āṅgīras:—

यत् पूर्वं मनुना प्रोक्तं धर्मशास्त्रमनुत्तमम् ।

न हि तत् समतिक्रम्य वचनं हितमात्मनः ॥

Also Brhaspati—

वेदादुपनिबद्धत्वात् प्राधान्यं तु मनोः स्मृतम् ।

In cases where the same act is prescribed in equally authoritative texts in two different forms, we have to accept the more elaborate of the two and reject the simpler.

Vīramitrodaya Paribhāṣā Pp. 25—29.

When there is conflict between two Vedic texts, both are to be regarded as equally authoritative, and in actual practice the two courses of action are to be treated as optional alternatives. Similarly when there is a conflict between two *Smṛti* texts or between two 'customs'. When there is conflict between a Vedic text and a *Smṛti* text, preference is to be given to the former as possessed of inherent authority, while the latter owes its authority to an assumed Vedic text.—When there is conflict between a *Smṛti* text and a Custom, the *Smṛti* is to be regarded as the more authoritative, e. g. the custom of the marrying of the maternal uncle's daughter cannot be accepted as authoritative when it is found to be in conflict with distinct *Smṛti* text forbidding that practice.

There is a further distinction among authorities of the same class also. For instance, between two Vedic texts, if one

is of doubtful import while the meaning of the other is clear, then the latter is to be given preference. If one treats of a more important matter than the other, it is to be given preference; e.g. if one deals with something to be done, while the other, with a minor detail of the act, the former is to set aside the latter. What occurs in the opening sentence sets aside what occurs in the concluding sentence; e.g. the opening sentence speaks of the 'three Vedas', and the concluding sentence speaks of the 'Ṛk Verse' as to be recited 'loudly', the signification of the word 'Ṛk' in the latter is sublated by that of the word 'Veda' in the former, and the 'loudness' becomes connected with the *three Vedas*, and not with the mantras of the Ṛg Veda only.—If what is said in one text is beset with more difficulties than what occurs in another, then the former is to be rejected; e.g. one text lays down that a man who accepts the gift of horses should perform as many sacrifices as the horses he receives; while another speaks of Prajāpati having given a horse to Varuṇa and performed a sacrifice to his deity:—by which the *giver* and not the *receiver*, is to perform the sacrifice;—now if we accept the former, i.e. if we accept the view that the sacrifice is to be performed by the *receiver* of the gift, then we shall have the following difficulties in the construing of the latter text: (1) it will be necessary to take the Dative in '*Varuṇāya*', ('to Varuṇa') as standing for the Ablative ('from Varuṇa'), and (2) to take the verb 'given' as standing for 'accepted'; while on the other hand, if we accept the latter text, according to which the sacrifice is to be performed by the giver of the horse, then the only difficulty involved in the construing of the former text is to take the verb 'accept' as standing for 'give'; and hence it is the former text that is rejected, and the conclusion is that the *giver* of a horse is to perform sacrifices. Where one thing is enjoined in connection with a particular Veda, this is given preference over what would apply to that same in accordance

with what has been prescribed in connection with another Veda; e.g. in connection with the Yajurveda we have the injunction that its mantras are to be recited 'in an undertone'; in accordance with this rule one may be led to think that the chanting of the *vāravantīya* (Sāman-hymn) is to be done in an undertone; but this is precluded by the 'high pitch' that has been enjoined in connection with the chanting of the mantras of the Sāma Veda.—What is enjoined in regard to the particular 'Vedic Recensional School' to which the performer's family belongs is given preference over what may have been enjoined in connection with another school.—The general law is superseded by the particular, So on

In the case of Smṛtis also,—the 'orthodox' Smṛti sets aside the 'heterodox',—among the 'orthodox' smṛtis also, if a certain course of action is sanctioned by one, but condemned by another, the latter sets aside the former, and the action in question is to be avoided. What is laid down in reference to imperceptible transcendental effects sets aside what is enjoined for temporal or worldly ends; e.g. the law prohibiting the killing of the Brāhmaṇa sets aside the law that 'one may kill a person who is threatening to kill'; as the latter course of action is meant only to serve the perceptible purpose of saving one's life. The Smṛti that is based upon a Vedic *Artha vāda* is set aside by that which is based upon a Vedic injunction; e.g. the law sanctioning the killing of the cow in honour of an honoured guest,—being based upon an *Arthavāda* passage commendatory of the 'churning' or 'rubbing' of sticks,—is set aside by that which prohibits the said killing,—this latter being based upon the Vedic injunctive passage—'Kill not Aditi, the hornless cow.'

Among 'Custom', 'self-satisfaction' and 'well considered vow',—the preceding is more authoritative than the following, as declared by the *Mitākṣarā*.

In some cases what is sanctioned by higher authority is rejected by what is said by a lower authority; e.g. the drinking of wine (at the *Sautrāmaṇi* sacrifice), even though enjoined by the *Veda*, is not considered right, in view of its prohibition during *Kali Yuga* contained in the *Smṛti*.

Any *Smṛti* that goes against the ordinances of *Manu* is to be rejected—as declared by *Bṛhaspati* (see above). This is the view of the *Kalpataru* also.—Customs, local, tribal as well as family, are to be rejected if repugnant to the *Veda* or the *Smṛti* or the *Purāṇa*.

As between *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, the conclusion arrived at is thus expressed by *Vyāsa*—‘That law which is deduced from the *Veda* is the *higher*, while that declared in the *Purāṇa* and other *Smṛtis* is the *lower*; which means that in cases of conflict our first duty is to do what is laid down in the *Veda*, and the doing of what is declared in the *Smṛti* can be justified only as a Substitute, i.e. to be adopted only when there is no possibility of the other being adopted. And this for the simple reason that according to *Manu* (11. 30), if one follows the ‘second best’ course when the latter course is possible, his action becomes futile; so that the conclusion indicated by this is that even in cases of conflict the *Smṛti* does not entirely lose its authoritative character; all that happens is that the course of action sanctioned by it is rendered fruitless by reason of the superiority of authority attaching to the *Vedic* text to the contrary.

The variability of the Law is unfeignedly declared by *Parāśara* in I. 22 :—

‘The Law or the Right is one in the *Kṛta* Cycle, different in the *Tretā* Cycle, yet different in the *Dvāpara* Cycle, and yet different in the *Kali* Cycle,—varying as it does with the character of the Time Cycles’.

On this *Mādhava* makes the following observations—

The ‘difference’ spoken of here is, not of the *nature* or

essence, of the Law or Right, but of its *modes*. If it were the former, then it would imply a corresponding diversity in the *Veda* also, as the source of that Law; while as a matter of fact, the *Veda* does *not* vary with the time-cycles. As regards the *modes* however, we have several instances of diversity: for instance, though the act of the *Agnihotra*-offering itself is the same yet there is diversity in regard to the *mode* of performing it according as it is performed in the morning or in the evening. For instance, at the evening-performance the sprinkling is to be done with the *mantra* '*Ṛtantvā satyena pariṣiñchāmi*', while that at the morning-performance with the *mantra* '*Satyantvā ṛtena pariṣiñchāmi*'. Thus in the present instance also, the 'variation' lies in the *mode* of doing what is 'right', and not in what is 'right' itself; the variations being due to the nature of the time-cycle and of the capacity of the man doing the acts. This matter has been fully discussed in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* VI. 3, where the conclusion arrived at is that in the case of the *Agnihotra* and such other obligatory rites, only those prescribed details have to be performed which it is within the capacity of the performer to perform. *Baudhāyana* also has discussed that the obligatory acts are to be performed to the extent that one can; they should, on no account, be entirely omitted.

The most important instance of variation is cited by *Parāśara* (1. 23) himself—"In the *Kṛta* Cycle, *Austerity* is the highest *Dharma* or Duty;—in the *Trētā*, *Learning*;—in the *Dvāpara*, *Sacrifice*,—and in the *Kali*, *Charity*." To the last *Brhaspati* adds 'sympathy and self-control'.

There is variation, according to *Parāśara* (1. 24), not only, in Law, but also in the authority:—"During the *Kṛta*, the Laws are those ordained by *Manu*,—during the *Trētā*, those ordained by *Gautama*,—during the *Dvāpara*, those ordained by *Śaṅkha-Likhita*,—and during the *Kali*, those ordained by *Parāśara*'.

The distinction however has never been observed in actual practice; as even up to this present time, the work of Manu holds the highest position among the Smṛtis.

CONCLUSION.

From the above we conclude that all the authorities are agreed on the following points—(a) The Veda is the first and paramount authority. (b) The Smṛti is authoritative only in so far as it is not repugnant to the Veda, to which it owes its authority; but on matters on which we have no paramount authority, (c) Practices or Customs are trustworthy guides, only as they are current among the 'cultured', and then too only those that are not repugnant to Vedic or Smṛti texts. (d) The same with regard to Tribal or Family Customs. (e) The judgment of the 'Assembly' of the learned is to be accepted as authoritative only when it is not repugnant to the Veda, and only when the judgment is 'unbiased' by improper feelings. There is not a single text, or 'explanation', which favours the opinion that Custom is to override original texts,—an opinion that has been upheld by the Privy Council, and endorsed by eminent writers on Anglo-Hindu Law. Neither Vijñāneśvara (*Mitākṣarā*) nor Jimūtavāhana (*Dharmaratna*) nor Nīlakaṇṭha (*Mayūkha*) countenances any such view; and these three are regarded by our lawyers as the founders of the principal 'Schools of Law'.

We have purposely avoided references to, or review of, the opinions held by modern scholars, as our purpose is to present before the reader the views that have been held by the older indigenous scholars in as accurate a form as possible. This is the reason also why we have added very little by way of any comments of our own.

IV—A NEW BHAKTI SŪTRA

BY GOPI NATH KAVIRAJ.

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In the history of Bhakti Literature two works only are known to have come down to us in the form of Sūtras, viz one ascribed to Śaṇḍilya and the other to Nārada. That there were other sūtras in existence is beyond any doubt. Śaṇḍilya himself refers to Kāśyapa and Bādarāyaṇa (2.1.29-30) as representing two extreme views in regard to the relation between God and Self and to the nature of right knowledge. As to whether these āchāryas were the authors of Bhakti Sūtras or only of Brahma Sūtras, as the latter is known to have been, is not quite clear, but it is highly probable that both Kāśyapa and Bādarāyaṇa were eminent teachers of Bhakti cult, though Svapneśvara has tried to read in the Śaṇḍilya Sūtra 2. 1. 30 a reflection of Brahma Sūtra 4. 1. 3. Nārada refers to Pārāśarya and Garga in addition to Śaṇḍilya, and their respective theories concerning the essence of Bhakti (16--18). This Pārāśarya may or may not have been identical with Bādarāyaṇa.* In other contexts we read of Uddhava, etc. as apparently expositors of Bhakti Śāstra.

But none of these works are available now. The sūtras of Śaṇḍilya and Nārada have been the only works in that form so long known to us. It is therefore of great interest to find a new sūtra work devoted to a clear exposition of the Bhakti cult. The book is named *Bhakti mīmāṃsā* and has been found in a private Ms. collection owned by a Mahārāṣṭrī Pandit of Benares. We reproduce it below in full, prefixing a few words by way of comments on its contents.

*Pāṇini in his sūtra IV. 3. 110, refers to one Pārāśarya as the author of a Bhikṣu sūtra—a word which denotes Vedānta or Brahma sūtra.

* * * * *

The work is complete in four chapters, with two pādas in each, and consists of 103 aphoristic sayings. The Ms. contains at the end a gloss called Bhaktakaṇṭhābharāṇa by one Raghunātha. It is unfortunately in a fragmentary condition, extending only to a part of the second pāda of the first chapter. The name of the author of the sūtras does not appear. It is a sad omission and we are unable to ascertain whether the work is really one of those associated with the names of the āchāryas whose references are often met with in Sanskrit Literature. But it is clear that it belongs to a school of thought distinct from those of Śāṇḍilya and Nārada, though in certain features similarity among them is also unmistakeable.

It is evident from sūtra 4.1. 7 that the author represents the views of the Bhāgavata sect; and this is further corroborated by the fact that the work bears a close resemblance to Bopadeva's Muktāphala* which is based directly upon the Bhāgavata. Śāṇḍilya however is associated with the Pāñcharātra sect; so is Nārada.

Bhakti is described in this work as a kind of *ullāsa* of the mind (1.1.2), which being of the nature of *rasa* is eternal and is an end in itself. From this it is evident that bhakti as thus conceived is different from what it is made out to be in some of the Alāṅkāra treatises, where, e.g. in Mammaṭa's Kāvya-prakāśa, it is openly characterised as a *bhāva*, implying that it is debarred by its very nature from rising up in intensity to the aesthetic level of *rasa*. In the history of Alāṅkāra and Bhakti literature there is no lack of evidence to show that bhakti is not unoften recognised as a *rasa* rather than a *bhāva*. The names of works like the *Bhaktirasāyana* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and the *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu* of Śrī Rūpa Gosvāmī, to speak only of two out of a number, are

* Cf. foot notes to the text following.

sufficient by themselves to establish the fact that this conception of bhakti was in favour with many of the mediaeval mystics, especially of the Vaiṣṇava order, of India. The literature of the Vallabhāchārya school agrees in the main with that of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas on this question. The author of our tract* also makes it perfectly clear, saying that the reason why bhakti should be regarded as a *rasa* and not as a *bhāva* is that it arises, *i.e.* is manifested,* like other *rasas*, from the same causal assemblage (1.1.1-2). And hence true bhakti, being of the nature of *rasa*, is not a means to an end, but an end in itself. It is only in a figurative and indirect sense (गौण) that the so-called साधनभक्ति may be named bhakti at all (1.2.7).

Achyuta Rāya in his *Sāhityasāra* (1.4.134-137) refers to the two rival theories regarding the nature of bhakti, viz. (a) the one connected with the school of Śaṇḍilya and his followers who claim it as a *rasa*, and (b) the other expounded by Mammāṭa, Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha and other rhetoricians who consider it to be a kind of *bhāva*. In reconciling the two views he observes that both are right. Thus we learn from the *Gītā* XII.13-14, he says, that Primary Bhakti is synonymous with Jīvanmukti; and this is confirmed by Vidyāranya's statement in the *Jīvanmuktiviveka*: जीवन्मुक्तः स्थितप्रज्ञो विष्णुभक्तश्च कथ्यते । Consequently it may be placed under the category of *Sānta rasa*, so that its rejection by the *Alaṅkāra* writers as a distinct *rasa* is easily explained. But the devotional literature accepts it as a distinct *rasa* in view of the fact that it is a kind of *Vṛtti* with the one Universal Self as its object. This of course represents a

* The Sūtras 1.1.4 and 2.1.1 read together imply that the word उत्पत्ति is to be understood as 'manifestation', and not 'production.'

- .. slightly different standpoint. Really speaking therefore there is no inherent contradiction between the views of the devotees and those of the rhetoricians. As the commentator points out—bhakti is twofold, primary and secondary. To the rhetorician the primary bhakti is identical with *Śānta rasa* and the secondary one is merely a *bhāva*. To the devotee on the other hand *Śānta* itself falls under the category of bhakti and primary bhakti is essentially a *ra.a*.

The result of pure bhakti, or more properly its invariable concomitant, is the attraction of God (ईश्वरवशीकार)*, and not cessation of Evil (अनर्थनिवृत्ति) nor even Jivanmukti (4. 1. 16). The sutra (4. 1. 6) makes it plain that mokṣa is not according to the Bhāgavatas an object of human striving. The highest object which a devotee keeps in view is Bhakti itself and not absence of misery or freedom from pain (4.1.7),† both of which he would regard as enlightened forms of selfishness.

It follows, then, that our tract is *in a sense* more allied to Nārada's school than to Śāṇḍilya's. Nārada's outlook on Bhakti is practically similar in so far as he calls it 'amṛta' or *ānanda* in its essence (3) and describes it plainly as an end in itself (30). Nārada openly repudiates the view, apparently the same as we find in Śāṇḍilya (5&84) which holds that Bhakti proceeds from Jñāna and leads to Mokṣa. The other view that Bhakti is a means to Jñāna which causes mokṣa is of course out of question in Bhakti literature.

* Cf. कृत्वा हरिं प्रेमभाजं प्रियदर्शनमन्वितम् ।

भक्तिर्वशीकरोतीति श्रीकृष्णार्पणी मता ॥ Bhaktirasamṛtasindhu,

I. I. 28.

† This would remind one of the following śloka in the Bhāgavata—

सालोक्यसार्धिसामीप्यसारूप्यैकत्वमप्युत ।

दीयमानं न गृह्णन्ति विना मत्सेवनं जनाः ॥

The rejection of mokṣa as the Supreme End of human aspirations follows as a necessary corollary from the conception of bhakti as in itself the Highest Form of Bliss, higher indeed—so it is boldly declared—than Brahmānanda which is revealed in Mokṣa. This view is ascribed to the Bhāgavatas.

The *Haribhaktisudhodaya* says—

त्वत्सत्तात्करणाद्वाविशुद्धाधिस्थितस्य मे ।

सुखानि गोप्पदायन्ते ब्राह्मण्यपि *जगद्गुरो ॥

The *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* is full of evidences in support of the view that Bhakti constitutes in its form of Love Divine the Supreme Happiness, before which even the Joy of Mokṣa pales into insignificance. In the *Nārada Pañcharātra* we have the explicit statement that Bhakti is the Empress and that all the siddhis, including *mokṣa* and *bhoga*, are as it were its attendant slaves †.

It is thus clear that the realisation of this Supreme object helps one inevitably in rising above the reach of Pain and Misery of mundane existence—a state after which every seeker after mokṣa really aspires. To one who has attained to the heights of Divine Love pain becomes a stranger, even as darkness ceases to obscure the vision of one who is in the presence of light.

* The word ब्राह्म as referring to happiness in this context must be understood in the sense of परब्रह्मानन्द, and not पारमेष्ठ्यानन्द । Cf. *Jīva Gosvāmī*: ब्राह्मणोऽत्यत्र पारमेष्ठयानीति तु न व्याख्येयं परब्रह्मानन्देनैव तस्य तारतम्यं श्रीभागवतादिषु प्रसिद्धम् । Cf. also *Svāyambhuvāgama*:

ब्रह्मानन्दरतदनन्तगुणितो रम्यो रसो वैष्णवः

तस्मात् कोटियुगोञ्ज्वलश्च मधुरः श्रीगोबुलेन्दो रसः । (Quoted in

Rādhātattvasudhānidhi, Ms. in possession of the writer, fol. 10 a).

† हरिभक्तिमहादेव्याः सर्वा मुक्त्यादिसिद्धयः ।

मुक्तयश्चाद्भुतास्तस्याश्चेष्टिकावदनुव्रताः ॥

Next, the classification of bhakti. From the foregoing it is abundantly clear that in the truest (*i. e.* primary, मुख्य) sense of the word Bhakti is unique and hence is incapable of classification. But from the empiric point of view a double classification has been attempted in the sūtras, and this in conformity with the teachings of the Bhāgavata as summed up in the Muktāphala.


A.—

- (a) *Nirguṇabhakti*.
- (b) *Saguṇabhakti*. This is described as ninefold (1. 2. 2) according to the number of persons enjoying. Each of these again is of three kinds and may be arranged in a scale varying in degrees of intensity or rather extensity (समास and व्यास), comparable to (i) a drop (विषुद्), (ii) a river (नदी), and (iii) the Ocean (समुद्र). Of these three, each may be looked at from a double viewpoint, according as the state persists for a short while (अल्पकालावच्छिन्न) or continues long.

B.—


The second classification is a verbatim reproduction from the Muktāphala, with some omissions. For facility of comparison we append below in the form of tables both the schemes.

(a) The Scheme of Mukti-phala :—



It may be noted by way of elucidation that शुद्धा or pure bhakti alone is bhakti *par excellence*, while the rest—the remaining forms of devotion, are so many stepping stones leading up to and finding their fruition in it. To this Bopadeva gives the name of bhakti-yoga proper, adding that it is by this that one can pass beyond the action of the three guṇas and become one with God (मद्भाव). It is described as absolutely selfless and free from the slightest touch of motive (अहैतुकी) and as unceasing (अव्यवाहिता, निरन्तरा). Such bhaktas, blessed with the joy of pure (शुद्धा) bhakti, look down with unconcern on the joys of all kinds of mokṣa, nay even that of unification with the Lord (एकत्व), and do not accept them when offered.

(b) The Scheme of the *Ms of Bhaktimīmāṃsā Sūtra*.



From a glance at the above tables it would appear^o that the two schemes are identical, so far as the forms of विहित भक्ति are concerned. The four varieties of निषिद्ध भक्ति have not been recognised in table (b), but they are referred to in the sūtras (cf. 2.2.7-8), where it is distinctly stated that they do not deserve the name of bhakti in as much as they are not a means to pure bhakti. काम and स्नेह lead only to the secondary bhakti, which itself is a means (साधन) to pure bhakti; and on this account they bear a close analogy to Karma. द्वेष and भय do not lead to the secondary Bhakti either.*

^o The reason why Bopadeva mentions काम and the other forbidden *vṛttis* of the mind as possible means to bhakti is thus given: कामाद् द्वेषाद् भयात् खेडाद् यथा भक्त्येवरे मनः। आवश्य तद्वं हित्वा बहवस्तद्वर्ति गताः॥ Hemādri points out that these *vṛttis* being natural (वभावासिद्ध) there is no possibility of injunction. Injunction (विधि) is operative only where the object is not natural. Hemādri observes that even though काम &c. are forbidden such is the natural potency of the Supreme Lord that if they are directed towards Him they will enable the soul to shake off its burden of sin and secure union with Him. Loving mercy and Lordship constitute the nature of God, so that the bhaktas receive their desired fruits from Him by the mere fact of having their thoughts fixed upon Him and not by resorting to any particular means : ईश्वरा हि कृपाशालित्वात् प्रभुत्वाच्च कथमपि स्वनिविष्टमन्तःकरणमपेक्ष्य भक्तानां फलं प्रसूते न तूपायविशेषेणैवेति। It is immaterial whether the means adopted are enjoined in the Śāstras or forbidden. The one thing needful is the concentration of one's thoughts on Him. And this alone forms the essence of bhakti. Cf. "येन केन प्युपायने मन कृष्णे निवेशयेत्।"

भक्तिमीमांसा

श्रीवदरीनाथो जयति ।

प्रथमाध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

- १ अथातो भक्तिजिज्ञासा । १ ।
- २ भक्तिर्मनस उल्लासविशेषः । २ ।
- ३ भाव एवेयमित्येके । ३ ।
- ४ रसस्तु तत्सामग्रीत उत्पत्तेः । ४ ।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ॥

द्वितीयः पादः

- ५ स द्विविधो निर्गुणः सगुणश्च । १ ।
- ६ अन्त्यो नवविधो भोक्तृभेदात् । २ ।
- ७ नवविधश्चैषः पुराणादिषु । ३ ।

3. This refers to the view of a school of Alaṅkāra. Cf Kāvyaṣṭakāśa, IV (Kārikā 48).

4. Cf : परत्रानासङ्गं जनयति रतिर्या नियमतः

परस्मिन्नेवास्मिन् समरसतया पश्यत इमम् ।

परप्रेमाढ्येयं भवति परमानन्दमधुरा

परा भक्तिः प्रोक्ता रस इति रसास्वादनचणैः ॥

(Quoted in Commentary on Sāhityasāra, p. 130, N. Sāgara Edn.)

6 7. Cf Mukṭāphala, Ch. XI : स नवधा भक्तः, नवविधत्वे हेतुमाह—भक्तीति । भक्तिर्विहिताविहिता च । भक्तिरसस्यैव हास्यशृङ्गारकरुणारौद्रभयानकवीभत्सशान्ताद्भुतवीररूपेणानुभवात् ।

- ८ समासव्यासाभ्यां स पुनस्त्रिविधो विप्रुणदी-
समुद्रश्च पूर्वपूर्वाभ्यासात् । ४ ।
९ तद्भेदोऽल्पकालाऽवच्छेदाऽनवच्छेदाभ्याम् । ५ ।
१० जातिभेदो वा । ६ ।
११ साधनेषु भक्तिशब्दो गौण आयुर्धृतमितिर्वत् । ७ ।
इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे प्रथमाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ॥

समाप्तिश्च ॥

द्वितीयाध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

- १२ भक्तिर्न जन्या रसो हि सा । १ ।
१३ नाऽऽगमविरोधात् । २ ।
१४ भक्तियोगो बहुविधः पुराणेषु । ३ ।
१५ स द्विविधः शुद्धो मिश्रश्च । ४ ।
१६ मिश्रस्त्रिविधः कर्मज्ञानतदुभयमिश्रणात् । ५ ।
१७ आद्यस्य न विधा कर्मज्ञानविरोधात् । ६ ।
१८ परिपाकापरिपाकावपीतभेदाविति चेन्नाऽव-
स्थाभेदौ हि तौ । ७ ।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे द्वितीयाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ॥

द्वितीयः पादः

- १९ त्रिविधः कर्ममिश्रः सार्वत्रिकादिभेदेन । १ ।

- २० सात्त्विकस्त्रिविधः कर्मक्षयविष्णवर्षणविधिसि-
द्ध्यर्थभेदेन । २ ।
- २१ तथा राजसो विषयाद्यभिसन्धिभेदात् । ३ ।
- २२ एवं तामसो हिंसादिफलभेदात् । ४ ।
- २३ ज्ञानमिश्रस्त्वेक एव । ५ ।
- २४ उभयश्रमिश्च त्रिविध उत्तममध्यमप्राकृतभेदेन
सत्त्वतारतम्यात् । ६ ।
- २५ कामादयोऽपीति चेन्नाऽऽद्याऽन्त्ययोः साधनं हि
फलं न भक्तिः कर्मवत् । ७ ।
- २६ मध्यमयोर्न साधनमपि । ८ ।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे द्वितीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ॥

समाप्तिश्च ॥

20. Cf. *Ibid, loc. cit.*: 'सात्त्विकी त्रेधा—कर्मक्षयार्था विष्णु-
प्रीत्यर्था विधिसिद्ध्यर्थो च'। This is based on Bhagavata
3. 29. 10.
21. Cf. *Ibid, loc. cit.*: 'राजसी त्रेधा—विषयार्था यशोऽर्था
ऐश्वर्यार्था च'। Cf. Bhāgavata 3. 29. 8.
22. Cf. *Ibid, loc. cit.*: 'तामसी त्रेधा—हिंसार्था दम्भार्था
मात्सर्यार्था च'। Cf. Bhāgavata 3. 29. 8.
23. In the Muktāphala this has been called Nirguṇā
bhakti. Its scriptural basis is Bhāgavata 3.29.11:
मद्गुणश्रुतिमात्रेण &c.
24. Cf. Muktāphala, *loc. cit.*: 'कर्मज्ञानमिश्रा त्रेधा—उत्तमा
मध्यमा अधमा च सत्त्वतारतम्यात्'। Cf. Bhāgavata
11.2.45-47.
- 25-26. These two sūtras sum up the author's views on
the four kinds of the so-called 'forbidden bhakti'

तृतीयाध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

- २७ सर्वं भक्तियोगोऽविशेषात् । १ ।
 २८ त्रिवर्गो वा तस्यैव भक्तिसम्बन्धात् । २ ।
 २९ यथाश्रुतीति चेन्न भक्तिवैषम्यात् । ३ ।
 ३० अपि वा विलम्बाऽविलम्बाभ्यां तदुभयोपपत्तेः । ४ ।
 ३१ श्रवणमेव वा सर्वत्र सामर्थ्यसव्यपेक्षो हि विधिः । ५ ।
 ३२ स्मरणमपि वा । ६ ।
 ३३ उत्तरोत्तरमिन् पूर्वः पूर्वश्च । ७ ।
 ३४ समुच्चयस्त्वङ्गभावेऽपि । ८ ।
 ३५ न चैष विधिर्हेतुनिर्देशात् । ९ ।
 ३६ विधिश्चेन्नित्यः स्यात् । १० ।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे तृतीयाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ॥

as mentioned in the Muktāphala, Ch. V. They are named : (1) कामजा, (2) द्वेषजा, (3) भयजा and (4) स्नेहजा । Hemādri explains काम as “परपरिगृहीताया अनृढाया वा स्त्रियाः परपुरुषे दुरभिसन्धिः” । द्वेष and भय mean of course malice (अप्रीति) and fear (त्रास). स्नेह is distinguished from काम and interpreted as “सन्निकर्षजः परस्परमङ्गत्रिमः चित्तबन्धः” । As examples of the types of forbidden bhakti may be mentioned respectively the names of (1) Gopīs, (2) Śisupāla, (3) Kansa and (4) Yudhiṣṭhira, &c. and the Vṛṣṇis.

द्वितीयः पादः

- ३७ इतराणि तदङ्गानि । १ ।
 ३८ सर्वैः सर्वाण्यविशेषात् प्रयुज्यन्ते । २ ।
 ३९ बिन्दुना वाद्यानि लौकिकतुल्यसामग्रीको हि
 सः । ३ ।
 ४० इतराणि तु द्वाभ्याम् । ४ ।
 ४१ आरादुपकारीण्यप्येवामिति चेत् । ५ ।
 ४२ नोच्छिद्येतैव हि नदी । ६ ।
 ४३ पादसेवादिकमप्यङ्गं भयद्वेषवतोस्तदनुत्पत्तेः । ७ ।
 ४४ नेह प्रधानानिष्पत्तेः । ८ ।
 ४५ अपि चोद्दीपकाऽभावाल्लौकिकवत् । ९ ।
 ४६ सङ्गीतशब्दश्रवणमपि प्रधानं भक्तिकामश्रुतेः । १० ।
 ४७ न शब्दप्रधानत्वात् । ११ ।
 ४८ गानञ्च स्वकर्तृकम् । १२ ।
 ४९ सङ्गाने नास्ति नियमः । १३ ।
 ५० पर एव वा गायति, अप्रयोज्यं हि तत्तमेवेति
 श्रुतेः । १४ ।
 ५१ श्रवणन्तु भक्तमुखतोऽतिशयहेतुः श्रुतेरनुभ-
 वाच्च । १५ ।
 ५२ सप्तमवर्गोक्ता आद्यवर्गप्रधानस्याऽपि वाक्य-
 संयोगात् । १६ ।
 ५३ अपिवा नाम्नातवृद्धिधर्मकस्य द्विस्तयापत्तेः । १७ ।
 ५४ न च लक्षणा प्रधानधर्मवित्ततिरल्पधर्मकत्वात् । १८ ।
 ५५ अपूर्वं वाऽऽन्नातधर्मकत्वात् । १९ ।
 ५६ नाऽन्यानर्थक्यं फलतारतम्यादधिकारिभेदाच्च । २० ।

- ५७ सप्तमवर्गोक्ता इहाऽपि । २१ ।
 ५८ कीर्तनं पुनरुक्तं स्यादिति चेन्न भिन्नं ह्येतत् । २२ ।
 ५९ एतेन षष्ठवर्गश्रवणं व्याख्यातम् । २३ ।
 ६० सप्तमवर्गीयास्तु न तत्र यमनियमोपदेशात् । २४ ।
 ६१ सङ्कीर्तनं नाम्नां सुस्वरेण सम्बन्धिगानम् । २५ ।
 ६२ नवं लक्षणादौ कीर्तनं शब्दसंस्कारकम् । २६ ।
 ६३ नमस्कारमात्राङ्गकं च क्वचिच्छ्रवणम् । २७ ।
 ६४ अनुपदेशे फलं स्वर्गः स्यात् । २८ ।
 ६५ भक्तिर्वानर्थो हि सः । २९ ।
 ६६ लिङ्गाच्च । ३० ।
 ६७ षाष्ठवर्गिकप्रकृतिकमिदं साप्तवर्गिकधर्मकं वा
 नवा पुनरुपदेशात् । ३१ ।
 ६८ नमस्कारोपदेश एवायमिति चेन्नानेकगुणश्रुतेः । ३२ ।
 ६९ क्वचित्तु केवलं स्मरणं तदप्येवमेव । ३३ ।
 ७० एतयोरत्युत्तमाधिकारिकत्वम् । ३४ ।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे तृतीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ॥

समाप्तिश्च ॥

चतुर्थाध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

- ७१ भक्तेः फलमीश्वरवशीकारः । १ ।

71. Cf Bhāgavata IX.

अहं भक्तपराधीनो ह्यस्वतन्त्र इव द्विज ।

साधुभिर्ग्रस्तहृदयो भक्तैर्भक्तजनप्रियः ॥

मयि निर्बद्धहृदयाः साधवः समदर्शिनः ।

वशे कुर्वन्ति मां भक्त्या सत्स्त्रियः सत्पति यथा ॥

- ७२ अनर्थनिवृत्तिरित्येके । २ ।
 ७३ तन्न विनाऽपि पुरुषप्रयत्नं निवृत्तेः । ३ ।
 ७४ जीवन्मुक्तिः फलं नैव कर्म्यमपीति श्रुतेः । ४ ।
 ७५ नैवमपि बाधितनिवृत्तेः पुरुषानुपेयत्वात् । ५ ।
 ७६ उक्तदोषाच्च । ६ ।
 ७७ भक्तिरेव परमः पुरुषार्थो मोक्षस्याऽपुरुषार्थत्वा-
 दिति तु भागवताः । ७ ।

इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे चतुर्थाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ॥

द्वितीयः पादः

- ७८ तानि च भक्तेः श्रूयन्ते हि । १ ।
 ७९ नानानभिसंहितानि हि भक्तिर्हि साधनम् । २ ।
 ८० अविशेषाच्चयमिति चेत् । ३ ।
 ८१ न समुद्रस्तद्वशीकरणविरोधात् । ४ ।
 ८२ अन्ययोरपि न त्वं तत्कालेन तद्विरोधादिति चेत्
 नैवं प्रागुत्तरं वा तत्सम्भवात् । ५ ।
 ८३ भक्त्या मामभिजानातीति चतुर्थीसाधनमधि-
 त्येत्याचार्याः । ६ ।
 ८४ नदी वा । ७ ।
 ८५ मध्यमोत्तमयोर्वशीकारः परिग्रहस्तु त्रयाणाम् । ८ ।
 ८६ भक्तिर्नार्थो विनाशयोगाज्जन्यभावो हि । ९ ।
 ८७ न हेतुर्जन्यत्ववदप्रयोजकत्वात् । १० ।
 ८८ अवच्छेदवत्त्वेनाऽश्रुतेश्च । ११ ।
 ८९ ध्वंसकादृष्टाभावाच्च । १२ ।

- ६१ मनोनाशात्तन्नाशश्चेत्तथापि नानर्थ इष्टनाशाननु-
भवात् । १४ ।
- ६२ सामर्थ्यमर्थिता विद्यावाधिकारिविशेषणं नान्ध-
दश्रुतेः । १५ ।
- ९३ चतुर्णामेतेतरेषां विद्याविरहात् । १६ ।
- ९४ पापनाशसाधनत्वं सर्वेषामिति चेत् । १७ ।
- ९५ न विद्याद्यपेक्षानपेक्षाभ्यां विशेषात् । १८ ।
- ६६ निरङ्गत्वाच्च तस्य तत्र । १९ ।
- ६७ अपि वाऽन्येषामपि श्रवणात् । २० ।
- ६८ विद्या कथमिति चेद्गुरूपदेशादितः । २१ ।
- ९९ पूर्वमीमांसासिद्धान्त एवं सति व्याप्ये [बाध्ये०]
तेति चेत् । २२ ।
- १०० नाध्ययविधितोऽधिकारनिर्णयो हि तत्र । २३ ।
- १०१ लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च । २४ ।
- १०२ उपलभ्यते च । २५ ।
- १०३ वामदेवादीनामिव जन्मान्तरीणपुराणश्रवणा-
दिसम्भवाच्च । २६ ।


इति भक्तिमीमांसासूत्रे चतुर्थाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ॥

समाप्तिश्च ॥

ग्रन्थश्च समाप्तः ॥ छ ॥

1. Introduction	23
2. The Arya Samaj	25
3. The Arya Samaj in India	27
4. The Arya Samaj in England	29
5. The Arya Samaj in America	31
6. The Arya Samaj in Australia	33
7. The Arya Samaj in Africa	35
8. The Arya Samaj in Asia	37
9. The Arya Samaj in Europe	39
10. The Arya Samaj in the East	41
11. The Arya Samaj in the West	43
12. The Arya Samaj in the South	45
13. The Arya Samaj in the North	47
14. The Arya Samaj in the East	49
15. The Arya Samaj in the West	51
16. The Arya Samaj in the South	53
17. The Arya Samaj in the North	55
18. The Arya Samaj in the East	57
19. The Arya Samaj in the West	59
20. The Arya Samaj in the South	61
21. The Arya Samaj in the North	63
22. The Arya Samaj in the East	65
23. The Arya Samaj in the West	67
24. The Arya Samaj in the South	69
25. The Arya Samaj in the North	71
26. The Arya Samaj in the East	73
27. The Arya Samaj in the West	75
28. The Arya Samaj in the South	77
29. The Arya Samaj in the North	79
30. The Arya Samaj in the East	81
31. The Arya Samaj in the West	83
32. The Arya Samaj in the South	85
33. The Arya Samaj in the North	87
34. The Arya Samaj in the East	89
35. The Arya Samaj in the West	91
36. The Arya Samaj in the South	93
37. The Arya Samaj in the North	95
38. The Arya Samaj in the East	97
39. The Arya Samaj in the West	99
40. The Arya Samaj in the South	101
41. The Arya Samaj in the North	103
42. The Arya Samaj in the East	105
43. The Arya Samaj in the West	107
44. The Arya Samaj in the South	109
45. The Arya Samaj in the North	111
46. The Arya Samaj in the East	113
47. The Arya Samaj in the West	115
48. The Arya Samaj in the South	117
49. The Arya Samaj in the North	119
50. The Arya Samaj in the East	121
51. The Arya Samaj in the West	123
52. The Arya Samaj in the South	125
53. The Arya Samaj in the North	127
54. The Arya Samaj in the East	129
55. The Arya Samaj in the West	131
56. The Arya Samaj in the South	133
57. The Arya Samaj in the North	135
58. The Arya Samaj in the East	137
59. The Arya Samaj in the West	139
60. The Arya Samaj in the South	141
61. The Arya Samaj in the North	143
62. The Arya Samaj in the East	145
63. The Arya Samaj in the West	147
64. The Arya Samaj in the South	149
65. The Arya Samaj in the North	151
66. The Arya Samaj in the East	153
67. The Arya Samaj in the West	155
68. The Arya Samaj in the South	157
69. The Arya Samaj in the North	159
70. The Arya Samaj in the East	161
71. The Arya Samaj in the West	163
72. The Arya Samaj in the South	165
73. The Arya Samaj in the North	167
74. The Arya Samaj in the East	169
75. The Arya Samaj in the West	171
76. The Arya Samaj in the South	173
77. The Arya Samaj in the North	175
78. The Arya Samaj in the East	177
79. The Arya Samaj in the West	179
80. The Arya Samaj in the South	181
81. The Arya Samaj in the North	183
82. The Arya Samaj in the East	185
83. The Arya Samaj in the West	187
84. The Arya Samaj in the South	189
85. The Arya Samaj in the North	191
86. The Arya Samaj in the East	193
87. The Arya Samaj in the West	195
88. The Arya Samaj in the South	197
89. The Arya Samaj in the North	199
90. The Arya Samaj in the East	201
91. The Arya Samaj in the West	203
92. The Arya Samaj in the South	205
93. The Arya Samaj in the North	207
94. The Arya Samaj in the East	209
95. The Arya Samaj in the West	211
96. The Arya Samaj in the South	213
97. The Arya Samaj in the North	215
98. The Arya Samaj in the East	217
99. The Arya Samaj in the West	219
100. The Arya Samaj in the South	221

V.—THE SYSTEM OF CHAKRAS ACCORDING TO GORAKṢANĀTHA BY GOPI NATH KAVIRAJ



The system of mystic culture introduced by Gorakṣa nātha does not seem to have spread widely through the educated classes, so that although about a millenium has passed since this great man appeared his preachings have remained till to day almost a sealed book to many. The Gorakṣa śataka and Gorakṣa paddhati are two of the few Sanskrit works published which profess to give an exposition of this teacher's instructions. The Haṭhayogapradīpikā also belongs to this school, but it deserves to be supplemented.

We propose to deal in a separate paper, on the basis of Mss. and printed books (in Hindi and Sanskrit), with the entire system of mystic culture associated with Gorakṣa nātha, both historically and philosophically. Here we must confine ourselves to the system of Chakras or intra-organic centres of spirital energy recognised by Gorakṣanātha. Our description will be based on a Ms of Vairāṭa Purāṇa and on an old coloured chart (obtained accidentally from a local gentleman interested in this *panth*) representing the human body containing the spinal column with the various centres painted and duly located. It will be found that this arrangement differs widely from the current notions both of the Haṭhayoga school and of the Tantras.

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First of all in the perineum we have the Ādhāra chakra (coloured red) presided over by Gaṇeśa nātha with his two Powers, viz. Siddhi and Buddhi. This is identical with the well known Mūlādhāra of the Tantras. But the next centre,

called Mahāpadma chakra, controlled by Nīla nātha is unknown else where. The third, the Svādhiṣṭhāna chakra (coloured yellow), is in the genital region and has Brahmā for its Deity and Sāvitrī for the Power.

Between this and the Maṇipura there are three distinct centres, viz. Śaḍḍala (called also Suṣumṇā chakra), Garbha (in the Garbha sthāna) and Kuṇḍalinī (in the region adjoining the waist and presided over by Fire). Besides bare names and vague localisation we do not find statement for any further detail about these psychic vehicles. The Maṇipura is situated in the navel and has Viṣṇu for its Devatā. Above this is supposed to exist the so-called Liṅga chakra, of which, again, no particulars are given. Higher still, in the pericarp of the Anāhata is the seat of mind—*Manas*.

The Anāhata itself is in the heart and looks like a lotus with 12 petals, emitting a white radiance around. The presiding god of the chakra is named Mahādeva (Rudra nātha, in the Ms) and the Power is Umā. The ṛṣi is called Hiraṇyagarbha. This corresponds to the causal body, dreamless sleep, Paśyanti Vāk and Sāma Veda.

The next higher Chakra is of course Viśuddha, in the throat. It is a sixteen-petalled lotus, with smoky colour, presided over by Jīva and Ādyā Śakti. The Ṛṣi is Virāt. It corresponds to the causal body, dreamless sleep, Parāvāk, Atharvaṇa Veda, Jalandhara Bandha and Sāyujya Mukti.

The Prāṇa chakra which is a thirty-two-petalled lotus of bright hue (उद्द्योतवर्णप्रभा) and is controlled by Prāṇanātha and Paramā Śakti, is seated near the region of the throat (गलस्थान)*. It forms the 10th aperture of the human body. Of the four chakras above Viśuddha and below Ājñā, the

* This is apparently the so-called कण्ठकूप mentioned in the Yogasūtra 3.30.

second one is Avala chakra, furnished with 32 lobes shining like the rising sun (अरुणोद्योतप्रभा), presided by Fire. The exact site of this Chakra is not mentioned. From what is said it appears that it is seated where the three *granthis* viz. Brahma°, Viṣṇu° and Rudra°, unite (त्रिग्रन्थिस्थान), and is very intimately connected with Kālachakra and Yoginichakra. The Chivuka chakra is somewhere in the facial region, apparently near the chin, and is formed like a sun-like lotus of 34 lobes, presided by Prāṇa and Sarasvatī. All the devas have their seats within the lotus. Its *Rṣi* is named Krodha. All languages, indeed human speech itself, are supposed to have their origin here. The Balavān chakra is just below the Ājñā, in the nasal region, and looks like a three-petalled lotus of red, white and dark colour. This place is described as Tribhū, being the confluence of the three streams of Gaṅgā, Yamunā and Śarasvatī represented in the body by the three nāḍis, viz. Idā, Pīṅgalā and Suṣumnā. The presiding God of this Chakra is Praṇava and the Power Suṣumnā. The statement that this place is associated with the three *mātrās* of Praṇava (viz. A, U & M) becomes thus intelligible. The name of its *Rṣi* is given as Mahāhaṅkāra*.

The famous Ājñā chakra (called also Anī chakra in the Ms.), which is in the centre of the space between the two brows, is a diamond like (माणिक्यवर्णप्रभा) lotus of two petals, presided by Haṁsa Devatā and Suṣumnā Śakti. It corresponds to the Vijñāna state and Anupama Vāk, and to the half *mātrā* of the Praṇava.

The Karṇamūla chakra, within the auricular region, is a 36-lobed lotus of mixed colour (dark and yellow.) The presiding God and Power are Nāda and Śruti' respectively. It is the seat of the 36 *mātrkā*s.

* Could this term mean the *Purṇāhantā* or *Parāhantā* of the Trika and Tripurā systems of philosophy?

The Tribhūṇi chakra, above the brows, is a 26-lobed circle with Ākāśa as its *Rṣi*. This is the real Tribhūṇi, but how this place is connected with the Balavān chakra lower down is nowhere stated.

The Chandra chakra is in the forehead and consists of 32 lobes* with a colour between white and red†. It is presided by the Moon and Amṛta‡ Śakti. The *Rṣi* is Manas (mind) with its sixteen kalās. It is said that the sun goes to this lunar mansion to drink nectar.

This centre is very closely related to another chakra—the Amṛta chakra, almost in the same region, probably a little upwards. Its Devatā and Śakti are identical with those of the preceding chakra, but the *Rṣi* is Ātmā rather than Manas. It is from here that nectar is constantly flowing. This place is described as the abode of the Gāyatrī named Kāmadhenu (lit. 'wish-giving cow'), figured like a milch cow with four teats viz. Ambikā, Lambikā, Ghaṇṭikā and Tālikā. It has a human face with intoxicant looks (मदनेत्र), a peacock's tail, a horse's neck (श्रीवा), an elephant's tusk (शुण्ड), a tiger's arms (हस्तशार्दूल), a cow's horns, and wings consisting of Līlā Brahma and Haṃsa. It is a stranger figure. It is from the udder of this 'cow' that nectar is perpetually streaming down. The Khecharī, Viparītakaraṇī and other mudrās are some of the devices intended to check the downward flow of this blissful current. The Yogin who has obtained access to this chakra and abides here becomes immortal and free from the effects of Time.

Next is the Brahmadvāra Chakra, located above the forehead and shining with its 100 petals like the many coloured rainbow; and beyond this is the seat of the Akula

* Sixteen lobes, according to *The Serpent Power*, p. 146.

† White only, according to the Ms.

‡ Amadā Śakti, according to the Ms.

Kuṇḍalinī—a lotus of 600 petals bright like the newly risen sun.

On crossing this one comes up to the Brahmarandhra in the cranium (मूर्धस्थान), with its multi-coloured 1,000 petals. This is the so-called Sahasrāra of the mystic literature—the Aim and End of all spiritual progress. It is here that the Guru and the Chaitanya Śakti reside.

One would naturally expect that the series of chakras would come to an end here. But the picture on which the above account is based, mentions 6 chakras more beyond the Sahasrāra, viz. (a) Ūrdharandhra, (b) Bhramaraguḥā, (c) Akunṭhapīṭha Puṇyāgāra, (d) Kolhāṭa, (e) Vajradanḍa and (f) Nirādhāra Paramajyotiśchakra. The Ūrdharandhra, called Tālu chakra in the Ms, is seated in the Tālimā and is a 64-lobed chakra, presided by Gorakṣanātha and Siddhānta śakti. This statement is interesting as it gives us an idea of what the followers of the path thought in connection with the founder of their school. The Bhramaraguḥā, also called Alekha, i. e. Alakṣya chakra (called Brahma Chakra* in the Ms), is the place where *śamādhi-yoga* ensues, and *prāṇa* and *manas* cease to work. The lotus is described as furnished with ten millions of lobes and wonderfully brilliant. The presiding God of this centre is Alakṣyanātha, the Śakti called Māyā (= Mahāmāyā ? ; Akalā in the Ms.) and the Ṛṣi Mahāviṣṇu.

The higher Chakra with an equal number of lobes has Akalanātha as Devatā, Akaleśvarī as Śakti and as Akalā as Ṛṣi.

The Kolhāṭa Chakra is in the Śikhāmaṇḍala and corresponds to the Vaikuṇṭha of the Vaiṣṇavas and Kailāsa of the

* According to the Ms. the Brahma Chakra is really within the Bhramaraguḥā and consists of 108 lobes in which the great Maṇḍins are incessantly occupied with the repetition of Ajapā.

..Śaivas. Both the Devatā and the Śakti are named Ananta*. The Ms. calls this region a road to the Highest Void (परमशून्यमार्ग) ।

The description of Vajradanḍa is not very clear. It is said to be, as I understand it to be, in the form of a column, vast (महाविशाल), lustrous (तेजःपुञ्जप्रभा) and long (दीर्घ) ।

The final Chakra is in the Nirālambasthāna, with an infinite number of lobes, colours, mātṛkāś, devas and worlds. This is the Highest Seat of the Gurudeva.

Beyond this is a series of 20 voids of which nothing is said. The Ms. observes that Final Liberation takes place in the Great Void (परमशून्यस्थान) above 21 Brahmāṇḍas. Transcending the great Void the Yogin becomes eternally free from 'coming and going, i. e. the wheel of birth and death: स च योगी तिष्ठति युगे युगे ज्योतिः समेत्य ।

* * * *

We have tried to reproduce above with as much fidelity to the understood meaning of the chart as possible the account of the Gorakhpānthis concerning the arrangement and function of the various chakras. But as the chart was on an old canvas with the figures rendered indistinct by time and the notes appended generally vague, illegible and sometimes totally unintelligible it is quite likely that mistakes and in some places even confusion have been left unnoticed. It is sure nevertheless that the general presentation of the scheme is unimpeachable.

Taking it as we find it there is no doubt that the ideas of this school differed in many points from those of the Tantras on the same subject. The question of the total

* The Ms. calls the Devatā Achintyantāha and the Śakti Avyakta.

number of chakras may be left aside for the present*.¹⁰ For we are aware that there are several hidden (गुप्त) chakras which are not ordinarily counted; and very often a certain number of chakras, considered minor from one's own point of view, is supposed to form a connected whole. There are other reasons also which would explain the difference of the number in different systems. The actual description of a particular chakra is more important to a student for purposes of comparative studies. But even here there are certain fatal limitations. For instance the same chakra may not look exactly alike to different sādhakas. The personal saṅkalpa of the aspirant, either conscious or sub-conscious, and that of his Guru go a great way towards determining the nature of the Vision. The reality observed is, in a certain sense, only ideal.

Entering into detail we may observe that the Sahasrārā is not supposed to form the Highest Limit;—there are stages beyond. With this we may compare the accounts of the Rādhāsāmī sect who also hold more or less the same views.

The Manaśchakra as described here embodies 32 lobes, while elsewhere it is said to be 6-petalled (Dr. B. N. Seal, *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, p. 221; Avalon, *The Serpent Power*, p. 146).

Regarding अकुलकुण्डलिनी it may be said that the Tantrists locate it within the Moon of Consciousness which forms the pericarp of the downward facing Sahasrārā and is situated in the transcendent heaven (पर व्योम)—a technical term for

*The *Svachchhanda Sangraha*, according to Bhāskara's report (*Lalitāsahasranāma Bhāṣya*, p. 53), speaks of 32 chakras, cf. also *Advaita mārtaṇḍa* as reported in Avalon, *The Serpent Power*, pp. 169—170, and in *Shakti and Shakta* (2nd Edition), p. 409.

..a part of the cerebral region*. The contact of kula with this akula is the immediate cause of the flow of nectar (सुधास्राव).† While Gorakṣanātha holds that the nectar flows from the Amṛta chakra above the Moon, Bhāskara considers that it flows from the Akula which is within the Moon.

The name of Bhramara Guhā is to be found mentioned in the literature connected with the names of Kabir, Rādhā-swāmī, &c., but no where is its function clearly stated. The Sūtasamhitā and Bodhasāra use the term vaguely in the sense of Brahmarandhra. This so-called cave is in reality a hole or rather a hollow which appears to view when one gazes into the centre of the 'Kūṭastha.' The entrance to this hollow is brilliantly dark, but it is surrounded by a luminous ring of rays. The powers of obscuration (आवरण) and dissipation (विक्षेप) are said to guard this entrance, so that they try to screen up and throw off the gazer. It is only when the power of introvision is produced after the generation of pure magnetism within the body through strict continence, pure food, &c. and through the cultivation of the moral virtues of selflessness, forbearance, &c. and through the action of prāṇa that one can expect to gaze at this hollow without fear of आवरण and विक्षेप. At this state mere gazing makes the mouth of the cave wide open, and every tattva is illuminated.

In the Chart the Prāṇa chakra is described as the tenth avenue of the human body. This aperture is usually closed

* द्वादशान्तं ललाटेर्द्धा कपालोर्द्धावसानकम् ।

द्व्यङ्गुलोर्द्धं शिरोदेशं परं व्योम प्रकीर्तितम् ॥ Quoted by Bhāskara in his *Varivasyā Rahasya* (Com-on verse 51), p. 94 (Cal. Edition).

in men, so that the body is as a rule likened to a "city with nine gates" (Cf. नवद्वारे पुरे देही— Gītā) only. But a steady process of psychic discipline helps to open this avenue through which the Jiva of the Kramamukta-upāsaka passes away along the ray of the sun into the Solar Region, called also Brahmaloṇa, and thence with the dawn of Knowledge is absorbed in Brahman. The medulla oblongata (मस्तिष्क ग्रन्थि) above the Viśuddha Chakra, is one of the sites where the three nāḍis are united. From here the Suṣumṇā enters into the skull, and the other two nāḍis, viz. Idā and Piṅgalā, pass along the right and left sides of the forehead and meet together and are joined with the Suṣumṇā between the two eyebrows. From there the Idā goes to the left nostril and the Piṅgalā to the right. From the medulla the Suṣumṇā is bifurcated: (1) one line passes below the brain and in a rather oblique course comes to the eyebrow whence with a slightly upward bend pierces the pericarp of the Ājñā and unites with Idā and Piṅgalā. Then it comes out, and running straight up crosses a very subtle hole within the interior of the central region of the forehead and hanging down to some distance takes a curve and goes right up, penetrating the Sahasrāra and entering the Brahmarandhra.* (2) Another line goes up direct from the medulla, and through the interior of the skull extends to the Śikhara. With a slight curve it enters the Barhmarandhra. The mouth of this line of the Suṣumṇā which is in the Brahma randhra remains usually closed, while that of the first line is open. Consequently the hollows of the two lines are not in union.

* See Introduction to the Praṇava Gītā. In *The Serpent Power*, p. 130, the Suṣumṇā is said to terminate at the twelve-petalled lotus in the pericarp of the Sahasrāra. The *Maṇḍala Brāhmaṇopaniṣad* and its *Rāja Yoga Bhāṣya* refer to the Suṣumṇā as ending in the Brahmarandhra (Mys. Ed., p. 9).

While passing away from the body the yogin gets the closed mouth of the Suṣuṃṇā opened, on which the two holes mentioned above become unified. This is what is usually known by the name of the "10th avenue". In the Amaraugha Śāsana, however, the 10th aperture is identified with the mouth of the Śaṅkhinī, which is a hollow behind the front tooth (राजदन्त); and the Kaṅkalamālinī Tantra locates Brahmaṇḍhra just below the Śaṅkhinī. *

* तस्मिन् रन्ध्रे विसर्गं च नित्यानन्दं निरञ्जनम् ।
तदूर्ध्वं शङ्खिनी देवी सृष्टिस्थित्यन्तकारिणी ॥
ब्रह्मरन्ध्रं ततः स्मृतम् ।

VI—THEISM IN ANCIENT INDIA

BY GOPINĀTH KAVIRĀJ

Part I. Introduction.

(1)

As a brief introduction to the study of theistic philosophy in ancient India it is desirable to take a short survey of the old controversy over the Causal (efficient) Problem and the kindred questions centred round it. It is an interesting question,—one which inevitably presents itself in the study of all ancient Philosophy, and we cannot well afford to leave out a short discussion of it here.

It may be said, broadly speaking, that the doctrine of Īśvara is as old in its systematised formulation as the age of the Mahābhārata and the Upaniṣads. The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad contains a nominal enunciation of some of the most popular theories current in its time in explanation of the origin of the Universe, and Īśvaravāda forms one of this number. Thus we read :

कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छा

भूतानि येनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्यम् ।

संयोग एषां न त्वात्मभावा-

दात्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः ॥

In the 2nd half of this famous passage, suffering though from a slight ambiguity of expression, the doctrine of Īśvara, I believe, is undoubtedly indicated*. A more pronounced

* Cf. The well-known verse, आत्मा जन्तुर्नशिोऽयं &c., which forms the nucleus, as it were, of the whole subsequent literature on Īśvaravāda. The *locus classicus* of this śloka is Mahābhārata, Vanaparvan, 30,28. For further details see our note on Īśvaravāda (*passim*).

statement; however, appears in Suśruta (1.7)† where six diverse views are mentioned. Puṇyārāja in his commentary on the Vākyapadīya (1.28), Sarvajñātma Mūni in the Saṃkṣepa Śāriraka (1.528), Guṇaratna in the Śaḍdarśanasamuchchaya-vṛtti (pp. 10-19), Māṭhara (Chowkh. Sk. S., pp. 75-76) and Gaudapāda (Ben. Sk. S., 37-38) on Sāṅkhya Kārikā no. 61, Bhaṭṭa Utpala on Brhat Samhitā 1. 7, Āchārya Nemichandra in Gommatasāra, verses 877-883, and Gotama in Nyāya Sūtras IV. 1. 14—43 speak of various rival theories about the origin of the world (Cf. Śivapurāṇa, Vāyaviya Saṃhitā, Uttara Bhāga, VIII.14). Many of these had been in vogue in independent forms, and as inter-related, long before the rise of Buddhism. And there seems to be good reason to believe that in course of centuries, with the systematisation of the schools, some of these doctrines lost their independence altogether and came to be affiliated to the systems *newly built up*. The inevitable consequence of this gradual assimilation would appear to have been a blending of thoughts which sometimes seriously hinders historical discrimination. I am however trying to append below a short note on each of these doctrines, taking especial care to keep up its integrity as closely as feasible*; and it will be evident from a glance at this description that theistic studies were very intimately connected in early times with the study of the fundamental Causal Problem with which all these theories had endeavoured to deal, and that they are traceable to a great antiquity in the past.

(2)

Svabhāvavāda

Under the name of Svabhāvavāda we may comprise almost† all those modes of thinking which may deny the

* Dr. Schrader, in his excellent tract "Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīras und Buddhas" (Strassburg, 1902), has attempted to sum up the views of some of these theories.

† I say *almost*, as some of the other Vādas also (e. g. Yādychhā, &c) reject the principle of causality altogether.

principle of Causality, more particularly *efficient* causality, and assert the supremacy of the inherent or immanent nature of a thing. Theoretically it may be thought of under a twofold aspect—extreme and moderate:

A. *The extremist view:*

It repudiates the possibility of discovering the cause of a thing at the very outset of the inquiry and sets up in explanation of the why of an event or product, the doctrine of Svabhāva. This is Svabhāvavāda par excellence.

Futility of causal investigation.

B. *The moderate view:*

It allows causal analysis as possible and even as legitimate, within certain limits, but holds that this discursive process of seeking for a sufficient reason cannot be carried very far. At the last stage, however, where no adequate explanation is forthcoming, an appeal must be made to "the nature of the thing"; and this is svabhāva. This is practically a confession of the impotence of human reason in regard to all first principles, on which some assumptions have necessarily to be made.

Ultimate causes are inscrutable: appeal to "the nature of the thing."

From the above it would appear that the former kind of svabhāvavāda is inimical to scientific progress, in that it puts a stop to the initiative of all researches by denying the existence and knowledge of the principle of efficient causation, while the latter view is quite sane and sound.

The earliest representatives of the extreme form of (1) Its history. svabhāvavāda seem to have been a set of free thinkers in Ancient India who were originally called lokāyatikas* but subsequently came to be more widely known under

* cf. Bhaṭṭa Utpala (on Brhat Samhitā 1.7) : अपरे अन्ये लौकायतिकाः स्वभावं जगतः कारणमाहुः । स्वभावादेव जगद् विचित्रमुत्पद्यते स्वभावतो विलयं याति । See also Schrader, pp. 30-32; Kern, Manual of Buddhism, p. 134.

the name of *chārvākas**. Rank materialism, an absence of belief in the Unseen and of regard for Authority, and an uncompromising rationalism—more correctly casuistry (*वितण्डा*)† were their general characteristics.

* As to the reason why and the circumstances under which the name *lokāyata* went out of popular use and was superseded by the term *Chārvāka* nothing is definitely known. But it is interesting to note that the meaning of the two terms is virtually the same. Cf. Nilakaṇṭha's Com. on M. Bh., 1.91.48 Kumbh, Kon. Ed., p. 164 (Mādhava's Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha, Poona Ed., p. 1)

† The word *Lokāyata* is explained as Casuistry (*वितण्डावसत्य*, *वितण्डावसत्य*) by Buddhaghōṣa and in the *Abhidhāna Padīpikā*. Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, Viz. Ed., P. 270:—

न हि लोकायते किञ्चित् कर्तव्यमुपदिश्यते । वैतण्डिककथैवासौ न पुनः कश्चिदागमः ॥

In the *Vidhurapaṇḍita Jātaka* (Fausboll, *The Jātaka*, VI, p. 286) Vidhura declaims against it (*न सेवे लोकायतिकं*), where the commentator expounds the word as *वितण्डासहायं लोकायतिकवादं* ।

But cf. *Āṅguttaranikāya*, III. 58.1, III. 59.1, *Kūṭadanta sūta* 14, *Assalāyana Sūta* (beginning), *Milinda pañho* (p. 10, Trenckner's Ed.), where the word *Lokāyata* stands for a branch of learning distinctive of well-educated Brahmins. It is clear, therefore, from a glance at the testimonies of these literary usages that the word meant originally *Vitaṇḍā* or Casuistry and nothing else, and that its adherents brooked no authority other than their own. That *Vitaṇḍā* too has a recognized place in a well-organised System of Debate seems evident from *Nyāya Sūtra* 4.2.50. What makes it repugnant to the orthodox community, therefore, is its impatience of all authority. In *Nyāya* the function of *Vitaṇḍā* is destructive, negative (*परपक्षप्रतिषेध*) and is necessarily subordinate, whereas in *Lokāyata* it is essential; and we know that without a constructive element, without a positive theory to propound (*स्वपक्षस्थापना*), a *Śāstra* ceases to have any great interest and even value. It is this negative element in general characteristic of the *Lokāyata* school which has earned for it the opprobrious nickname of *Nāstika*.

(For some interesting notes regarding this sect as bearing on the M. Bh, see Hopkins, *The Great Epic*, pp 86-90).

There are evidences in the Pali Literature as to the existence, during the age of Buddhism or even earlier, of a class of persons, Brahmins by caste, who spent all their wits in the subtleties of futile controversies. —What the nature of these controversies was in which they found so much pleasure and showed such skill we do not exactly know. But one thing stands out certain. They did not believe in the Vedas nor even in the Dharma Śāstras—the canonical works—of the Buddhists and the Jains. Hence their arguments did not appeal to any of those religious communities in which in spite of mutual differences there was unanimity in an unquestioning and unquestionable obedience to Authority (in the form of Veda or Buddha Vachana or Jinaśāsana).

Thus we find that the Brahmins, the Buddhists and the Jains were all equally ill-disposed towards the Lokāyatikas on whom they looked down with contempt as their common enemies: (a) In the Rāmāyaṇa (II. 100. 38-39) Rāmachandra is said to have spoken to Bharata—

कच्चिन्न लोकायतिकान् ब्राह्मणांस्तान् सेवसे ।

अनर्थकुशला ह्येते बालाः परिडतमानिनः ॥

धर्मशास्त्रेषु मुख्येषु विद्यमानेषु दुर्बुधाः ।

बुद्धिमान्वीक्षिकीं प्राप्य निरर्थं प्रवदन्ति ते ॥

Here the Commentator Rāma explains the word Lokāyatikas as चार्वाकमतानुसारिणः or as शुष्कतर्कवाचदूकाः । There is little doubt that Manu II. 11 refers to these Lokāyatika Brahmins given to casuistry by the expression nāstika. (b) Pali works abound in references to this sect. The Buddha did not allow his Bhikṣus to learn or teach the Lokāyata system (Vinaya Piṭaka, Culla Vagga, V. 33. 2). The notorious Chhabbaggiya monks whose names occur so often as mischief-makers in the Vinaya Piṭaka were adepts in this branch of learning. It is condemned among other low arts in the Mahāsīla 5. The Nepalese Buddhists refer to it as one of

those things with which a Bodhisattva should not occupy himself or in which good disciples should not take any pleasure (Saddharma Puṇḍarīka, Ch. XIII). (c) The attitude of the Jains may be best evidenced by their describing it as a form of मिच्छादिद्वि or heresy (Weber, Bhagavati, II. 248).

The extreme form of Svabhāvavāda may be thus
 II. Its doctrines illustrated. It has already been noted that in this view the rejection of causal principle forms the most important feature*. It is averred that neither sensuous perception nor inference is an evidence in support of its existence. For mere perception of two events is not sufficient to establish between them a causal nexus, the reason being that even when a thing is observed by the senses doubt may still arise as to its being a cause. To ascertain whether a given antecedent condition has the character of a true cause it is really necessary to find out with certainty the elements of invariability (नियम ; and of relevancy (अनन्यथासिद्धि) involved in such a notion. But this certitude can never be arrived at. As for inference being possibly a means of the ascertainment of causality, the Lokāyatika contests its evidentiary value. The problem of Induction is to him insoluble. The conviction of Universal Concomitance or of the absence of a condition limiting the Universality of the relation on which all inference is based is inaccessible to human resources. The result is that to the Lokāyatika there is no order revealed in the world, either of sense or of intellect. Every thing stands isolated and self-contained.

* In the commentary on Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka (1,528), where the svabhāvavāda is alluded to Rāmātīrtha attributes the view to the nāstikas and Madhusūdana explains it, saying that it consists in holding that the product comes into existence without any cause : कारण विनैव कार्यं भवतीति स्वभाववादिनः । Agnichit Puruṣottama adds : स्वभाव एव हेतु रिति चावीकाः ।

In this state of intellectual confusion the fact of contingency observable in phenomenal creation appears to be very hard to explain; but an explanation may be suggested. Contingency means that a product comes into existence at one particular moment rather than another. But how is this particular time to be determined? The usual reply of the causalists consists in referring this time-determination to the co-operation of the antecedent conditions. But the svabhāvavādī staves off this difficulty by an appeal to svabhāva, remarking that no further question on this point is relevant. Let us try to understand the situation. It is well known that even the doctrine of causality fails to explain the ultimate principles; it is then simpler, so it is affirmed, to assume at the very start that causes, known or unknown (अदृष्ट) are all superfluous. Varieties and inequalities remain after all unexplained facts, and no amount of analysis will ever furnish us with the right solution. The only reasonable conclusion therefore in such cases is to say that it is the nature of the thing to happen at such and such a time†, and that is all. The only law here is the law of svabhāva. Just as a piece of cloth occupies the same space as its material cause,—the threads (तन्तु), and not the shuttle &c., although the threads and the shuttles are both equally causes; in the same way a product, though destitute of a cause, may appear at one time and not at another. As in the former case space association (देशनियम) is due to svabhāva and not to a cause, so in the latter time-relation (कालनियम) too is similarly to be explained. This being so, the contingency of the visible-phenomena need not be in opposition to the fact of their being self-sufficient (निरपेक्ष) and uncaused (अहेतुक).* The position of the Lokāyatika on this point

* See Nyāya Kusumāñjali 1. 5. Guṇaratna in the Introduction to his commentary on the Śaṅkaraśāstrī's Nyāya-sūtra, p. 13, gives also a report on the views of these svabhāvavādīns on causation.

is thus summed up by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī :

अदृष्टाङ्गीकारेऽपि कचिद्गत्वा स्वभावे पर्यवसानात् स्वाभाविकमेव जगद्वैचित्र्यमस्तु दृष्टे संभवत्यदृष्टकल्पनानवकाशात् ।
अतः काम एव प्राणिनां कारणं नान्यददृष्टेश्वरादीत्याहुरिति लोका-
यतिकदृष्टिरियम् ।

(Com. on Gītā, 16. 8,

N. Sāg. Ed., p. 641).

From what we have seen of svabhāvavāda we can well understand that it is a doctrine of unmitigated automatism, in the sense that all movements, within the organism and outside it, are held to proceed from the inherent necessity of the body rather than from an extrinsic principle of efficiency, such as Personal Will or Adṛṣṭa*. The power and freedom

* (a) While denying the effectuating power of a निमित्तकारण, and conceiving matter as moved into action of its own nature परिणाम स्वभाव the Sāṅkhya too approaches the position of a Svabhāvavādin. [Cf the identification proposed by Nīlakaṇṭha in his Com. on M. Bh., Śāntiparva 231.53, p. 1635. But this is historically untenable]. But it has this difference from the above that the necessity of a निमित्त is not here entirely dispensed with :

- (1) The Puruṣa, though exercising no volition, is still a निमित्त by virtue of Its Presence merely. This Presence is indispensable to set into motion all varieties of existence which lie eternally embosomed in the Primordial Unmanifest Matter.
- (2) And the efficiency of adṛṣṭa is also accepted, in so far as it determines the precise nature of the product, by removing the obstructions which stand between the cause and its manifestation as (i. e. transformation into) the product.
- (3) In addition to this, the efficiency of पुरुषार्थ—viz. भोग and अपवर्ग is admitted, though as a Final Cause—उद्देश्यत्वेन । The aim and purpose of all natural evolution is either one or the other, according as the Self is on the path of Enjoyment or of Renunciation. All movement is governed by purpose.

of Will being thus totally disavowed, the theory commits itself to the awkward position of a queer sort of Determinism.

The literature of the Svabhāvavādins is now entirely lost except what has reached us in fragments. Here is a verse which appears to have originally belonged to a standard work of this literature, describing in outline the three main theses of this doctrine, viz. (1) Varieties due to svabhāva, (2) movement (pravṛtti and nivṛtti) due to svabhāva, and (3) denial of free will :

कः कण्टकानां प्रकरोति तैक्ष्ण्यं विचित्रभावं मृगपक्षिणां च ।

माधुर्यमिक्षोः कटुतां च निम्बे स्वभावतः सर्वमिदं प्रवृत्तम् ॥

I quote this from Bhaṭṭa Utpala's Com. on Bṛhat Saṃhitā (under 1.7), but it also occurs in the Śaḍdarśana Samuchchaya vṛtti (p. 13), in Ḍallana's Com. on Saśruta (Śāntira°, Ch. I), and, among other ślokas of a similar nature, in Aśvaghōṣa's Buddhacharita (IX.47-52)*. In the last there is a slight variation in the reading of the verse in the second half : thus

Line 3=स्वभावतः सर्वमिदं प्रवृत्तं

Line 4=न कामकारोऽस्ति कुतः प्रयत्नः ।

(b) Of the 4 Buddhist systems in Nepal, of which Hodgson gave a brief sketch in his famous essay on the subject (Asiatic Researches, Vol. XVI, pp. 435-440), I feel disposed to identify the Svābhāvikas, the Yātnikas and the Kārmikas with sects which held स्वभाव, प्रयत्न (Will) and कर्म (Adṛṣṭa) respectively as the sole principle of efficiency. The Aisvatikas of course are the well-known Isvaravādins.

* Cf Gommatasāra, verse 883, where the reading is—को कण्टकं तैक्ष्ण्यं मिगविहंगमादीनां । विविहत्तं तु सहाश्रो इति सर्वं पि य सहाश्रोति ॥ The verse—अग्निरुष्णो जले शीतं समस्पर्शस्तयानिलः । केनेदं चित्रितं तस्मात् स्वभावात्तद्व्यवस्थितिः ॥—quoted in Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha (Poona Ed., p. 4) and in Varadarāja and Vardhamāna on Kusumāñjali,—may also be compared.

Probably this view is referred to as निर्निमित्तवाद in Ny. Sū. 4.1.22—24.

Udayana, in his Kusumāñjali (1.5), appears to make svabhāvavāda one of the five forms of आकस्मिकत्ववाद, the remaining 4 forms being (1) अहेतुवाद, (2) अभूतिवाद, (3) स्वत उत्पादवाद (4) & अनुपाख्योत्पादवाद । A brief note on these tenets is, I believe, necessary to make the discussion complete. (1) The first view is apparently a formal denial of causality, but not of production. This much is common with svabhāvavāda, but it does not accept the elaborate explanation of svabhāva as offered by the latter. This अहेतुवाद seems to me identical with the famous अधिच्चसमुत्पन्नवाद so often met in Pali literature. (cf Brahmajālasutta, 1.30-34 = Dīgha nikāya Vol. I, pp. 28-30, Mil. Pañ. 1.443). (अधिच्च=fortuitous, opposed to अभिरुह=habitual, Mil Pañ. 1.442, or पटिच्च=having a cause). As for the meaning of the term अधिच्च, cf. Udāna VI. 5, where the word from its context seems to mean neither स्वत उत्पन्न nor परत उत्पन्न । Buddhaghōṣa (Sumaṅgala 1.118) explains it as अहेतुत उत्पन्न । This is really the so-called अहेतुवाद । Buddhaghōṣa explains its form as अहुत्वा सत्तत्ताय परिणत (i. e. अभूत्वा भवनम्). There is reference to the Ahetuvāda in the Mahābodhi-jātaka (Fausboll, The Jātaka, VI, pp. 228, 237), but the doctrine appears to have a slightly different shade of meaning there.

(2) The 2nd view is a down-right rejection of production (भवन) itself. I cannot say anything about the historical setting of this vāda. Could it be an extreme form of Śāśvatavāda which in later times entered into Vedānta and Sāṅkhya-Yoga ?

(3) The third view is a strange doctrine in which the duality usually set up between an effect and its cause is

denied. This view is referred to in (1) above, and in Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka Kārikā*.

(4) The last doctrine is evidently some form of *Sūnyavāda* in which a product is said to appear from a pre-existing Void or Nothing. In this view of Causality the reality of both **उपादान** and **निमित्त** is denied.

Ujjvaladatta divides *Svabhāva* as two-fold, viz, (1) *nisarga* and (2) *svabhāva* proper. The former is explained as habit and the latter as nature. Habit has its origin in conscious and repeated effort in the past, but nature is spontaneous and has no extrinsic source of origin at all. He says : **वहिर्हेतुत्वनपेक्षी तु स्वभावोऽथ प्रकीर्तितः । निसर्गश्च स्वभावश्च इत्येष भवति द्विधा ॥ निसर्गः सुदृढाभ्यासजन्यः संस्कार उच्यते । अजन्यस्तु स्वतः सिद्धः स्वरूपो भाव उच्यते ॥** (Quoted in *Nyāya-Kośa*, 2nd Ed., p. 971.)

(3)

NIYATIVĀDA

The views of the *Niyativādins* are thus stated in *Daṭṭana's* *Niyati*—its meaning. Commentary: **पूर्वजन्मार्जितौ धर्माधर्मौ नियतिः, सैव सर्वस्य कारणमिति नियतिवादिनः ।** As thus expressed the doctrine appears to be practically identical in sense with the *Karma-vāda* to which *Varāha Mihira* refers in the *Bṛhat Saṃhitā* (1.7). *Nilakaṇṭha* makes it the especial feature of the *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy (on *M. Bh. Śānti Prava*, Ch. 231. 53, Beng. Ed., p. 1635),* but the reason is not given. The word *niyati* according to the above definition stands undoubtedly either for the whole body of stored Karmic forces which are waiting for the right Time,—proper season, to be realised into action or only for that part of it which has commenced to

* Cf. *Bhaṭṭa Utpala* : **परे अन्ये मीमांसका जगतः कर्म कारणं जगुरुक्तवन्तः ।** The following verse is quoted—**पूर्वजन्मार्जितं यच्च कर्म पुंसां शुभाशुभम् । तदेव सर्वजन्तूनां सृष्टिसंहारकारणम् ॥** Com. on *Bṛh. Saṃ.* (1. 7)

fructify. In any sense it is a doctrine held in common by all the systems of India, and not by Mīmāṃsā in particular. Nīlakaṇṭha's justification seems, however, to be thus possible: in all the systems Karma has a subordinate rank, in that it has to work in subjection to the Divine Will or at any rate to the transcendental influence of Puruṣa; but in Mīmāṃsā alone the restrictive condition laying down that an insentient object cannot move into action of itself is totally rejected and in consequence of this Karma has in Mīmāṃsā a unique position. Mīmāṃsā is *par excellence* a karmavādin.

But to me it seems as if the original significance of Niyativāda were somewhat different. In all probability the original vādas known as Svabhāvavāda, Kālavāda, Yadrchchhāvāda, Niyativāda &c. were collateral and had a community of origin. They were all non-theistic assumptions, which had arisen in attempting to find out an explanation of the appearance and disappearance of phenomena. All were more or less of a determinist cast. The reality of Kṛti-Puruṣakāra (Kāmakāra) or Freedom of the Will is denied everywhere, and with this the agency of the Self. Naturally therefore Niyati would seem to stand for the blind driving impulse of a Power from behind, without indeed the redeeming capacity of an initiative Will. It is, so to speak, the determining power of the past asserting itself over against the vacuity of the present. Thus viewed Niyati answers in a large measure to the ancient classical notions of Necessity (*necessiteo ineluctabilis*) or Fate (*fatum*). It is altogether a different conception from Adṛṣṭa, in so far as it is an inexorable and inevitable destiny, in every manner blind and purposeless. Adṛṣṭavāda allows for the freedom of will and the consequent possibility of fresh actions, with the

* It seems to be against these niyativādins or necessitarians that the tirades of the Yogavāsiṣṭha were directed.

result that Adrṣṭa and Puruṣakāra are held to be capable of acting and reacting on each other. Adrṣṭa is never an implacable necessity, for its power, however intense, may be neutralised by an act of the Will, provided that it is sufficiently strong.

The doctrine known as *Pubbekata-vāda* (पूर्वकृतवाद), of which we find an account in the Pali Literature, approaches the philosophical position of Niyati in so far as it denies the freedom of the will and the existence of the present Karma capable of modifying the past. In the Mahābodhi-jātaka (Fausboll, The Jātaka, Vol. V, pp. 228, 238-9) where this view is described it is plainly stated that pleasure and pain are due *entirely* to the past karma and that the act of rendering pleasure to or inflicting pain upon others means really a discharge of old debts and involves *no fresh moral responsibility*. The two doctrines are not therefore exactly identical.

Nemichandrāchārya explicitly says that Niyativāda consists in holding that the time, instrumentality, manner and the subject of an action are all pre-determined and invariable: जत्तु जदा जेण जहा जस्स य नियमेण होदि जत्तु तदा । तेण तहा तस्स हवे इदि वादो नियदिवादो दु (Verse 882).

In the (1) Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa, in the (2) ancient Pañcharātra and in the (3) Śaiva systems the conception of Niyati is of course greatly modified. There is none of that rigid and inflexible determinism, that blank fatalism, which prevailed in the old extremist school.

(1) In the former, for instance (Vairāgya Sec., 26 Chap), it stands, stripped of metaphor, as equivalent to what I consider to be the Cosmic Law (समाष्टिकर्म) or the Combined Adrṣṭas of a particular system of the world. Ānanda-bodhendra, in his com. on the above (verse 6, Nir. Sag. Ed., Vol. I, p. 54), explains the word simply as कृतस्य कर्मणः

फलावश्यम्भावनियमः, but the context hardly leaves any doubt as to the exact nature of its connotation. And again, the brilliant metaphor conceiving Niyati as the consort of Time-spirit with whom it dances in union* and sets up the cosmic movement lends undoubtedly a strong support to my contention about its universality.

I may take this opportunity of pointing out that this Cosmic Law, including what are generally called the Laws of Nature, is according to Yoga Vāsiṣṭha, as in the Purāṇas usually†, the stamp of God's Will set on the forms of creation.

Thus the question turns on the origin of svabhāva
 Niyati or Nature's (वस्तुस्वभाव) or of the laws of nature.
 Laws. Why, e. g. is fire hot and ice cold? How are the final differences to be accounted for? The simple answer is—through Niyati. So the Yogavāsiṣṭha says. But what is Niyati?

To start from the state of Universal Dissolution when all phenomenal varieties are believed to sink into the Unity of the Absolute. On the close of this quiescent period, which is indicated by Time, God wakes into activity and wills into manifestation all the entities of the preceding

* This seems to be a counterpart of the remarkable conception which ascribes all rhythm in the universe—nay, all vibrations in it—to the dancing sports of Hara and Pārvatī.

† In the Pauranic view Kāla and Niyati are but forms of the Divine Energy, or more properly of the Divine Will, so called when this latter is concerned with the creation, maintenance and disruption of the Universe. It is rather a loose employment of the term, characteristic of the popular literature of the Purāṇas, and may be taken for what it may be worth.

Cf. महाभावेऽविवेकिते नियतिर्माहनीति च । प्रकृतिर्वासनेऽयं तवेच्छानन्तं चोच्यते ॥
 (Quoted in Vāchaspatya, p. 4076)

cycle which have not yet completed their round of worldly journeys. This rise of Will (involving its logical precedents—Knowledge and Desire) in God is tantamount to the maturity or fructification (through Time) of the Universal Karma hitherto lying dormant. God as thus willing forth or projecting the Universe, subject to the past Karmas of the Jivas, is technically known by the name of Brahmā, and the Universe thus brought forth as the expression of His Will (संकल्पजन्य) is really a Mental Creation. The forms of his Will as expressed in the beginning of Creation persist even to-day and will persist till the very end. They are in this sense unalterable. These fixed laws and relations and the properties of things are what is collectively known as Niyati.* सर्गादौ या यथा रूढा संवित्कचन सन्ततिः । साद्याप्यचलितान्येन स्थिता नियतिरुच्यते ॥ (Yo. Vā, Utpatti Sec., 54 22, Nir. Sag. Ed., Vol. I, p, 260). It is interesting to note that this fixity is not absolute, in so far as individual acts of the will are believed, according to their degrees of purity, to be able to influence more or less successfully this pre-destined nature. But what particular karma has the power of acting on a particular aspect of Niyati is already determined by the Will of God, and this remaining inviolable the fixity of Niyati stands in one way unassailed. It would be instructive to compare with this the view of Vyāsa in his Com. on the Yoga Sūtra III. 45 where he notes that the Yogin who has conquered by a process of psychic control (संयम) the 5 forms of the bhūtas and can direct them to his will is rewarded *inter alias* with the power of immediately

* Kālidāsa, in Raghu Vaṃśa (VIII. 46) says that nectar and poison may be converted into each other under God's Will : विषममृतं कचिद् भवेदमृतं वा विषमीत्येच्छया ॥

This shows that the properties of physical objects were believed to be the immediate result of God's Will.

realising his will. The essences of the bhūtas (भूतप्रकृतयः) obey his will, as soon as it arises. But even such a yogin, with command over the entire forces of nature, does not act in violation to the established order of the universe, viz. the order already imposed by the Will of a Supreme Self (i. e. God) similarly empowered: न च शक्तोऽपि पदार्थविषयोऽं करोति । कस्मात् ? अन्यस्य यत्रकामावसायिनः पूर्वसिद्धस्य तथा भूतेषु संकल्पात् ।

Vāchaspati's Comment on the above is of exceeding interest. He observes that a Yogin of the kind described above may indeed alter the *powers* and *properties* of things, since these are variable, being subject to diverse conditions, e. g., time, place, origin and circumstances; but he can in no wise reverse the *nature* of the things themselves.

(2) In the Pañcharātra works, however, Niyati is conceived as the mother of Time and the immediate product of Māyā Śakti*. Probably this is a modification of the early Sāṅkhya in which besides the grosser time, which is declared to be an emanation from Ākāśa (Sā. Sut. II. 12), a subtler form of it, perhaps equally eternal with Puruṣa and Prakṛti, was conceded. The question of Puruṣa being left out of account, it seems to me likely that the Prakṛti and Kāla of the ancient Sāṅkhya correspond to Śakti (Māyā) and its Time-body (consisting of Niyati and Kāla) in the Pañcharātras (as preserved in the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā). The Guṇa-body of Śakti is of course the same as the disturbed state of Prakṛti's equilibrium brought about by the influence of Time.

(3) The Śaiva works present a slightly different account from the above. But even here Niyati and Kāla are clearly distinguished in their functions, and have none of that stern fatalistic tinge about them which is the distinctive feature of the extremist schools known by those two names. Niyati and

*See Schrader's Introduction (*loc. cit.*, pp. 62-66).

Kāla are here two of the five forms of limitation of experience, viz. those in regard to Space and Time, imposed by Māyā Śakti on the experiencing Self (प्रमाता), Niyati being concerned with the ob. curation of the Immanence (व्यापकत्व) of the Self and Kāla with that of its Eternity (नित्यत्व)*. The main difference of the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava notions on this point lies in the fact that whereas in the former Niyati and Kāla are supposed to spring simultaneously from Māyā Śakti, in the latter Kāla comes out of Niyati which is the direct offspring of† Māyā.

(4)

KĀLAVĀDA

With Niyativāda stands intimately connected the concept of Kāla, a detailed review of which is omitted from this place‡. The original Kālavāda was doubtless a fatalistic creed, much like the notion to which Uddyotakara refers in the Nyāya Vārtika (Ben. Ed. p. 459)§. But the doctrine of which Ḍallana speaks is evidently different. The writer quotes a verse from the astronomer Śrīpati, in which Time is described as the Lord-Īśvara—the Source of the world's efficient Causation. From the above as well as from the statements of Rāmatīrtha and Agnichit Puruṣottama (Com. on Saṃk. Śāriraka, I. 528) it would seem that this view was that of the astronomers||.

* See Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya. Sut. 9, pp. 21—22 (Srinagar Ed).

† Cf. J. C. Chatterjea's excellent summary of the Śaiva doctrines in the *Kāśhmīr Śaivism*, pp. 51, 75-83, Avalon, *Studies in Mantra Śāstra* Part I.

‡ For a very able and comprehensive survey of the materials bearing on this theory see Schrader, pp. 17-30.

§ Cf. Hopkins, *The Great Epic*.

|| Cf. Nīla Kaṇṭha on M. Bh., Śānti Parva, 231, 53. But Jayanta in the Nyāya Māñjarī (p. 138 9-17) gives a different

(110)

(5)

YADṚCHCHHĀVĀDA

Yadṛchchhā is defined by Śaṅkarāchārya (on Śvetāśvatara Up.) as आकस्मिकप्राप्तिः or Coincidence (Cf. Guṇaratna, p. 15). The upholders of this doctrine were also deniers of the Uniformities of Nature (कार्यकारणभाव), and asserted that the knowledge of the causal relation was unattainable by any of the accredited means of proof. It is observed that the same product arises from each of a variety of antecedents*, and this would not be possible if there were a definite and invariable relation between the cause and the effect. The connection between an antecedent and the consequent following upon it is always casual, rather than causal.

It is very difficult to distinguish between Svabhāva and Yadṛchchhā, as both are identical so far as the rejection of the causal principle is concerned. But the distinction however may be taken to lie in this that whereas in svabhāvavāda a niyama is formally admitted which is technically known as svabhāvaniyama, in yadṛchchhāvāda there is no scope for any such restriction†. With reference to the question—why a jar should be produced from clay and

report of the astronomical conception of Time. In this view, it is urged, time is taken to be a series of movements of the stars and planets on which our notions of succession and simultaneity depend.

I do not see how to reconcile the two accounts except by supposing that they represent two different epochs in the history of astronomical notions.

* Cf. Guṇaratna, p. 15.

† Nīla Kaṇṭha attributes, evidently, this chance-theory to the Ārhatas : यदृच्छेत्यनियंवादितामार्हतायाम् (on M. Bh., Sānti, Ch. 231, 53).

not from threads—the answer of the svabhāvavādin is a plain statement of the nature of the thing which is unchangeable, but the answer of the yadrchchhāvādin would be a flat denial of the reality of any such *natural principle*. The observed order and regularity in our experience is due to mere Chance, they would say. Amalānanda, in his Vedānta Kalpataru on 2. 1. 33, p. 246 (Viz. Ed.), brings out^r this distinction very clearly in the following remarkable sentence :
 नियतनिमित्तमनपेक्ष्य यदा कदाचित्प्रवृत्त्युदयो यदृच्छा, स्वभावस्तु
 स एव यावद्वस्तुभावी यथा श्वासादौ ।

VII—HINDU POETICS

BY BATUKNATH ŚARMĀ

About twenty-five years ago, Dr. Grierson, in his preface to his translation of *Bhāṣā Bhūṣaṇa**, very rightly observed that the *Alaṅkāra* Literature had not sufficiently attracted the attention of oriental scholars as many other subjects had done. That remark of the learned linguist is even now almost as true as it was when it was made. India is undoubtedly under a very great obligation to all savants of all nationalities who have ever devoted their time with unflinching energy to the searching out of hidden treasures of this ancient land. But it may be said with all justice and without any tinge of ingratitude that hardly any of them ever dived deep into the fountain-heads of Sanskrit Learning. The *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* and the *Indian Antiquary*, though they are mines of all kinds of information regarding India, contain but a few articles on the discussion or description of any serious subject such as philosophy² or poetics. Such is the fate of almost all oriental journals known to the present writer.

Dr. Regnaud was the first, and perhaps also the last, person to write upon this subject with any degree of scientific thoroughness and exactness. But even his work† has not done full justice to the great subject. It does not treat of all the topics coming under *Alaṅkāra Śāstra*. The consideration of the divisions of *Kāvya* according to the form

* Published in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XXIII, p, 215.

† *La Rhétorique Sanskrite*, Paris, 1884. It contains the texts of the *Nāṭya Śāstra*, Chs. VI and VII, and of *Rasatarāṅgiṇī*.

is left wholly untouched, and consequently it has not a word to say about the Hindu Drama. Even his bibliography is not large and omits many important names. But we must observe to the credit of Dr. Regnaud that he did his best, and at the time when he wrote his work, perhaps none could have done better.

In 1891, Professor Lévi of Paris wrote his *Lé Theatre Indien* which is undoubtedly a very useful work on Hindu Drama. This work is a valuable contribution, and, as M. Barth reviewing it in *Revue Critique* (1892) said, gives evidence of insight into the history and development of the Indian Theatre. But in spite of its great utility, it treats of only a portion of the subject, viz *Drśya Kāvya*. Many of the views expressed therein, have, with the advance of research, become wholly antiquated; and as a matter of fact the learned author himself, has, as he recently remarked*, changed many of them.

In 1902 Richard Schmidt brought out his work on *Hindu Erotics*†, in which he gave here and there some indirect account of Hindu poetics also. His work is indeed a monument of scholarly labour and diligence but his subject being *Kāma Śāstra*, it has no direct bearing on *Alaṅkāra*.

Now we may turn to a few important articles on the subject published in oriental Journals. Leumann‡ wrote a paper on *Bharata* in the *Journal of the German Oriental Society* in 1894. In the same Journal, Jacobi published his translations of *Dhvanyāloka*¶ and *Alaṅkāra Sarvasva*.§ Jacob

* In his address to the students of the Benares Hindu University.

† *Beitrage zur indischen Erotik*, by R. Schmidt, Leipzig, 1902.

‡ *Die Bharata-Sage*, Z. D. M. G., Vol. XLVIII (P. 65 to p. 83), 1894.

¶ Z. D. M. G., Vols. LVI and LVII, 1902, 1903. It consists of about 150 pages.

§ Z. D. M. G., Vol. LXII.

wrote three papers in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society in the years 1897 and 1898. But they contain nothing more than an incomplete bibliography and inadequate references. A few years ago Dr. P. R. Bhandarkar published his article on Hindu Music in the Indian Antiquary in which he made, in passing*, a few very interesting remarks on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra. A series of articles appeared in that very Journal on Alaṅkāra Śāstra†, which evinces on the part of the writer great insight and thorough grasp of the subject. Mr. Kane, the writer of those articles, succinctly but carefully traces the development of this science but he confines himself mostly to a very general treatment of the subject.

Dr. Harichand Śāstrī of Bihar has written a very interesting thesis‡ in French. Besides the scholarly conclusions which he draws from the ślokaś of Kālidāsa quoted as examples in the various works of Poetics, he gives a very lengthy bibliography of Alaṅkāra works. Dr. Jacobi's promised great work on Hindu Poetics has not as yet come to our sight. He, however, wrote a number of articles on this subject in the Journals of his country and was undoubtedly the best person to undertake an elaborate work he had promised. Nobel made valuable contributions§ to this subject but he confined himself to the study of figures only.

From the above account, it is clear that this field of research lies still wholly unexplored and is awaiting a thorough and serious investigation. The subject from its very nature is interesting to a scholar as well as to a general reader. It is in literature alone that we can study the character of a

* I. A., Vol. XLI, p. 157.

† I. A., Vols. XLI and XLVI.

‡ Kālidāsa et l'art Poétique de l'Inde, Paris, 1917.

§ Z. D. M. G., Vols. LXVI and LXVII. In Vol. LXXIII, he gives us a learned review of Dr. Harichand's work.

nation. We cannot know it from what the few thought but we can realise its real status and feel the pulse of its moral, intellectual and emotional development only when we are brought in touch with what it felt at a particular time; and this cannot be done by judging its literature with our present emotions and sentiments. We can do so only if we place ourselves in the place of those who felt. This is possible by the study of their emotions and their mental character. Thank God, our forefathers were not such as held the mind as mere spectator or as mere actor but they had a mind which was both active and quiescent at one and the same time. So they felt the highest feelings and at the same time recorded what and how they felt. A study of the *Alaṅkāra Śāstra* may easily convince one of this fact.

We know what an important part Aesthetic has played, after Baumgarten, in the philosophical thoughts of Western countries. Criticism, the prosaic but popular sister of Aesthetic, has in no way been lagging behind. In the last two centuries, criticism has had a very luxuriant growth, though not with any definite result. We may realise the importance of Hindu Poetics when we remember that most topics of these two subjects come under its fold.

The scope of *Alaṅkāra Śāstra* is so very wide that there is scarcely a word in the English language which can adequately connote its sense. Oriental scholars, when writing upon it, have used the word 'Rhetoric' and 'Poetics' synonymously. These two words, by the force of associations which they carry with them, bring to one's mind the two works of Aristotle known by these names. Rhetoric as understood by Aristotle, is only a science of speech. Any consideration of speech could come within its scope. Ancient Rome and Greece had this meaning of the word Rhetoric, and it has been preserved even to our own

days. Dr. Bain's 'Rhetoric,' an excellent example of its class, mainly deals with higher composition and merits of style, with the express object of teaching good and pleasant ways of writing. The subject matter of Rhetoric may be said to correspond to that portion of Alāṅkāra works which deal with 'Kavi-śikṣā' or instruction for a poet.

The word 'Poetics' literally means 'science of poetry', but Aristotle's work known by that name can by no means be called the 'science of poetry,' for it deals with only a few problems which may properly be described as belonging to this science. This narrowness of signification can also be inferred from the fact that Aristotle had to write another book on Rhetoric. Really speaking, both the words, as used by western scholars, are inapplicable to our Alāṅkāra-śāstra. But in the absence of a better word, we have used 'Poetics' in its wider and literal sense. Thus the word, as used here, is a name for that science or department of learning which undertakes to answer any and every question and to furnish any and every information regarding poetical literature. In other words, Poetics, as understood and known by the Hindus, is that species of systematized knowledge which being based on a sound philosophy of life, conduces to the wise and fruitful practice and appreciation of poetic art.

Before we try to trace the origin and mark the development of Hindu Poetics, we should cast a cursory glance on the beginnings of Aryan Poetry in India. Wherever the history of literary styles of composition is indigenous in origin and imperceptible in growth, people are apt themselves to such modes of writing and turns of thought as are naturally fitted to their own stages of evolution and civilization. The climatic exigencies of a country, the richness of the soil, the nature of the government and the civilization around,—all

these contribute not a little towards the formation of a poet. The ancient Hindus settled happily in the basin of the three rivers of Hindustan, were enamoured of the beauty of the snow-clad summits of the Himalayas and the fertility of the soil which the benign hand of Providence blessed with timely and fruitful crops. All this could not but kindle in the minds of the cultured Aryans, the desire to express themselves in a language befitting their surroundings. And this was perhaps the origin of Sanskrit Poetry, for as Sayce says, 'the origin of poetry is from a desire to set forth in clear and distinct language the ideas which possess the mind'.

The language plays no small part in the healthy development of a nation's poetry. The Hindus were very fortunate in the high perfection to which their language attained. 'Sanskrit on account of its flexibility of forms, exuberance of expression, compressibility of thought and euphony of words, has been pre-eminently the language of poets'.

Moreover, "Ancient India", as W. H. Hunter remarks, "is essentially philosophic in ideas and actions." The ancient sages could not rest satisfied with the superficial observation of objects but tried to penetrate to the very root of things. According to Emerson, "Poetry is the perpetual endeavour to express the spirit of the things, to search the life and reason which causes the brute body to exist or desist. All words of such enquiry are poems". Thus the Hindu mind,—active though dreamy, and mystic yet speculative,—developed both the sides, namely, intellectual and emotional, which find expression in genuine and vigorous poetry. The Hindus have had a mania for poetry more than anything else.

These are some of the reasons why India has been the favourite abode of poetic muse from times immemorial. Sanskrit writers cultivated poetry to such an extent that

every kind of work, whether on the sublime theme of the philosophy of soul or on the commonplace problem of everyday concerns of human life, whether on the terrors of war or on the delights of love, came to be composed in verse. Even Metaphysics and Science, not to talk of History and Religion, were deemed no unworthy subjects for the art of poetry. Bharata, the great father of Hindu dramaturgy, says: "There is no sacred lore, no mechanical skill, no learning and no art; neither there is any yoga nor any action which may not be handled by a dramatic poet."* Bhāmaha in the fifth chapter of his *Kāvya-lankāra* expresses himself in a similar strain. He says: "There is scarcely a word or a sense and rarely a philosophy or an art which may not form a part of poetry. Oh, the burden of a poet".†

This all roundedness of its theme, together with its immeasurably long continuity of activity, is a feature which cannot be passed by even by a superficial student as a peculiarity of Sanskrit poetry. It contains the sweetest love-songs of the silver-tongued Jayadeva, the vigorous hymns of the great Tantrik Abhinava Gupta, simple and beautiful descriptions of *Ūṣas* and the terrible delineations of the formidable *Vṛtra*. As for its continuity, we may repeat the words of Dr. Macdonnel that 'no other country except China can trace back its language and literature, its religious beliefs and rites, its domestic and social customs through an uninterrupted development of more than three thousand years'.

But as we have once mentioned above, the Hindus were naturally philosophical and tried to study the underlying principles of every phenomenon. The scientific spirit went

* न तच्छ्रुतं न तच्छास्त्रं न सा विद्या न सा कला ।

नासौ योगो न तत्कर्म यत्राप्येऽस्मिन्न दृश्यते ॥ Ch. I.

† न स शब्दो न तद् वाच्यं न स न्यायो न सा कला ।

जायते यत्र काव्याङ्गमहो भारो महान् कवेः ॥ V. 4.

so far that they formulated even such sciences as Chaurya Śāstra—the science of stealing,*—Kāma Śāstra† and others. Those whose faculty of diving deep into the principles of things was so much developed could not remain satisfied with the creation of poetry only but formulated the science and discovered the philosophy of the art of poetry.

‘Poetry is the most ancient art,’ says a writer. Indeed it is so ancient that it took its birth with the birth of humanity. It is true not only of poetry but of every branch of fine arts. Man is verily a slave to his feelings in whatever station of life he may be. Howsoever he may advance in intellectuality, he is bound to feel the emotions affecting the human heart. By the over-whelming intellectual element, the emotional may appear at times almost extinct; but it can never be effectually smothered, and it never wholly dies out. Whenever a suitable soil and atmosphere are found, the plant of feelings shoots up. It is for this reason that men of even divergent intellectual capacities derive practically an equal amount of pleasure from music, poetry and other branches of fine arts.

But still there is a difference to be marked between the fine arts of a barbarous and those of a civilized nation. We shall try very briefly to understand where the difference lies. The difference is mainly due to the consciousness with which

* We find a very clear idea as to what this art would have been like, in *Mṛchchhakaṭika* where Śarvilaka—the learned thief—gives some names of its Āchāryas. Recently a book has been discovered by Pandit Haraprasāda Śāstrī on the scientific art of stealing.

† We can easily imagine what an amount of useful Kāma śāstra literature must have existed, if we simply have a look into Schmidt's *indischen Erotik* in which not less than a hundred manuscripts have been utilized and quoted (1st Edition, Leipzig, 1902).

a cultured person practises his art. Art, which with a barbarian remains an outcome of impulse only, becomes in the hand of a cultured person the result of conscious effort. When a barbarian is in excellent spirits he yields to his singing tendency. His voice is governed not by his brain but by his heart. He is carried off by the torrent of his feelings. The cultured person, on the other hand, studies the relation between the feelings and the music and can thus acquire the power of rousing those feelings by means of his music not only in himself but even in others whenever he likes to do so.

This skill of making the tender chords of the heart vibrate is what is called an art in its restricted sense. The success of art, as we have observed, depends upon the knowledge of various facts about the phenomenon. It is observed that under the influence of a particular emotion, there is a particular kind of change in one's voice and thus it is laid down that an emotion has its corresponding expression. This systematization of facts is what may be called a science. So the difference between a cultured and an uncultured artist lies in the scientific spirit with which a phenomenon is studied.

Having such a systematized knowledge, the artist can carry on his practice in a satisfactory manner. But his knowledge is not yet complete. He knows *what* a phenomenon is and *how* it may be practised but he does not know *why* such is the nature of the thing and why it should be handled in a particular way. Why an emotion should have a particular expression, why we should feel pleasure under definite conditions—these are questions he cannot answer. This knowledge of 'whys' and 'wherefores' may be called a philosophy. Thus we see that in order to know and master a phenomenon thoroughly, we must acquire its art, its science and its philosophy.

Watts Dunton* divides poets into two classes, namely poets of energy and poets of art, and further very rightly observes that those poets are the greatest who are both. The ancient Hindus in the heyday of their civilization had a very high ideal of their poetry—the poetry which in the hands of eminent persons had reached the pinnacle of its perfection. With the express object of carrying their poetic ideal into actual practice, they composed elaborate treatises on the art, science and philosophy of poetry which have been, for the sake of convenience, designated here as ‘Poetics’. This in brief is the beginning of Hindu Poetics.

“It is difficult”, says Prof. Rangacharya†, “to trace the beginnings of Alaṅkāra literature in Sanskrit. All writers on poetics in Sanskrit are agreed in thinking that the literature on poetics came into existence only after the production of classical poems capable of serving as models, and Indian tradition looks upon the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmiki as having served for long centuries the purpose of such a classical model, and even now speaks of that famous epic poem as the ‘Ādikāvya’ or ‘the first poem.’ Indeed it seems to be very probable that the study of the Rāmāyaṇa and the very natural literary endeavour to imitate the beauty of its poetry gave rise to the first impulse for formulating the theory of what constitutes the artistic excellence of true poetry. That such attempts must have been made very early in the history of Sanskrit literature is indeed capable of being borne out fairly well by means of available evidence. No careful student of Aśvaghōṣa’s Buddhacharita, for instance, can fail to agree with Cowell in thinking that the poem ‘certainly

* See his article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition.

† See Kāvya-darśa of Daṇḍin, edited with two old commentaries and an English Introduction by Rao Bahadur Rangacharya, M. A., Madras, 1910 pp. 2-3.

shows an acquaintance with the teaching of Hindu Rhetoric or *Alaṅkāra*.⁷ The very fact that *Buddhacharita* is designated in the colophons of its sargas as a *mahākāvya* may be taken to be a further proof of this view. This evidence is in itself enough to show that *Alaṅkāra* literature of a very developed kind must have been current among authors of poetry even before the days of Aśvaghoṣa. In fact in Bharata's *Nāṭya-Śāstrā*, which most probably belongs to the earlier centuries of the Christian era, there is a chapter dealing with *Alaṅkāra* as applicable to songs and dramatic compositions. Tradition speaks of the great grammarian Pāṇini himself as having been the author of a *mahākāvya*. Thus even in the centuries preceding the origin of Buddhism, *Alaṅkāra* literature may very well have existed in Sanskrit."

I have given this long extract from the writing of a learned professor of Sanskrit to show how far the eyes of modern scholarship can penetrate the dark mist which surrounds the beginnings of Sanskrit Learning. I shall, however, try now to give the traditional origin of this śāstra according to Bharata and Rājaśekhara.

In the first chapter of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra** we find that once upon a time, Ātreya and others approached Bharata and requested him to give them a discourse on *Nāṭya Veda*. Bharata, being thus importuned, began his discourse with the origin of Dramaturgy. He said: "When the *tretā* age set in and man began to give way to worldly feelings such as avarice, anger and others and consequently began to be assailed by pleasure and pain and the other *dvandas*, the Devas, with Indra at their head, approached Brahmā, the Creator, and spoke thus:—'We want a means of diversion which may be both heard and seen. As the existing four Vedas should

* *Nāṭyaśāstra* has been quoted here from a manuscript in the Goyt. Sarasvatī Bhavana Library, Benares.

not be heard by Śūdras, please create a fifth Veda which may be enjoyed by men of all castes.' Brahmā, thus addressed, said, 'let it be so,' and sent the devas to their homes. He then created the Nāṭya Veda.* He took Pāṭhya from the Ṛgveda, songs from the Sāmaveda, acting from the Yajurveda and Rasas from the Atharvaveda.† After creating the Nāṭyaveda, Brahmā spoke to Indra, 'appoint clever and diligent persons for the practice of this Veda.'‡ Hearing this Indra replied with folded hands : 'The Devas are not fit to know the theory, and practise the art of Nāṭya Veda. The sages who know the secret of Vedas are the proper persons for its theory and practice'. On this Brahmā ordered me to carry it out with the help of my hundred sons.§ By the order of Brahmā we began our work. The Apsarās were created. They with the Gandharvas, Nārada and others formed the *dramatis personae*. The first staging took place on the occasion of Indra's Dhvajamahā."

The Nāṭyaśāstra proceeds with the description how the asuras hindered the performance and how for protecting the dramatic representation from their hands a theatre-hall was built. We have at present nothing to do with all these details. We have seen what kind of origin has been assigned to Drama by the author of the Nāṭyaśāstra. Now we shall see what Rājaśekhara§ has to say on this point.

* Śloka 1—26

† जग्राह पाठ्यमृग्वेदात् सामभ्यो गीतमेव च । यजुर्वेदादभिनयान् रसानायर्वणादपि ॥

‡ उत्पाद्य नाट्यवेदं तु ब्रह्मोवाच सुरेश्वरम् । इतिहासो मया दृष्टः सुरेषु विनियोज्यताम् ॥
कुशला ये विदग्धाश्च प्रणल्भाश्च जितश्रमाः । तेष्वयं नाट्यसंज्ञो हि वेदः संक्राम्यतां त्वया ॥

§ अशक्ता भगवन् देवा अयोग्या नाट्यकर्मणि । य इमे वेदगुह्यज्ञा मुनयः संशितवृत्ताः ॥
एतस्य ग्रहणे शक्ताः प्रयोगे धारणे तथा । श्रुत्वा तु शक्तवचनं मामाहाम्बुजसंभवः ॥
स्वं पुत्रशतसंयुक्तः प्रयोक्तृस्य भवानघ । 1. 22-24.

After this the Manuscript gives the names of Bharata's hundred sons, beginning with शाखिल्यं चापि वार्यं च, from śloka 26 to 39.

§ Rājaśekhara, as known to all Sanskritists, is a great poet

The publication of *Kāvyaīmāṃsā** of Rājasekhara has opened a new gateway for understanding the ancient poetics of India. The *Kāvyaīmāṃsā* of Rājasekhara consisted of eighteen Adhikaraṇas of which only one has been as yet found. These eighteen Adhikaraṇas were based on eighteen different treatises treating of the eighteen topics of poetics by the eighteen pupils of Kāvya Puruṣa. The first Adhikaraṇa is called Kavirahasya and consists in its turn of eighteen chapters. The first chapter gives briefly the names of the progenitors of this science.

The first person to teach this Śāstra was Śrīkaṇṭha Śiva who taught it to his sixty-four pupils, Viṣṇu and Brahmā being two of them. Brahmā taught it to his pupils including one Kāvya Puruṣa, the son of Sarasvatī. Kāvya Puruṣa was appointed by the Creator to propagate Kāvya Vidyā in the three worlds.†

The birth of this Kāvya Puruṣa and his marriage with Sāhitya Vidyā Vadhū is described in the third chapter of this book. It is said that once Sarasvatī, desiring to have a son, practised penances on the Himālaya mountain. Brahmā was pleased with her penances and granted her wishes. The son, called Kāvyaṣṭhī, was born and spoke these words :

of the 10th century and well known as the writer of *Bālarāmāyaṇa*, *Bālabhārata*, *Viddhaśalabhañjikā* and *Karpūra Mañjarī*. But from the *Kāvyaīmāṃsā*, a part of which has been published by the Govt. of H. H. Maharaja of Baroda, we find that he was also a great writer on poetics.

* *Kāvyaīmāṃsā* of Rājasekhara, edited with Introduction and notes by C. D. Dalal, M. A. and R. A. Shāstry, Baroda, 1916.

अथातः काव्यं मीमांसिष्यामहे ययोपदिदेश श्रीकण्ठः परमेष्ठिवैकुण्ठादिभ्यश्चतुः षष्ठ्ये शिष्येभ्यः । सोऽपि भगवान् स्वयम्भूरिच्छाजन्मभ्यः स्वान्तेवासिभ्यः । तेषु सारस्वतेयो वृन्दीयसा-
मपि वन्द्यः काव्यपुरुष आसीत् । तं च सर्वसमयविदं दिव्येन चक्षुषा भविष्यदर्शदंशिनं भूर्भुवः-
स्त्रितयवर्त्तिनीषु प्रजासु हितकाम्यया प्रजापतिः काव्यविद्याप्रवर्तनायै प्रायुक्तः ।

“ यदेतद् वाङ्मयं विश्वमर्थमूर्त्या विवर्तते ।

सोऽस्मि काव्यपुमानस्व पादौ बन्देय तावकौ ॥”

Hearing this metrical speech, Sarasvatī was greatly delighted and exclaimed : ‘Child, you have conquered even myself. Up till now the learned knew only prose. You certainly deserve all praise. Śabda and Artha form your body, Sanskrit your mouth, Prakrit your arm, Apabhraṃśa your thigh, Pāṣācī your feet, Miśra your chest, etc.’*

Sarasvatī leaving Kāvya-puruṣa there went to bathe in the Gaṅgā. Accidentally Uśanas came that way and seeing the child there carried him to his hermitage. This Kāvya-puruṣa inspired him with the poetic genius so that he all of a sudden exclaimed :—

या दुग्धाऽपि न दुग्धेव कविदोग्धुभिरन्वहम् ।

हृदि नः संनिधत्तां सा सूक्तिधेनुः सरस्वती ॥

From that time Uśanas became known as ‘Kavi’, and by transference of epithet other poets also were called by that, name. Sarasvatī coming, back and not finding her son there, became very anxious, but she was that very moment carried by Vālmiki to the hermitage of Uśanas. She became pleased with Vālmiki and gave him the power of metrical speech. But Vālmiki did not know of this fact up to the time when seeing a Krauñcha pierced by the arrow of a fowler, he exclaimed :

मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समाः ।

यत्कौञ्चमिथुनादेकमवधीः काममोहितम् ॥

Once upon a time Sarasvatī was appointed by Brahmā

* वत्स सच्छन्दस्काया गिरः प्रथेतर्वाङ्मयमातरमपि मातरं मां विजयसे । प्रशस्यतम चेदमुदाहरन्ति यदुत पुत्रात्पराजयो द्वितीयं पुत्रजन्म इति । त्वत्तः पूर्वं हि विद्वांसो गद्यं ददृशुर्न पद्यम् । त्वदुत्पत्त्यातः छन्दस्वद्वयः प्रवर्त्यति । अहो श्लाघनीयोऽसि । शब्दायौ ते शरीरं, संस्कृतं मुखं, प्राकृतं वाङ्मयं, जवनमपभ्रंशः पैशाचं पादौ, उरो मिश्रम् । समः प्रसन्नो मधुर उदार ओजस्वी चासि । उक्तिचरणं च ते वचो, रस आत्मा, रोमानि च्छन्दांसि, प्रशन्नोत्तरप्रहेलिकादिकं च वाक्केलिः, अनुप्रासोपमादयश्च त्वामलंकुर्वन्ति । Kāvya-mīmāṃsā, page 6.

the Nirṇetṛi in the discussion of Brahmarṣis and Devas. When Kāvya-puruṣa saw his mother going to Brahmaloṇa he insisted upon his following her. But she did not take him with her. He got angry and went away. His friend Kumāra Skanda became very sorry at his departure and began to weep. His mother Gauri consoled him and said, 'My child, have patience, I shall bring him back'. She thought within herself: 'There is nothing else but love which can bind the hearts of men. So I shall create a woman who will bring Kāvya-puruṣa round.' Thus she created Sāhitya Vidyā-Vadhū and asked her to follow her husband. She ordered the sages to follow them and to describe their behaviour towards each other. Whatever dress she assumed in a particular country was followed by the women of that country and became known as 'Pravṛtti'. The mode of her amorous blandishments became known as 'Vṛtti'. The manner in which she spoke was called 'Riti'. They were at last married in the Gandharva form at Vatsagulma in Vidarbha*.

Kāvya-puruṣa had eighteen pupils each of whom took up one topic of poetics and wrote a treatise upon it. Rājasekhara gives their names and themes thus. :—

तत्र कविरहस्यं सहस्राक्षः समाप्नासीत् । औक्तिकमुक्तिगर्भः ।
रीतिनिर्णयं सुवर्णनाभः । आनुप्रासिकं प्रचेतायणः । यमकानि चित्रं
चित्राङ्गदः । शब्दश्लेषं शेषः । वास्तवं पुलस्त्यः । औपम्यमौपकायनः ।
अतिशयं पाराशरः । अर्थश्लेषमुत्तमः । उभयालङ्कारिकं कुवेरः ।
वैनोदिकं कामदेवः । रूपकनिरूपणीयं भरतः । रसाधिकारिकं
नन्दिकेश्वरः । दोषाधिकरणं धिषणः । गुणोपादानिकमुपमन्युः ।
औपनिषदिकं कुचमारः† ।


It may be seen from the above what a queer but interesting account Rājasekhara has given of the origin of poetics.

* Kāvya-mīmāṃsā, Ch. 3.

† Kāvya-mīmāṃsā, page 1.

We may now sum up the information which we gather from the Kāvya-mīmāṃsā :—"Like other Śāstrakāras our author (Rājaśekhara) attributes the origin of poetry to the Supreme Being and the celestials. Śrikanṭha taught this science to Parameṣṭhi, Vaikunṭha and others of his sixty-four pupils. The self-born God imparted it to His will-born pupils. Among these was Kāvya-puruṣa, born of Sarasvatī. Prajapāti set him to promulgate this science in the three worlds. He taught this to his divine pupils in 18 adhikaraṇas. Of these Saḥasrākṣa and the other 17 pupils composed separate treatises, on the portions learnt by them. On account of these separate treatises, the science was to some extent lost." *

* From the English Introduction (by Mr. Dalal) to the Kāvya-mīmāṃsā.



VIII—A SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ASTROLABE

BY PADMAKARA DVIVEDI.

This is a brass instrument, termed the Astrolabe, 15·6 inches in diameter and ·5 inches thick and is of the type of astrolabium planisphoerum or the flat astrolabe called in Arabic Lat *al-Ṣafāih* (consisting of tablets) inscribed in Deonagari and Arabic characters and deposited in the Government Sanskrit College Library, Benares. The body of this instrument has a circular raised edge into which fit the Ankabut (aranea or rete) and tablets. The circular raised edge or rim is graduated in degrees, which are numbered in groups of 5 up to 90 in each quadrant in Hindu and Abjad (naskhi) notations.

The Venter. The venter or the inner part of the containing disc, termed mater, is inscribed with the names of the following forty-five cities together with their latitudes in Devnagari characters and numbers :

No.	Names of the Cities.	Latitudes.
1	Ferozabad	28° 10'
2	Hansi	29° 45'
3	Thako-Bangala (Dhaka)	27° 0'
4	Vadaun (Badaun)	27° 42'
5	Akabarnagar	25° 0'
6	Nighat	40° 0'

No.	Name of the Cities.	Latitudes.
7	Kashmir	35° 0'
8	Kabul	33° 45'
9	Ahmadnagar	19° 22'
10	Ahmedabad	23° 15'
11	Daulatbad (Daulatabad)	20° 32'
12	Burhanpur	20° 40'
13	Jalanapur	20° 19'
14	Patana	26° 6'
15	Javanpur (Jaunpur)	26° 36'
16	Mevat	27° 30'
17	Surarah	28° 40'
18	Talesar	30° 10'
19	Batala	32° 0'
20	Avadh (Oudh)	28° 0'
21	Suranpur	28° 0'
22	Panipatha (Panipat)	28° 52'
23	Luti	32° 0'
24	Shalkut	33° 0'
25	Kilerajgarh	33° 20'
26	Palaur	31° 25'

No.	Name of the Cities.	Latitudes
27	Sunam	30° 30'
28	Dhamalo	31° 32'
29	Veju	30° 5'
30	Deval	26° 30'
31	Taheran	26° 20'
32	Raj Kud (Raj Kund)	18° 0'
33	Isvedakhali	32° 0'
34	Mihiravar	19° 50'
35	Multan	29° 40'
36	Karor	31° 0'
37	Siroj	24° 10'
38	Golakuda (Golakunda)	18° 0'
39	Sardip	10° 0'
40	Tansai	19° 20'
41	Somanata (Somanatha)	17° 40'
42	Kalavarge	17° 40'
43	Vijapur (Bijapur)	17° 20'
44	Shukar	16° 40'
45	Vidar	18° 15'

The back of the Astrolabe.—The back of the instrument has the upper half of the rim also graduated in degrees, which are numbered in groups of 5 up to 90° in the South-East and South-West quadrants in both Hindu and Arabic notations. The South-East quadrant consists of a graphic table of sines; the South-West arc is inscribed with some Persian passages written in Urdu characters. These passages show that this astrolabe was constructed in the eleventh year of the reign of Jahangir. As Jahangir ascended the throne in 1605 A. D., the year in which this instrument was constructed must be 1616 (1605+11) A. D.

The lower periphery and the central rectangle consist of shadow scales engraved in Arabic (naskhi) notation only.

The upper half of the rectangle contains a special table of climates :

Climates.			Hours of longest day.	Latitudes.
First	...	{ beginning	12 55 ?	12° 43'
		{ middle	13 0	16° 47'
Second	...	{ beginning	13 15	20° 31'
		{ middle	13 30	24° 10'
Third	...	{ beginning	13 55 ?	27° 34'
		{ middle	14 0	30° 46'
Fourth	...	{ beginning	14 15	33° 43'
		{ middle	14 30	36° 28'
Fifth	...	{ beginning	14 45	39° 1'
		{ middle	15 0	41° 21'

Climates.			Hours of longest day.	Latitude.
Sixth ..	{ beginning		15 15	43° 30'
	{ middle		15 30	45° 29'
Seventh ...	{ beginning		15 45	47° 38'
	{ middle		16 0	48° 59'
			16 15	50° 31'

The Alhidade.—The alhidade (idadah) or sighter (which has near to each end, one fixed sighting piece with two sighting holes, the upper one being the larger, is fixed on the centre pin and revolves round the centre on the back of the astrolabe, so that its graduated edge lies on a diameter of the circle. Half of the levelled upper edge is roughly divided into 30 equal divisions; the lower edge is divided into six equal divisions.

The Ankabut.—The Ankabut (aranea) or shabakah (rete) is a star map of the heavens, and the Ankabut of this instrument includes the equator and the ecliptic which is inscribed with the names of the 12 signs of Zodiac in Arabic, and from Leo to Capricornius in Devanāgarī notations also. The ecliptic circle is graduated in degrees which are numbered in groups of 3 starting from the east point on the left and proceeding counter-clock-wise.

The Ankabut has 22 branches of which only 19 have star names attached. Some of the branches have more than one star name. Some have only Arabic names and some only Sanskrit names of stars. As the tablet of the latitude of the complement of the total obliquity really gives the celestial co-ordinates (longitude and latitude) and by its aid the positions of the stars on the ankabut can be at once

read off, it is not given. Hence the following 28 star names only inscribed on the branches are given.

STAR LIST OF THE ASTROLABE.

Name on Instrument in Deonāgarī,	Name on Instrument in Urdu.	Modern name.
1. Pretaśirā		26 β Persei, Algol.
2. Payemukha (Payomukha)		
3. Maṇuṣyapārśva		
4. Rohiṇī, Daharan		87 α Tauri, Aldebran.
5. Mithunavāma- skandha		
6. Mithunapādada- kṣiṇa		19 β Orionis, Rigel.
7. Ārdrā		α Orionis
8. Sheri Yamani	Sheri Yamani	9 α Canis Majoris Sirius
9. Lubdhakabandhu Sheri Stramih	Sheri Stramih	10 α canis minoris Procyon
10. Agasti		α Argus
11. Fard-al-Shiya	Fard-al-shiya	α Hydrae or Alphard.
12. Pūrvabhādrapada	Qalb-al-asad	α Pegasi
13. Chitrā	Simak Azal	67 α Virginis Spica
14. Svāti		α Bootis
15. Qalb-al-aqrab	Qalb-al-aqrab	21 α Scorpii Antares.

Name on Instrument in Deonāgarī.	Name on Instrument in Urdu.	Modern name.
16. Viśākhāmātr- maṇḍala		
17. Dhanukoṭi		
18. Ras-al-hawwa		α Ophinci
19. Abhijit, Nasr Waqi	Nasre Waqi	α Lyrae
20. Nasre tair		α Aquilea
21. Aśvini		(β Arietis)
22. Muqqadam Zamb- al-jadi		γ Capricorni
23. Kakumda puchchha		
24. Aśvanābha		21 α Andromedea.
25. Karatichur		
26. Maghā		32 α Leonis, Regulus.
27. Kaff-al-Khadih		β Cassiopeiae
28. Samudrapakṣa		

Of these 7 are names of Nakṣatras.

The Tablets of the Astrolabe. The Astrolabe has four brass tablets, each $14\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter and about 1mm thick.

T_1^0 represents the obverse of the tablet No. 1. It is marked 21 in Hindu and Abjad notations, i.e. it exhibits co-ordinates for 21° latitude. Almucantarats or circles of

altitude are drawn for each degree and numbered in groups of 5 in Abjad notation. The tablet is tamm or complete. The 12 unequal or temporal hour lines and the equal hour lines (dotted) are drawn. There are three concentric circles viz. the tropic of Cancer, the Equator and the tropic of Capricorn. The names of two cities Navsari, latitude $21^{\circ}0'$ and Mecca, latitude $21^{\circ}20'$ are engraved in Arabic characters and Abjad notations.

T_1^r represents the reverse of the first tablet and is marked latitude 33° in both notations. Otherwise it is just like the preceding. The names of two cities Baghdad, latitude $33^{\circ}25'$ and Qandahar $30^{\circ}0'$ are engraved.

T_2^o is marked latitude 23° . Otherwise as the preceding. Dhar, $23^{\circ}30'$; Ujjain $23^{\circ}30'$; Kidahgarh, $23^{\circ}25'$; Mandaran $23^{\circ}30'$. Raipur, Ratnaur $23^{\circ}0'$.

T_2^r is marked latitude 24° .

Besides the preceding the 45 Azimuth circles including the Meridian are drawn.

Sarangpur $24^{\circ}25'$; Surkach $24^{\circ}10'$; Ahlanpatan $24^{\circ}0'$.

T_3^o is marked latitude 26° . Otherwise as the preceding.

Ajmer 26° ; Kanauj $26^{\circ}35'$; Tirhut $26^{\circ}15'$; Kalpi $26^{\circ}30'$; Benares $26^{\circ}20'$; Alahbas $26^{\circ}10'$. The almucantarats are numbered in Devanāgarī notation.

T_3^r is marked latitude 32° . The almucantarats are numbered in groups of two. Otherwise as the preceding. Lahore 32° ; Yezd. Wast.

T_4^o is marked latitude 27° . Otherwise as the T_1^o . Tibet $27^{\circ}45'$; Jagannath $27^{\circ}5'$ Jainagar $27^{\circ}5'$; Oudha $27^{\circ}45'$; Gwalior $27^{\circ}8'$; Agra $27^{\circ}5'$; Narwar $27^{\circ}10'$.

T_4^r is marked latitude 28° . Otherwise as the preceding. Kampila $28^{\circ}10'$; Nimkhar $28^{\circ}40'$; Goljalali or Koljalali $28^{\circ}20'$; Dehli $28^{\circ}40'$, the name is also engraved in Devnagari and its latitude $28^{\circ}39'$. Rohatak $28^{\circ}45'$; Kurkhet $28^{\circ}50'$;

IX.—SOME ASPECTS OF VĪRA ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY.

BY GOPĪ NĀTH KAVIRĀJ

(1)

Though the sect of Vīra Śaivas or Liṅgāyats holds an important position in the religious history of Southern India, its name, except at Benares, is not perhaps so widely known in the North. Neither its history and sectarian characteristics nor its system of philosophy are so familiar to the student of Indian Culture as one might wish them to be. It is proposed therefore to speak a few words in the present paper on some aspects of this philosophy.

The sect had its origin about the middle of the 12th Century A. D., being founded by a Brahmin named Bāsava, who had been the prime minister of the Kalachuri King Bijjala. Of course there are differences of opinion. But it is beyond doubt that Bāsava was a very important figure, and if he was not the actual founder he was at least the reformer of the sect. What Gautama had been to Buddhism and Mahavīra to Jainism (according to tradition) Bāsava was to this Śaiva faith. According to tradition the sect originated from five ascetics who became the first heads of 5 original monasteries. The names of these pontiffs are: Ekorāma, Paṇḍitārādhyā, Revāṇa, Marula and Viśvārādhyā, and those of the monasteries respectively are: Śrī Śaila, Kedāranātha, Rambhāpurī (Balehalli), Ujjainī and Benares. They appeared in a miraculous way from the following Liṅgas respectively, viz. Śrī Mallikārjuna in Dhātu Kuṇḍa, Rāmanātha in Drākṣārāma, Someśvara in Kollipākī, Siddheśa in Vaṭa Kṣetra and Viśveśvara in Benares.

There seems to exist a variety of opinion regarding the line of teachers through whom the teachings of the sect are said to have been transmitted. Śrīpati in his commentary on the Brahmasūtra makes Sadāśiva the original teacher. From him we have the following line:

Sadāśiva
|
Śaktidhara
|
Dadhichi
|
Durvāsas
|
Viśvāmitra
|
Sukeśa
|
Agastya
|
Chinmaya Vāmadeva
|
Śrī Revāṇa Siddha

This Revāṇa was one of the five original *mohants* of the order. Śrīpati was apparently a disciple of Revāṇa to whom as well as to Ekorāma he pays his respects.

Māyideva, author of Anubhava Sūtra and Viśeṣārtha Prakāśikā, another teacher of this sect, claims his spiritual descent from Upamanyu, thus:

Upamanyu
|
Bhīmanātha
|
Kuleśvara
|
Vopanātha
|
Nākarāja
|
Saṅgameśvara
|
Māyideva.

It may be of interest to note that in the Vāyaviya Saṃhitā of the Śiva Purāṇa (Section I, Chapter 28, verses 15-16)⁹ Upamanyu is mentioned with three others, viz. Ruru, Dadhichi and Agastya as the original propounders of Śaiva doctrines and authors of four distinct Saṃhitās. Śrīpati also in his commentary on the Vedānta sūtra शास्त्रयोनित्वात् mentions the names of Upamanyu, Dadhichi, Gautama, Durvāsas, Reṇuka, Dārūka, Śaṅkhakarna, Gokarna, etc. as those of great teachers who were omniscient (सर्वज्ञ)—a term which is explained as meaning सर्ववेदवेदान्तोक्तसकलपदार्थाभिज्ञ ।

(2)

The Primal Reality, called here by the name of Sthala,* is the abiding background of all phenomena (creative, preservative and destructive) and as such is identical with Parama Śiva. Absolute Freedom, Eternal Self-revelation and Supreme Selfhood (पूर्णहन्ता) constitute its very essence. When this Primal Reality wants to play with Itself as Worshipper and Worshipped there arises on Its calm bosom what we might describe as a slight tremor or vibration, very much like the agitation which appears on the calm surface of an ocean before heavy breakers begin to rise into view. This tremor results in dividing the Sthala into two aspects by depriving it, as it were, of its equilibrium, so that the portion where self-consciousness is predominant is called by one name, viz. Śiva, and the remaining portion by another, viz. Jīva.

* सर्वेषां स्यानभूतत्वाल्लयभूतत्वतस्तथा ।

तत्त्वानां महदादीनां स्थलमित्यभिधीयते ॥

अधिष्ठानसमस्तस्य स्थावरस्य चरस्य च ।

जगतो यद् भवेत् तत्त्वं तद्धि वै स्थलमुच्यते ॥

आधारः सर्वशक्तीनां ज्योतिषामखिलात्मनाम् ।

यत्तत्त्वं भवति प्राज्ञैः स्थलं तत् परिगीयते ॥

आलयाः सर्वभूतानां लोकानां लोकसंपदाम् ।

यद् भवेत् परमं ब्रह्म स्थलं तत्प्रादुराकारम् ॥

The Primal Reality would thus appear to be a state in which the Substance and its Power are in un-
 Equilibrium of Siva and Sakti. affected equilibrium. The Substance is known in the Āgamas as Para Śiva and the Power as Parā Śakti or Chidambara. The Anubhava Sūtra (2. 20) says:

शक्तिरप्रतिमा साक्षात् शिवेन सहधर्मिणी ।

साक्षिणी सत्यसम्पूर्णा निर्विकल्पा महेश्वरी ॥ * .

The Līngāyat philosophers are advocates of Viśiṣṭādvaita like Śrī Kaṇṭha and the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, and they have consequently to assume that Śakti as qualifying the Supreme Reality is its eternal adjunct and never separable from it. It is two-fold, according as it abides in Brahma directly as Light or *Chit Śakti* or indirectly as the Reflection of the Light or *Achit Śakti*. The two names represent the two opposite aspects of the same Fundamental Power, so that the system does not recognise any inherent contradiction between Matter and Spirit.†

The Sārasvata Sūtra‡ says that the Śakti, which always resides in the Supreme Self, is called Vimarśa when it reposes exclusively in the Self (स्वस्था). The Self which as Awareness is the background of the entire creation must be described as *existing*,— for

* The S'ūti also declares that the Parā Śakti of the Lord is *natural* and that it is manifold in character. Cf. परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानवलक्रिया च । S'ivāditya observes : धर्मरूपा परा शक्तिर्धर्मिरूपः परः शिवः । तस्यानावृतरूपत्वात् परा शक्तिः परात्मनः । सर्वदा तत्त्वरूपेण भाति भानोरिव प्रभा ॥ तादात्म्यमनयोनित्यं धर्मधर्मिस्त्वभावतः ।

† Cf. S'ivānubhava S'ivayogīndra (*Sivādvaita Darpaṇa*, Ch. I) : अस्मन्मन्त्र ब्रह्मधर्मरूपायाः शक्तिश्चिच्छक्तिरूपत्वं तत्प्रतिबिम्बरूपाया अचिच्छक्तिरूपत्वमित्यङ्गीकारेण चिच्छक्तितत्प्रतिबिम्बाचिच्छक्तयोर्ब्रह्मधर्मविरोधाभावेन शक्तिद्वयं समुच्चितैकस्यैव सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्रूपशक्तिविशिष्टवरय लक्षणीकरणे तात्पर्यात् ।

‡ सन् ह्रदयप्रकाशो भवनस्य क्रियाया भवति कर्ता ।

सैव क्रिया विमर्शः स्वस्या लुभिता च विश्वविस्तारा ॥

without its presence all would be darkness and void,—and therefore it must be held to be the subject of existence of being. It is the Agent (कर्त्ता) or Śiva and Existence the Action (क्रिया) or Śakti. When the Primal Reality loses its equilibrium the Śakti becomes *partially* agitated (क्षुभित) and transforms itself into the manifested Universe consisting of thirty-six tattvas and of an infinite variety of products. The agitation of the Śakti is partial, because there are some aspects of the Śakti e.g. Chit and Ānanda which being devoid of succession (क्रम) by nature are never subject to agitation. It is Ichchhā and the others alone which are sometimes agitated and sometimes in a state of balance. The Śakti, both spiritual and material, in its unmanifest condition is called subtle (सूक्ष्म) and its manifested state is known as gross (स्थूल). In Dissolution which represents the causal and undifferentiated state of Brahma both spirit and matter are involved while their evolution or differentiation marks the beginning of the creative or productive stage.


(a) Through the agitation of its own Power (स्वशक्तिदोषमोत्रेण) the Sthala becomes divided into two—
 Creative Stage. Līṅga and Aṅga. But this division is only an apparent cleft in the Indivisible, the duality being due to the limiting conditions (उपाधि) of accidental existence. Accepting the current coinage of Vedāntā terminology it may be said by way of illustration that Līṅga corresponds to the *mahat* of mahākāśa and Aṅga to the *ghaṭa* of ghāṭakāśa. Beyond a verbal distinction introduced by association with two distinct concepts (e.g. mahat and ghaṭa) there is no difference in ākāśa at all, so far as it is considered in its pure essence. It is as ever one and undivided. So too with Līṅgasthala and Aṅgasthala. Līṅga is the Upāsya, the Object of worship and Aṅga the ūpāsaka or worshipper, but in reality both the worshipper and the worshipped are One;

नाशिवस्य शिवोपास्ति घटते जन्मकोटिभिः ।

शिवस्यैव शिवोपास्तिरिति नानाश्रुतिस्मृतिः ॥

Thus one of the great dicta of mystic experience is asserted and vindicated. He is the worshipper and He is the worshipped—in fact, He is worshipping Himself through Himself. The Universe, with all its activities, is an expression of His Self-delight, manifested in myriads of ways.*

Sthala = Pure Chit



(4) Like Sthala, Śakti (Power) too becomes two-fold during manifestation. The original Śakti is ubiquitous and practically identical with Śiva. As residing in the Linga this Power is known as Kalā (कलाशक्तिः लिङ्गस्थलाश्रया शक्तिः कलारूपा प्रकीर्तिता) and when in Aṅga it is called Bhakti. The former is pravṛtti and is the cause of the origin of worlds, the latter is nivṛtti and is the cause of their dissolution. It is the mysterious virtue of Śakti (Kalā) which makes what is absolutely formless and homogeneous take on an infinite number of forms ; and through an equally mysterious virtue

* So in Vaiṣṇavism, more particularly in the Gauḍīya and Vallabhīya schools, He is declared to be comprising within Himself the Lover and the Beloved both (cf. Rādhikopaniṣad). The Advaita Śaiva and Advaita Vaiṣṇava are really on a par in their outlook on the Supreme Being, except for the attitude with which each approaches Him in relationship. The true Śaiva is a devotee and a worshipper, but a Vaiṣṇava is nothing if not a lover. Aśvarya or the sense of Divine Majesty prevails in the former, Mādhurya or Divine Fellowship in the latter. To the Śaiva Sādhaka God reveals Himself as the Father, the Lord and the Teacher; to the Vaiṣṇava He is the Friend and Beloved, and sometimes also the Child.

inherent in Bhakti all varieties of forms return into the blankness of the Primal Unity. One looks down, as it were, from the heights and is tinged with māyā, while the other looks up from the depths and is free from all defilement. Briefly speaking, the natural tendency of Śakti is towards multiplication and that of Bhakti is towards unification. The Self, as endowed with this Śakti, is an object of worship, and as possessed of Bhakti it is the worshipper.

(3)

That the Liṅga is identical with Śiva has been already noted.* It is three-fold—(a) Bhāvaliṅga, (b) Prāṇa-
 Six-fold division of Liṅga liṅga and (c) Iṣṭaliṅga. Of these (a) Bhāvaliṅga is described as pure being (सन्मात्र) partless or indivisible (निष्कल) and accessible to intuition (भाव) alone. It is the Sat aspect of Divine Essence and the Highest Tattva (परतत्त्व).

(b) Prāṇaliṅga is at once above all division and yet infinitely divided (सकल and निष्कल) and is reached by the mind. It forms the Chit aspect of the Divine Essence and the Subtle Tattva (सूक्ष्मतत्त्व).

(c) The third one, the so-called Iṣṭaliṅga, is called mahat and is the source, for the devotee, of all his pleasure and immunity from pain. It is to this that the afflicted Soul appeals for succour. It is the Ānanda-aspect of the Deity and forms the Gross Tattva (स्थूलतत्त्व).

Each of these Liṅgas is two-fold. Thus—

- | | | | |
|----------------|---|---|------------------------------------|
| (a) Bhāvaliṅga | = | { | (i) Mahaliṅga. |
| | | { | (ii) Prasādaliṅga. |
| (b) Prāṇaliṅga | = | { | (iii) Charaliṅga or Jaṇagamaliṅga. |
| | | { | (iv) Śivaliṅga. |

* लीयते गम्येत यत्र येन सर्वं चराचरम् ।

तदेव विज्ञमित्युक्तं विज्ञतत्त्वपरायणैः ॥

$$(c) \text{ Iṣṭalīṅga} = \begin{cases} (v) \text{ Gurulīṅga.} \\ (vi) \text{ Āchārālīṅga.} \end{cases}$$

These are the six Sthalas, and corresponding to them, Six-fold Śakti each to each, there are six Śaktis :

एवं षड्विधं भूतं लिङ्गं परमकारणम् ।
स्वशक्तिवैभवाच्चैव स्वातन्त्र्याल्लीलयापि च ।
शक्तयः षड्विधा ज्ञेयाः षट्स्थलेषु समाहिताः ॥

The six Śaktis are named : Chit Śakti, Parā Śakti, Ādi Śakti, Ichchhā Śakti or Vidyā, Jñāna Śakti or Pratiṣṭhā and Kriyā Śakti or Nivṛtti.

(i) The Mahālīṅga, in association with the Light of Supreme Revelation (चिच्छक्ति), flashes eternally upon itself. This is known as Śivatattva, the Ultimate Unity, Full, Subtle and Immeasurable, without beginning or end. It is accessible to *bhāva* or intuition.

(ii) Prasādālīṅga, with Parā Śakti, is known as Sadākhyā Tattva and is open to Jñāna. It is devoid of all limitations (उपाधि), Bright, Supersensuous, and contains within itself *in potentia* the yet-unmanifested Universe.

(iii) The Charālīṅga, with Ādi Śakti, is realised in mental concentration (मानस ध्यान).

(iv) The Śivalīṅga, with Ichchhā Śakti is the Ego (अहं-कृति), described as one-faced (एकमुख) and luminous, shining with the Vidyākālās.

(v) The Gurulīṅga, with Jñāna Śakti, is the great Teacher (उपदेशक) from whom the Tantras come forth as if by a spontaneous movement.

(vi) The Āchārālīṅga, with Kriyā Śakti, is the source of renunciation.

(4)

Anga is the Soul or Jīva so called because it resorts to the Liṅga and finds its rest there.* It is said to be of three kinds—(a) Yogāṅga, (b) Bhogāṅga and (c) Tyāgāṅga.

The first enjoys Communion the with Śiva, second Power (भोग) with Him, and the third is so called from the fact of its having cast off the Cosmic Illusion (ससारभ्रान्ति संत्याग). Of these

- (a) Yogāṅga, being self-contained, represents the Causal State and is identified with the dreamless sleep. It corresponds to the Prājña of Vedānta.
- (b) Bhogāṅga, being intrinsic (अन्तरङ्ग), represents the Śūkṣma state and is identified with dream, standing for the Taijasa of Vedānta.
- (c) Tyāgāṅga being extrinsic (बहिरङ्ग), represents the gross state and is identified with the waking life. It is equivalent to the Viśva of Vedānta.

Like the Liṅga, the Aṅga is of two varieties each :

- (a) Yogāṅga = { (i) Aikya Sthala.
(ii) Śaraṇa Sthala.
- (b) Bhogāṅga = { (iii) Prāṇaliṅga.
(iv) Prasādi.
- (c) Tyāgāṅga = { (v) Maheśvara Sthala.
(vi) Bhakta Sthala.

* अनाद्यन्तमजं लिङ्गं तत्पदं परमं प्रति ।

यद् गच्छति महा भक्त्या तदङ्गमिति निश्चितम् ॥

संभवेत् परमं तत्त्वं तद्गततत्परायणः ।

अङ्गस्थलमिति प्राचुरङ्गतत्त्वविशारदाः ॥

अमिति ब्रह्मचिन्मात्रं गच्छतीति गमुच्यते ।

रूपयतेऽङ्गमिति प्राज्ञैरङ्गतत्त्वविचिन्तकैः ॥

Bhakti, as a dominant mood, is really one and undivided, but appears as many-coloured in relation to the six Sthalas.

मधुरादिषु यत् षट्सु प्रविश्य सलिलं यथा ।

तत्तदाकारतो भाति तथा भक्तिः स्थले स्थले ॥

The names of the six kinds of Bhakti, arranged in the order of the Āngas, are: (i) Samarasākārā, (ii) Sixfold Bhakti Ānandākārā, (iii) Anubhavākārā, (iv) Avadhānātmikā, (v) Naiṣṭhiki and (vi) Sadbhakti.

(5)

It is said that Jiva is a part (अंश) of Śiva, and hence like Him pure (अमल), eternal (नित्य), spotless (निरञ्जन), and tranquil (शान्त). Essentially there is not the slightest difference between the two. And when this semblance of distinction due to the presence of the threefold defilement, which perennially haunts one in the state of bondage and stands in the way of one's self-realisation, melts away, there dawns upon the "naughted" soul the Vision of its destiny fulfilled. Taken back, absorbed, into the Being of Śiva, the soul finds at last its consummation reached. The six attributes which are usually predicated of Śiva or of the Pure Self are named: Omniscience, Self-contentedness, Immaculate Wisdom, Freedom, Absolute and Infinite Power*.

Just as Līṅga Sthala (Śiva) becomes manifold

* सर्वज्ञत्वं च त्वत्त्वं तयानादिप्रबोधिता ।

स्वतन्त्रताऽपि चालुप्रशक्तताऽनन्तशक्तता ॥

इत्येतैस्तैर्गणैः षड्भिः शिवाङ्गमिति लक्ष्यते ।

तस्मादङ्गस्थलं सान्नादत्मेवायं न सशयः ॥ Anubhava Sutra

These terms are explained in Śrīkaṇṭha Śivāchārya's Commentary on the Brahma Sūtra 1.1.2 (Mysore Ed., pp. 10-12). See also Appaya Dikṣita's Śivārkamaṇidīpikā on the above (Kumbhakonam Ed., pp. 121-125).

through its own Power (शक्ति) so does Āṅga Sthala (Jīva) become correspondingly multiplied through its devotion, (भक्ति). As Līṅga becomes more and more drawn up into the State of Śiva through accession of power, so does Āṅga become lifted higher and higher into the level of Ātman by reason of its Devotion, till in the end Pure Śiva and Pure Ātmā alone remain, eternally attached to each other, as Master and Attendant, as Worshipper and Worshipped, or as Teacher and Pupil. This is the blessed state to which every devotee inwardly aspires.*

The union of Jīva and Śiva as described in the above, is called here Sāyujya Mukti, and constitutes according to the teachings of this sect the highest form of Salvation.

तस्माल्लिङ्गाङ्गसंयोगात् परा मुक्तिर्न विद्यते ।

Ātmā is really a direct part of Śiva pure and free, but in its mundane existence it appears as roaming, restless and in chains. It is on account of self-forgetfulness that the state of bondage seems so real to it. It identifies, falsely, the body with itself, accept-

Need of
Spiritual
Guidance.

* यद् यद्रूपमुपास्यात् [=पास्य त्वात्] शिवो व्रजति शक्तिमान् ।

उपासकत्वतश्चात्मा तत्तदापनोति भक्तिमान् ॥

यथा स्वरूपमादत्ते पूज्यत्वेन महेश्वरः ।

पूजकत्वेन च त्मायमेतद्रूपमनुव्रजेत् ॥

यथा स्वरूपमादत्ते साध्यत्वात् परमेश्वरः ।

साधकत्वादसावात्मा तत्तदास्याय तिष्ठति ॥

यद्यत्स्वरूपमादत्ते गुरुत्वनाम्बिकापतिः ।

शिष्यत्वेनायमात्मा च तत्तद्रूपमुपासेत् ॥

Cf. the first verse of Utpala's 13th Stotra :

संग्रहेण सुखदुःखञ्जलय मां प्रति स्थितमिदं शृणु प्रभो ।

सौख्यमेव भवता समात्मः स्वामिना विरह एव दुःखिता ॥

Kṣemarāja in his commentary explains the term समागम as समावेशै-
क्यं and विरह as स्वरूपाप्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ।

ing as a matter of course the hard penalties which such an act of identification inevitably entails; at the best, it considers itself as the owner of the body and inseparably associated with it. A period of storm and unrest naturally follows, accompanied by pain, heart-burnings, doubts and despondencies and culminating in the disillusionment of a blighted life. Racked by agonies, the soul seeks refuge in the wisdom of an elevated and illuminated self, asking for edification as to its real character (कोऽहम्). The teacher (देशिक), out of compassion (करुणावलात्) and in response to his query, declares the great truth as expressed in the Mantra-तत्त्वमसि—expounding analytically that the words तत् & त्वम् denote līṅga and āṅga respectively and that the word असि stands for their identity which is the truth of both.

The pupil is then led through a solemn process of Initiation, Initiation known as Mahā Śaivi Dikṣā which results in snapping asunder the bonds of ignorance, effecting the union of Āṅga with Līṅga and removing the three-fold impurity.

दीयते लिङ्गसम्बन्धः क्षीयते च मलत्रयम् ।

दीयते क्षीयते यस्मात् सा दीक्षेति निगद्यते ॥*

Dikṣā is three-fold: (a) Vedhātmikā, (b) Mantrātmikā and (c) Kriyātmikā.
 Its threefold character.

* In the Śivapurāṇa (Vāya. Sam, Pt. 2, Chap. 13) the verse appears in the following slightly altered form :

दीयते येन विज्ञानं क्षीयते पाशबन्धनम् ।

तस्मात् संस्कार एवायं दीक्षेत्यपि च कथ्यते ॥

The Rudrayāmala and Merutantra also contain the same definition of Dikṣā (see Puraścaryāṃbava, Benares Ed., p. 40); so the Devī-bhāgavata XII. 7. 5. Cf. also Śiva Sūtra III. 28, with Kṣemarāja's Vimarśiṇī (pp. 114-115) and Bhaskara's Vārtika (pp. 69-70): Sidhāntasīkhāmaṇi, Ch. VI, 11-12 (p. 85.)

(a) The word *Vedhā* stands here as a symbol for the touch of the teacher's hand on the disciple's head. The mere gazing of the teacher is enough to rouse into action the spiritual energy of the disciple.* In the *Śivādvaitadarpaṇa* (Ch. III) it is further observed that the result of this *dikṣā* is the contact (संयोग) of the *Yogāṅga* (the soul as conditioned by its causal envelope) with the *Bhāvaliṅga*. (b) *Mantra* means what the teacher whispers into the ears of the disciple. This form of *dikṣā* consists in the instruction of the great five-syllabled mantra and is represented by the contact of the *Bhogāṅga* of the *Jīva* with the *Prāṇaliṅga*†. (c) *Kriyā dikṣā* is the ceremonial part of the initiation, in which the disciple is seated within the *Svastika*-circle drawn, and made to repeat by way of penances the name of *Śiva* and to meditate on Him. Then follows the three-fold anointment of the disciple with waters from five jars.‡

* Cf. *Anubhava sūtra*, V. 40, 57. Also *Siddhāntasikhāmaṇi*, VI. 13-14: गुरोरालोक्रमात्रेण हस्तमस्तक्रयोगतः । यः शिवत्वसमावेशो वेधादीक्षेति सा मता । *Śrīmaritopādārya* adds : गुरो दृष्टिर्गर्भे स्थित्वा करकमले समुपनस्यात्मनः चिन्मयस्वरूपोपदेशो वेधादीक्षा ।

† Cf. *Anubhava sūtra*, V. 41, 58 ; *Siddhāntasikhāmaṇi*, VI. 14,; *Śivādvaita darpaṇa*, Ch. III.

‡ *Kriyā* refers to what is offered by the guru to the disciple in his hand, i.e. the *Śivaliṅga*. The rule is that an auspicious *liṅga* (one made of crystal, moon or sun stones, or one prepared from the rock of *Śrīśaila* or obtained from the bed of the *Nerbudda*) has to be secured, sanctified, anointed and worshipped, and thereupon the teacher has to draw forth by means of the so called *Aṅkuśa mudrā* from the head (i. e. *Sahasrāra*) of the disciple the *Saivīkalā* and infuse it into the *liṅga*. This process resembles that of lighting one fire from another already burning (प्रदीपाद् दीपान्तरमिव). He has then to draw out in a similar manner the *Jīvākalā* or *Vital Power* (प्राण) of the disciple and settle it on the *liṅga*. The two *kalās* are thus balanced with each other, and the *liṅga* is then placed in the hand of the disciple with instruction to hold it on his body.

Such is the mysterious power of this initiatory process that it effects a complete revolution in the life of the neo-phyte. It makes manifest to him his hidden and hitherto unrecognised powers and secures for him the Beatific Vision; and the Veil of Cosmic Illusion is for ever lifted from his eyes.

The details of this inner conversion are not set out here. Conversion, with as much fulness as might be desired. But what is said is enough to convince one that the whole process is graduated, even though on occasions quite rapid. It is said that the novice is instructed, immediately after his initiation, to meditate upon the kalā. This leads on successively to the realisations of bhāva, of manas, of dṛṣṭi and finally of the Sthala itself. The kalā serves to awaken (बोधनी) and bring into play the latent energies stored in the mantra. Having drawn it forth (आकृष्य) by force, the initiate is to lay it in the Līṅga which is All-Light. As soon as this Supreme Līṅga is seen, all the karmas of the Jīva are burnt off, his struggles and vacillations,—indeed the whole machinery of his discursive understanding—come to an end, and he becomes a new man altogether, convinced and pacified. As to the manner in which this is done it is said that the Teacher brings the three Līṅgas down in touch with the three Aṅgas of the disciple by a three-fold process along the same line, but in an inverted course (viz. through dṛṣṭi, manas and bhāva down to kalā). That is, by means of the Vedhādīkṣā the Bhāvalīṅga is united with the Yogāṅga; the Prāṇalīṅga is united with Bhogāṅga through Mantradīkṣā; and through Kriyādīkṣā the unification of Iṣṭalīṅga and Tyāgāṅga is brought about. The union of Līṅga and Aṅga is likened to the union of flame (शिखी) and camphor (कर्पूर), Līṅga being the flame and Aṅga the camphor.

This union is indeed the inner reality of all upāsana. The soul realises its unity with the Lord. The duality of exclusiveness being gone, the soul rests for ever unmolested in the presence of its Lord and feels identified with His Being. The cessation of duality and of divided consciousness as effected in this way is variously termed—as Nivṛtti (Rest), as Viśrānti (Quiescence) and sometimes as Parama Sukha (Supreme Happiness).

The identity thus established is not absolute. But all empirical differences incident to a life of bondage have also vanished. Śiva and Ātmā are in all essentials one and the self-same thing, both being of the nature of Pure Existence, Consciousness and Bliss—in fact, the Being of one is the Being of the other. But a mysterious difference still persists through which the one appears as the Lord and the other as the Servant, and so forth. It is a state, not describable in the language of man, in which the opposite moments of the so-called identity and difference, with which the lower mind is familiar, are reconciled in the synthesis of a higher Unity. This state is called “bhāga-yoga”, and bears in the mystery of its relation a close resemblance to the intimacy subsisting between, say, fire and its light, or ice and water or camphor and its perfume. The two are not separable except by a logical abstraction.

As soon as this union comes to happen, the seed of Pure Devotion (परा भक्ति) which has till now been embedded in the Soul waiting for a favourable opportunity begins to sprout forth and germinate:

तस्मात् क्षेत्रस्य बीजस्य बीजिनश्च कदाचन ।

वियोगो नेष्यते कापि सदा संयोग एव हि ॥

योगेन तु परा भक्तिरिति भक्तेस्तु वैभवम् ।

अस्याः स्वरूपसद्भावात् सद्भक्तिरिति कीर्तिता ॥

This is Sadbhakti which works up to higher and higher levels, bringing each Aṅga into contact with its corresponding Liṅga, till it comes to the Supreme stage called सामरस्य when the Mahāliṅga and Aikya Sthala are *completely* fused with each other.

This six-fold contact is called Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga and is declared to be a means to the attainment of Śivatattva—to the Divine Alliance.

(6)

A few words now require to be said about the manner
 Resignation: in which the activities of the Jīva are to be
 Surrender unto the Lord. offered up one and all to the Lord. It is said
 that this dedication (अर्पण) is to be made in a spirit of meekness and self-abnegation. It is two-fold, according as the object dedicated is (a) an action (क्रियार्पण) or (b) a thought and emotion (ज्ञानार्पण).

(a) Let us try to understand what the author intends
 Dedication of actions. to convey by the former term (क्रियार्पण).

It is said that the object which the Self holds enjoyable in its earthly life must belong to one of the three Categories of bhogyadravya—(i) Sthūla, (ii) Pravivikta or (iii) Ānanda; and consequently the dedication is also three-fold.

(i) The first and lowest kind of such object is rūpa which the Viśva offers up to the Iṣṭaliṅga. This is external dedication (बाह्यार्पण).

(ii) The next in order is *ruchi*, which is offered up by the Taijasa to the Prāṇaliṅga. This is internal dedication (अन्तर्पण).

(iii) But the highest form of dedication is that known as Ātmasaṅga, in which the Prājña offers up *trpti* to the Bhāvaliṅga by way of sacrifice.

This statement, albeit brief, gives an excellent account of what according to this system constitutes the true philosophy of enjoyment. All enjoyment is not bondage, it is held, but only that which is divorced from the Spirit. Nothing is to be accepted for personal gratification unless it be dedicated to the Lord who is the real owner of all. That is, everything being His should be offered to Him, and then received back from Him as a free gift or prasāda for purposes of enjoyment. Else it would be an act of misappropriation. Cravings after fruits and petty desires should be given up. Whatever is not thus offered in sacrifice to the Lord is not fit for enjoyment.

यद्रूपमर्पितं लिङ्गे तद्रूपं भोक्तुमर्हति ।

रूपान्तरं न भोक्तव्यं भुक्तं चेत्तदनर्पितम् ॥

The purity and liberation of heart,* the inner enfranchisement (निर्लेप), which this attitude of dedication ends in effecting, vary in degree and are differently named—Suddhi, Siddhi and Prasiddhi.

(b) The second form of dedication (ज्ञानार्पण) which is described as ineffable (स्वानुभूत्येकगोचर), and not definable by words, and of which the purpose is to remove taints of sensible objects, is said to consist in offering up to the Sthala revealed in the 6 Līngas the 6 kinds of experiences of the soul, viz. the five sense-impressions and the sixth—pariṇāma or the feeling of pleasure-pain, &c. All these varied objects, of which the world of man is composed, being offered to the Lord, the Ātman is able

* This is practically an explication of the central teaching of the Īsopaniṣad. Cf. the idea involved in its first couplet व्यक्तेन तेन भुञ्जाथाः &c. It is a compromise in spirit between the absolute rejection (संन्यास) of Vedānta and the utter self-indulgence of the sensual life. (For a masterly analysis of this Upaniṣad and its exposition vide A. Ghose's papers in "Ārya", Vol. I). Cf. Gītā, III. 12.

to enjoy them as His favour (प्रसाद) and find in them the fulfilment of an all-encompassing delight :

ऐक्यात्मकोऽयं परिणामवस्तु सदा महालिङ्गसमर्पितं हि ।

स्वभावसिद्धनिजभक्तियोगान् निषेवते तृप्तिघनप्रसादम् ॥

The mysterious relation between Faith and Grace is such that it is hard to say which of them stands in the relation of cause to the other. It is said that Grace leads to Faith and also Faith to Grace :

प्रसादाद् देवताभक्तिः प्रसादो भक्तिसम्भवः ।

यथा चाऽङ्कुरतो बीजं बीजतो वा यथाऽङ्कुरः ॥*

When all the activities of the soul, through dedication to the Lord, come to absolute rest in themselves (स्वस्मिन्नेव स्वयं यान्ति विश्रान्तिं), this state of repose is called *Kriyāvīśrānti* or Happiness. It is a state when, all desires satisfied (आप्तकाम), the soul rises above the stirrings and strivings of a finite existence and becomes perfectly free. Its true character is then revealed and it realises

* From this it is apparent that the two acts—or rather the two attitudes—are not so much as two *distinct* attitudes as two phases of the same indescribable reality, so that what is Bhakti (Faith) on the part of Jīva is really the other side of what is Prasāda (Grace) from the view-point of Īśvara. There is no causal relation between the two. This will remind one of the famous statement in the Bhāgavata wherein it is said that whatever is offered to the Lord comes back reflected to the soul and that the best way of securing a thing is to sacrifice it unto the Lord :

नैवात्मनः प्रभुरयं निजलाभपूर्णो मानं जनद्विदुषः करुणो वृणोति ।

यद्यज्जनो भगवते विदधति मानं तच्चात्मने, प्रतिमुखस्य यथा मुखश्रीः ॥

The two acts are really *simultaneous*. See Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's discussion on this point in his commentary on the Gītā, VII. 14 (Nir. Ed., p. 360). Cf Meister Eckhart :

"Thy opening and His entering are but one moment" (Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 159).

in a single act of intuition, no longer subject to the disturbing influence of Time, its eternal Unity with the Supreme Being—'I am Śiva Himself' (अहं साक्षात् शिव एव). For one who has attained to these heights all the movements of the body, all the activities of the will, are transmuted into forms of Divine Worship.* His will is but God's will, every thing is and to him 'apparelled in a celestial light'—fact a Divine manifestation.

Freedom and
Beatific State.

His freedom of movement (स्वेच्छाचार) forms at this stage the highest kind of worship. Such a man is no more subject in his dealings to the regulations of ethical codes (विधि and निषेध) or even to the Laws of Nature. His Devotion is unrestricted (निरुद्ध), allabsorbing. Yoga has done its share of work in conducting him above the realms of Māyā: Bhakti alone endures. This Bhakti is an ever-flowing source of Happiness, being above the trammels of bondage.† This is the so-called Advaita Bhakti of which we hear so much in subsequent literature and which is characterised as निजनिर्वाणरूपिणी । It is to be distinguished from Dvaita Bhakti which involves difference between the worshipper and the worshipped and is a source of evil (क्लेशहेतुप्रसाधिनी). The actions of an advaita Bhakta are no actions at all, though

* आप्तकामस्य सुखिनः कामाच्चावहिर्मुखाः ।

प्रवृत्ता लौकिकाः सर्वे प्रथयुर्नाशमरुमानि ॥

प्रणष्ट्वेषु सर्वेषु स्वेच्छाचारेण यत्कृतम् ।

तच्छिवार्चनमेव स्याद् यद्भुक्तं तच्छिवार्चितम् ॥

शिवरूपतया भाति यस्य सर्वं स्वभावतः ।

स्वेच्छाचारस्माचारः तस्य चार्चा हि शूलिनः ॥

† बन्धमुत्तयरेभावे हि भक्तिरुक्ता निर्माणा ।

न बन्धे मोक्षे चापि लीनयोश्च समुच्चये ॥

न योगो न तपोऽन्यच्च क्रमः कोऽपि न विद्यते ।

अमाये शिवमार्गेऽस्मिन् भक्तिरेका प्रशस्यते ॥ (Anubhava Sūtra)

The latter verse occurs with some variation in Utpala's Śiva-stotrāvalī, stotra no. 1 (Verse 18).

appearing as such*. These are neither fruitful nor barren, but are by nature (स्वभावतः) the plays of Divine Will (लाला मात्राः). It is thus evident that the true Śaiva Bhakti finds scope for manifestation only when the liberation is effected. That Parā Bhakti stands above Mokṣa is clear from the following lines of Māyideva :

ज्ञानादेव हि मोक्षः स्यान्मोक्षादुपरि शाम्भवी ।
भक्तिः परतरा भाति स्वतन्त्रा भक्तिलीलया ॥
लोकयोरुभयोरैहिकामुष्मिकपदारथयोः ।
गमागमं विनैवास्ते भक्तिः सम्पूर्णवैभवा ॥

This is an interesting statement, as showing that as in Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇavism, so in the Śaiva Siddhānta also, Mokṣa is not held to be the highest end of man, but forms only the gateway through which the soul has to pass for realising its divine possibilities of Self-Adoration and Self-Delight. The doctrine of what has come to be known as a fifth puruṣārtha finds an explicit enunciation† in this system as well, and it would be a historical blunder to associate it exclusively with the Gauḍīya and other Vaiṣṇava sects affiliated to the Bhāgavata order.

In the following lines of Māyideva it is stated that true Bhakti comes after Jñāna :

* अद्वैतभक्तियुक्तस्य योगिनः सकला क्रिया ।
अस्ति दग्धपटन्यायात् क्रियामात्रा न हि क्रिया ॥
यथा नानाविधा नद्यो नानाविधजला अपि ।
स्वन्दमाना इमाः सर्वाः पारावारं समाश्रिताः ॥
तद्रूपेणैव दृश्यन्ते नामरूपे विहाय च ।
तथाद्वैतं समाश्रित्य क्रिया नानाविधा अपि ॥
अद्वैततत्त्वरूपेण दृश्यन्ते भक्तियोगतः ।
क्रियाकारवरूपेण प्रतीता अपि सर्वदा ॥
न केवलक्रिया ह्यस्य लालामात्राः स्वभावतः ॥

† Cf धर्मादिपुरुषार्थानां चतुर्णां परतः परा ।

पथमः पुरुषार्थो हि भक्तिः शैवी सनातनी ॥ Anubhaya Sutra, VIII.78

ज्ञानं ब्रूते भक्तिः कुरुते शिवजीवयोः ।

पृथग्भावं, तेन ज्ञानं पूर्वं भक्तिस्तूत्तरतया विभाति ततः ॥

Jñānakāṇḍa starts from and finds its justification in the egoistic consciousness (अभिमान) of man, and so far is on a par with the Karmakāṇḍa, the difference being based only on the nature of this consciousness. Thus in the Way of Action the Soul must needs feel itself to be an active agent (कर्त्ता); in the Way of Knowledge too, though it does not participate in and stands above the multiple activities of Nature and watches them from its lonely height, it still feels itself to be their constant Witness, indifferent and poised in the serenity of its blissful unconcern. But in Devotion both these abhimānas are transcended, and stress is laid on the passive aspect of the Soul. It is a marvellous state and is incapable of expression in human language. For who can fathom the mystery of that ineffable state in which every enjoyment of the Soul becomes equivalent to divine worship, so that what appears on one hand as the Satisfaction (तृप्ति) of the Soul is on the other a synonym of the Favour (प्रसाद) of God. It is through Advaita Bhakti that absolute Grace of the Lord is realised*.

स्वच्छन्दाचारवर्तिन्या भक्त्या यत् कृतमर्चनम् ।

यद्भुक्तमर्पितं लिङ्गे सत्यमेवं मयोदितम् ॥

गन्धपुष्पादिगन्धस्य ग्रहणं तस्य पूजनम् ।

षड्रसार्वादानं तस्य नैवेद्याय प्रकल्पितम् ॥

इन्द्रियाकारभासा सा विषयाकारभासनम् ।

क्रोडया देवता भुङ्क्ते स्वत इत्यर्चनं कृतम् ॥

लिङ्गदेहो यिवात्मायं लिङ्गाचारो न लौकिकः ।

सर्वं लिङ्गमयं रूपं लिङ्गेन सममश्नुते ॥

सर्वाङ्गं लिङ्गमेव स्यादन्नपानं यदर्पितम् ।

प्रसादः तृप्तिरेव स्यात् सर्वं लिङ्गमयं भवेत् ॥

पवमद्वैतभक्त्यैव प्रसादः सर्वतोमुखः ।

प्रसिध्यति ततः सर्वमात्मरूपेण दृश्यते ॥

Through this Grace unending of the Supreme Self, resulting as a matter of course from Parā Bhakti, is vouchsafed unto the Soul a Unitive or Deified Life (सर्वत्मभावः)—a life in which everything reveals itself as the Self. Such is the infinite potency of Divine Grace that the subject, object and instrument of every action, cognition and enjoyment—nay, the action, cognition and enjoyment themselves are recognised as verily the Self. The body, the senses, the names, the vital energies, the intellect, the egoism—indeed the injunctions and the prohibitions, are all glorified into one Universal Reality, viz Self.*

* कर्त्ता कारयिता चैव करणं कार्यमेव च ।
 सर्वमात्मतया भाति प्रसादात् पारमेश्वरात् ॥
 भोक्ता भोजयिता भोग्यं भोगोपकरणान्यपि ।
 सर्वमात्मतया भाति प्रसादात् पारमेश्वरात् ॥
 ग्राहकश्च तथा ग्राह्यं ग्रहणं सर्वतोमुखम् ।
 सर्वमात्मतया भाति प्रसादात् पारमेश्वरात् ॥
 शरीरमिन्द्रियं प्राणा मनोबुद्धिरहंकृतिः ।
 सर्वमात्मतया भाति प्रसादात् पारमेश्वरात् ॥
 विषयश्च निषेधाश्च निषिद्धकरणान्यपि ।
 सर्वमात्मतया भाति प्रसादात् पारमेश्वरात् ॥

X.—NYĀYA KUSUMĀÑJALI.

(English Translation)

BY GOPINATH KAVIRAJ.

Prefatory Note.

The following pages embody an English translation, to be continued and published serially, of Udayana Āchārya's famous theistic treatise, viz. Nyāya Kusumāñjali. The work consists of a certain number of memorial verses distributed in five chapters, and of a prose commentary on the same by the author himself. The metrical portion of the work has been enjoying immense popularity for the last *three* or *four* hundred years, and in the community of teachers and pupils the name Kusumāñjali is generally understood as standing for this portion alone. With a few exceptions all the commentaries available deal exclusively with the verses and leave the prose portion wholly untouched. The whole book, however, including Udayana's original commentary in prose is known by the name of Kusumāñjali Prakaraṇa, and has been commented upon by Varadarāja, Vardhamāna and Guṇānanda and partly by Śaṅkara Miśra.

It is a strange fact that while so many philosophical works in Sanskrit have been translated into English, not a single work by Udayana has yet been taken in hand. And yet Udayana, according to the unanimous verdict of all ancient and modern scholars, was one of the deepest, most learned, abstruse and authoritative of Indian Philosophers. His position in the history of Indian Philosophy is *as a specialist* (in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) certainly higher than that of Vāchaspati Miśra. His Ātmatattvaviveka, Nyāya Kusumāñjali, Kiraṇāvali and to some extent his Nyāyavārtikatātparyapariśuddhi

bear upon them the stamp of his bright genius and deserve to be more widely known than they have hitherto been done. Long ago, as far back as in 1864, Cowell published an English translation of the Kusumāñjali, but it was only of the metrical portion of the work accompanied by Haridāsa's popular gloss on it. The translation, herewith offered for the first time, is however of the entire work, including Udayana's own scholium.

Besides translating the text, we have deemed it proper to add an elaborate annotation (with foot notes) of the nature of a historical and critical exegesis, intended to clear up obscurities in the text and generally to throw such light upon it as to make it easily intelligible to a modern mind. The technicalities of scholastic philosophy, together with the stiffness and concentrated character of Udayana's style, render an interpretative annotation absolutely necessary. Without such annotation the translation is likely to leave the original text obscure and vague;—and it is inevitable, because the complex associations and the delicate shades of meaning which every technical Sanskrit word, especially of philosophy, has come to assume in the course of centuries can hardly find an appropriate expression in a merely literal rendering into a foreign language.

Among the Commentaries on the text used in preparing the translation, annotation and notes may be mentioned the names of those of Varadarāja, Vardhamāna, Śaṅkara Miśra, Guṇānanda, Haridāsa, Rāmabhadra, Jayatāma, Raghudeva, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Trilochana. The sub-commentaries of Ruchidatta and Bhagīratha Thakkura have also been occasionally utilised.

We propose to deal at great length, in the Introduction which will follow the completion of the translation, with the contents of the work in comparison with the Theistic Problem

(161)

discussed in the different systems of Indian Philosophy and with the history of Udayana Āchārya and his successors in the field. An exhaustive bibliography of Indian Theism will also appear as an appendix to the translation.*

G. N. Kaviraj.

* But in the meantime the reader may be referred, for some interesting notes, to our Introduction to the Kusumāñjalibodhani of Varadarāja, pp. i—x (The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Texts, No. 4, Government Sanskrit Library, Benares).

NYAYA KUSUMAÑJALI.

FIRST CLUSTER.

I. May this handful of flowers of nyāya, free from any fault, laid at the feet of God, delight my mind bee-like roving about them—this handful of flowers having the petals blooming under favourable conditions, and affording delight by its fragrance to those whose olfactory organ is not affected by phlegm &c.—one which is not disfigured even when rubbed with the hand; and which is the source of a honey as sweet as nectar.*

II. He whose worship the sages (मनीषिणः) declare to be the means of Heaven and Liberation—that Supreme Self (परमात्मा) is here ascertained.

Annotation.

It has been declared, though in an implied manner, in the benedictory verse that Nyāya (lit. *reasoning*) i.e. worship of God, leads to Mokṣa. To this it may be objected:

(i) So long as the Karmans remain there is no escape from re-birth : thus the Karmans, unless experienced, cannot be exhausted, but experience of them would produce fresh

* The verse has a double meaning, applicable both to the work in hand as well as to a handful of flowers to which it is likened.

Karmans, so that there is no possibility of mokṣa or destruction of *all* the guṇas of the self. (ii) And there is no evidence to show that the study (व्युत्पादन) of the theistic proofs is a means to mokṣa. Such a study, therefore, which the author proposes to undertake, is absolutely fruitless. (iii) If however it could be shown that the contemplation of God (ईश्वरमनन) is the cause of mokṣa the study of the theistic proofs might find some justification. But there is really no evidence in favour of such causality. The Śruti आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः &c. means by the term आत्मा the individual self, and *not* God, because the context would not allow it. In the context we have आत्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति, &c which cannot be twisted to yield the sense of God, since प्रियत्व &c. cannot be ascribed to Him. Again, the root of this worldly life of bondage (संसार) is the ignorance of one's own self (स्वात्मगोचरं मिथ्याज्ञानं) rather than that of Jivātmā as such (जीवात्ममात्र) or of Īśvara.

To the above it may be replied that the infinity of Karmans need not be an obstacle in the way of the realisation of mokṣa. It is the inherent potency of Truth that error, however long standing, vanishes before its light, even as the darkness of centuries melts away in a moment in the presence of Light. And on the dawn of this Light of Knowledge the possibility of fresh Karmans is gone, and there remains nothing to obscure the purity of this Light. The sacred scriptures too are positive in asserting this fact. The second and third objections have been answered by Udayana in the present couplet. He states in plain terms that both heaven and liberation* result from the worship of God

* It is better to take the words स्वर्ग and अपवर्ग in their usual sense than to interpret with Vardhamāna *svaṅga* as 'intensely desired' (उत्कट-रागगोचर) and *apavarga* as the two forms of Mukti, viz. lower (अपर) and higher (पर) or Jīvanmukti and Videha mukti. Vardhamāna

(उपासना), which consists in His contemplation (मनन). The discussion (व्युत्पादन) of proofs in support of His existence being a part (अङ्ग) of such contemplation is useful. And the contemplation of God, as the cause of mokṣa, is verily enjoined in the Śruti, viz. तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति, &c., according to which the knowledge of God is the cause of mokṣa, just like the knowledge of one's own Self. What the Vedic text "द्वे ब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये" really insists upon is Knowledge only. The contribution of the contemplation of God to mokṣa is not through eradication of Nescience, but indirectly as leading to the attainment of the self-realisation of the individual Self. It is said: स हि तत्त्वतो ज्ञातः स्वात्मसाक्षात्कारस्योपकरोति । The causal relation between such contemplation and mokṣa may be explained differently also. The declaration of the Śruti establishes the causal relation between contemplation and mokṣa but in order to make this possible it is necessary to

observes that both the kinds of mukti being attainable by the same means what the author really aims at is the Parā-Mukti, together with Jīvanmukti. To us however the interpretation of the word रंज as 'intensely desired' seems to be far-fetched and strained. When the usual and primary sense of the word is quite consistent with the context there is no justification for running off the track in search of a secondary meaning. Varadarāja too is evidently of this view, but he notes that there was no need for bringing in the question of Svarga. He justifies it however on the ground that as people whose minds are full of worldly desires can not be drawn up to the contemplation of God except by an appeal to the sensuous element in their nature i.e. by placing before them some alluring prospect (e.g. heaven) it has been purposely introduced by what is called the गुडजिह्विकाश्लेषः—गुडजिह्विकया रागिजनमावर्जयितुमत्र स्वर्गोपादानम् । The motive is that even such men will be disgusted with the sparks of evanescent pleasure shining glow-worm-like in the midst of thick darkness of Pain and will desire to get Release from it.

assume *adṛṣṭa* as the modus operandi. In other words, the contemplation of God generates an *adṛṣṭa* which conduces to mokṣa.

Varadarāja holds that the knowledge of the individual Self as such (जीवात्मा) is unable to produce mokṣa. The Supreme Self or God *must* be realised, and the Grace of God thus realised acts as an auxiliary to the knowledge of the individual Self. The Grace thus working, the knowledge of the individual Self is competent to give rise to apavarga : साक्षात्कृतपरमेश्वरप्रसादसहकृतमेव हि जीवात्मज्ञानमपवर्गमा-
तनोति । The Śrutis “द्वे ब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये”, “द्वा सुपर्णा”, etc., are explained as having this sense.

The question how a single upāsana produces two different results is easily answered. Varadarāja says that difference in effect is due to difference in causal assemblage, which in the present case is occasioned by the auxiliary, viz. the desire of the worshipper.

Although with regard to that Being whom all men worship, whichever of the (four) Aims of Man they may strive after,—viz the Being whom the followers of the Upaniṣads worship as One by nature pure and enlightened, the followers of Kapila as the perfected First-Knower, the followers of Patañjali as the Being who is untouched by afflictions (Kleśas), actions, fruits and deserts, and who by assuming a ‘phantasmal body’ revealed the Veda and imparts (Saving) Grace, the followers of Mahāpaśupati as the absolutely Independent One who is undefiled by actions opposed to those enjoined in the Vedas and sanctioned by popular usage, the Śaivas as Śiva, the Vaiṣṇavas as Puruṣottama, the Paurāṇikas as the Supreme Father (lit. the Father of father), the Sacrificialists as the Soul of the sacrifice, the Saugatas (i. e. the Bauddhas) as the Omniscient, the Digambaras as the Uncovered, the Mīmāṃsakas as That which is enjoined (by the

Vedas; as the object of worship, the Naiyāyikas as the Being who is endowed with all the attributes (among those mentioned above) which befit Him, the Chārvākas as One whose authority is established by the convention of the world, what more—whom even the artisans worship as Viśvakarman, the Great Architect,—now, although with regard to such a Being, the Lord Śiva, whose power is universally recognised, like caste, family (gotra),* pravara,* school (of Veda), family-duties, &c., there can hardly be any ground for doubt and consequently any need for investigation,—still,


III. This logical dissertation of God, which may be called His contemplation, constitutes verily His worship, in as much as it follows the hearing of the Śruti.

The Lord has indeed been heard of frequently in the Śruti, Smṛti, Īhāsa and Purāṇa, and requires to be contemplated now; for the Śruti declares : “ He is to be heard , He is (then) to be contemplated,” and the Smṛti has : “One attains to the highest Yoga by invoking Knowledge in a threefold manner, viz. through the revealed scriptures, through inference (based upon them) and through the joy of continued meditation ”.

* The word ‘gotra’ means ‘ the name of the Ṛṣi in whose line one is born, the ancestor being a son or descendant of one of the seven great Ṛṣis and the eighth Agastya ’: सप्तानां सप्तर्षीणामगस्त्याष्टमानां यदपत्यं तद्गोत्रमिह्याचक्षते । The word *pravara* means the Ṛṣi chosen by the yajamāna in a sacrifice Vardhamāna says : ऋषय एव यज्ञे त्रियमाणाः प्रवराः । For some interesting historical notes on these words, see C. V. Vaidya’s paper, *Gotra and Pravara*, in the Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference, Poona, Vol. II, pp. 34—45.

ANNOTATION.

The *Puruṣārthas*, the 'Ends of Man', are usually counted as four in number, called by the collective name of *Chaturvarga*—the fourfold group. These are (1) *Dharma*, (2) *Artha*, (3) *Kāma* and (4) *Mokṣa*. On analysis of human aspirations it would appear that what men really strive after is nothing but Pleasure (or absence of Pain). It may be thus classified—



This is Mokṣa or Liberation, when the Self realises its essential purity and is dis-entagled from the association of foreign

matter.

(4)

Obtainable in the present life Obtainable, after death, in

heaven. Here the pleasure is relatively permanent and free from pain. But it is still transitory and the admixture of pain, however slight, is still present. This is Heaven or *Svarga*. *Dharma* as a means to such pleasure

Pleasure of wealth or such other things. This is *Artha*. Pleasure of sexual gratification. This is *Kāma*. is considered a *Puruṣārtha*.

(2)

(3)

(1)

This however is the usual conception. But the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṅkhya-yogins do not consider Pleasure as the highest end of man. Pleasure as an inferior end is not denied, so that in regard to Dharma, Artha and Kāma there does not exist any difference of opinion.

Now this leaves aside the view of the Bhāgavatas who consider Divine Love as the Highest Puruṣārtha and call it the fifth End of Man. This Divine Love, much like Brahmanānda which is revealed in mokṣa, is positive in character ; but it is supposed to differ from the latter in the sense that it is the culmination of Bhakti, while the latter is that of Knowledge. In other words, Bhakti, according to the thinkers of this school, is a deeper Joy because it rests on the eternal *Aiśvarya* and *Mādhurya* of the Supreme Self—which may or may not be looked at from the monistic view-point—; but Brahmanānda, though the highest from the world's point of view in so far as it is eternal, pure, steady and free from the action of the guṇas of Nature, pales into insignificance before the transcendent raptures of Love Divine.

Udayana however does not name the puruṣārthas and speak of any of them specifically. We need not therefore enter into a detailed review of the field in this connection. What he means to say is that whatever fruit a man may desire comes really from God, so that in whatever form he may worship, the giver of his fruit it is verily God Himself. It is immaterial whether the worshipper consciously resorts to Him or is even theoretically opposed to His existence, but the fact is that it is God, and God alone, so Udayana thinks, who responds to the prayer. The conception one may have of the Divinity, in case one is inclined to believe in It, has nothing to do with the special attitude of the worshipper. This view of Udayana, which of course is shared by Nyāya (cf Ny. Sūtra IV.1.19-21) and Vaiśeṣika in general, is also to be found in Vedānta. The Brahmasūtra 'फलमत उपपत्तेः' (Ved. Sūt. III. 2. 38),

(169)

which is a refutation of the Mīmāṃsā view, expressly declares that the fruit of an action comes from God and *not* from the Karma itself as Mīmāṃsā holds. Udayana's position is really based upon the statement in the Gītā—मम वर्तमानुवर्त्तते मनुष्याः पार्थ सर्वशः (IV. 11), and more particularly on the text येऽप्यन्यदेवताभक्ता यजन्ते श्रद्धयान्विताः । तेऽपि मामेव कौन्तेय यजन्त्यविधिपूर्वकम् (IX. 23), implying that God is the only object of worship. The Upaniṣad declares that whatever a man may love,—be it wealth or fame or relation or anything else—it is because of the Self that he loves it : न वाऽरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति । The Self is the only object of Love ; in every act of love it is the Self that is loved in reality, though the lover may not be aware of the fact. In a similar strain Udayana observes that there can be no denial of God from the practical standpoint, so long as a man has any want and resorts to a means for its fulfilment, for the simple reason that the fulfilment is due to a Will other than his own—a Will more potent indeed but determined by the nature of the action performed by and the desire existing in the man himself. It is in this sense that the rest of the views concerning the means which leads to the realisation of the fruit becomes intelligible, for otherwise the names of Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsaka, Chārvāka, Bauddha, Jaina, &c., which are avowedly non-theistic, cannot be justified.

Another point deserves to be noted. In Kārikā II it has been stated that the worship of God is a means to Heaven and Liberation, i. e. two of the four well-known ends of man, but no mention was made of the remaining two puruṣārthas. But here the author adds—यं कमपि पुरुषार्थं प्रार्थयमानाः.....
.....उपासते, meaning that every desire of man, worldly or transcendent, finds its satisfaction from the Supreme Self. As to whether such a desire is proper or not is of course a different question.

It is clear that all people, seeking for Enjoyment or for Emancipation, worship God, though unknowingly in some cases. Udayana now takes a brief survey of the various conceptions which different sects have formed of this Supreme Object which they worship for the fulfilment of their desires.

(1) In the very beginning the views of the Upaniṣad school, the Vedantists, are stated.

(2) The Sāṅkhya conception of Īśvara requires to be analysed. Udayana describes Him as Ādividvān and Siddha, and says nothing more. It is well known that Sāṅkhya repudiates the idea of Īśvara, but this must be understood in the sense that there is no room in Sāṅkhya for an eternal Īśvara posited for explaining the origin, maintenance and destruction of phenomena, or even for the imparting of fruits of actions or of saving knowledge. To understand their position we must consider the arguments at some length.

(i) *Īśvara conceived as the Creator, &c of the Universe.*

This is repugnant to Sāṅkhya which believes in the doctrine of Satkārya, holding that every effect pre-exists in its material cause as a Śakti and that the causal operation simply helps to bring out or evolve what was always involved. Prakṛti is the fundamental stuff of the world and is by nature liable to modification. The state of relative equilibrium in which it rests in Dissolution is disturbed after the period of suspense is over and the guṇas begin to form more and more differentiated wholes. This arrest of repose in Nature is due to the contiguity of Puruṣa—by which term is to be understood here not the pure Self, alienated from Prakṛti, but the bound self sullied by the coating of Prakṛti. In Dissolution this coating, which is a thin luminous film viz. buddhi, returns to its source where it remains immersed until it rises up again from the abyss at the end of the Cycle of Rest. As to why it rises again, i.e. why Nature is disturbed in its equilibrium the answer which Sāṅkhya has

to offer is that it is due to the influence of actions i.e., germinal saṃskāras awaiting fruition (S. Sutra III. 51, 62). Of course the operation is natural (S. S. III. 61) and not intelligent, Nature being insentient. The superintendence of an eternal and intelligent Being capable of observing the dharmas and adharma in their latent condition and of bringing forth the requisite products so as to facilitate the fruition of those dharmas etc. is a gratuitous assumption. The laws of Nature, i. e. the laws of cause and effect are inexorable, and such is the nature of things that they manifest themselves automatically. As in creation, so in preservation and destruction. There is no justification for assuming an Eternal Puruṣa in order to explain the creative and other allied phenomena.

(ii) *Īśvara conceived as the giver of fruits.*

This is denied by Sāṅkhya (S. S. II-9) which expressly declares—‘नेश्वराधिष्ठिते फलसम्पत्तिः कर्मणा तत्सिद्धेः’ (V. 2). It is held that the Karman brings about its own fruition. The superintendence of Īśvara, if assumed, would lead to fatal difficulties, e.g. selfishness or worldliness, possession of desire or absence of eternal freedom, attachment, and so forth.

(iii) *Īśvara conceived as the giver of saving knowledge.*

According to Sāṅkhya Saving Knowledge comes only from the Jīvanmukta, for it cannot come from one whose detachment is very keen (तीव्रविवेक) and who being unaware of anything external is unable to serve as spiritual guide (उपदेष्टा), nor can it come from one whose detachment is very weak (मन्दविवेक) and who being ignorant is himself an object of such guidance. The real instructor is one whose detachment is neither very keen nor very weak (मध्यविवेक), who is free from passions, merits and demerits (Sā Sut. III. 78-83), is no longer subject to pleasure and pain and

retains only a trace of saṁskāras enabling him to continue in life. Such a person is known as Jivanmukta.

Thus in this scheme of spiritual illumination there is no place for Īśvara.

From the above it is clear that an eternal and universal Īśvara is unknown in Sāṅkhya. The Divinity, with which Sāṅkhya is familiar, is that of lordship over a particular cosmic system or Brahmāṇḍa. The lord of a Brahmāṇḍa is called Hiranyagarbha. He is no more than a Puruṣa who by virtue of his spiritual culture has attained to perfection in the highest or the *Sāsmīta* Samādhi—a samādhi which is just a step below Kaivalya and in which the Mahattattva is realised. When the chitta of such a Puruṣa is in a state of suspense he is called Prakṛtilina, because it is then dissolved and rendered unmanifest in Nature. But unlike the Kevalin his chitta is liable to periodic upheaval,—return to surface (S. S. III. 54 नकारणलयात् कृतकृत्यता मग्नवदुत्थानात्)* and to continuance, until of course he obtains discrimination (विवेकज्ञान) from the buddhi. Buddhi being the first evolute from Nature such a chitta, when it has returned from nirodha, is naturally endowed with omniscience and omnipresence, and consequent control over the whole Brahmāṇḍa. He remains manifest in the Highest Loka of the Brahmāṇḍa viz. Satya or Brahma-loka. Any Puruṣa who attains to similar perfection realises a similar status. Each of these puruṣas is known as जन्य or कार्य ईश्वर, because his Lordship (इच्छा, ज्ञान and क्रियाशक्ति) is not eternal but obtained or developed through culture, and confined to a single Brahmāṇḍa and continues till Discrimination or Kaivalya ensues. The phrase उपासासिद्ध, as in Sā. Sut. I. 95, is used to mean such a person. The Sā. Sut. III. 56, describing Puruṣa as omniscient (सर्वविद्)

* Vijñāna Bhikṣu says—यया जले मग्नः पुनरात्तच्छति एवमेव प्रकृतिर्लानाः पुरुषाः ईश्वरभावेन पुनराविर्भवन्ति (Si. Pra. Bhāṣya, III. 54).

and omnipotent (सर्वकर्ता), refers to the above Janya Īvara ; and the next Sūtra (III. 57 : ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धः) emphasises that such a conception of Lordship is consistent with Sāṅkhya.

The phrases आदिविद्वान् and सिद्ध mean, according to Sāṅkhya, Īvara as described above. Their significance comes out when we remember that He receives discriminating knowledge before all others at the beginning of the cycle and his Siddhi, though really the outcome of his culture in the previous cycle, appears as inborn in his present life. Kapila and others were siddhas of this kind. The Sāṅkhya view is thus expressed by Udayana himself, in a different context, in the second chapter : सन्तु कपिलादय एव साक्षात्कृत-धर्माणः कर्मयोगसिद्धास्त एव संसाराङ्गारेषु पच्यमानान् प्राणिनः पश्यन्तः परमकारुणिकाः प्रियहितोपदेशेनानुग्रहीष्यन्ति, कृतं परमेश्वरेणानपेक्षितकीटादिसंख्यापरिज्ञानवता (Nyāyakusumāñjali Ben. Ed., II, p. 68). And Pañchaśikha indeed speaks of Kapila, though not by name, as the First Enlightened One (आदिविद्वान्), the Great Ṛṣi (परमर्षि), who out of compassion assumed a *nirmānachitta** and taught the tantra i.e. the Sāṅkhya Śāstra to enquiring Āsuri : आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोक्तवान् (Quoted in Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra 1. 25)†.

* For the meaning of this term see Yo. Sū. IV.—4-6, and our paper on "Nirmāṇa Kāya" in *The Princess of Wales Sarasvatī Bhavana Studies*, Vol. I, pp 47-60.

† That this refers to Kapila is beyond doubt. He is usually described as Paramarṣi and the teacher of Āsuri (cf. Sā Kārikā, no. 70). But it seems to me open to suspicion whether Vyāsa who quotes Pañchaśikha meant to support the current Sāṅkhya notion on the question. Whatever Pañchaśikha may have meant himself, Vyāsa certainly understood by the epithets आदिविद्वान् and परमर्षि, the Supreme Lord (परमेश्वर), and not any Janya Īvara merely.

defiance is sure to produce in the case of ordinary persons ; and freedom from demerit implies freedom from suffering. He is thus shown to be above pleasure and pain (भोग) as well as merit and demerit (धर्माधर्म). What the Pāsupatas mean to say is that the seed of Karma sprouts forth as merit and demerit (धर्म and अधर्म) only when the mental soil is already drenched with the waters of Nescience, and *not when it is rendered barren with its moisture sucked up by the heat of Right Knowledge* : मिथ्याज्ञानसलिलावसिक्तायामात्मभूमौ कर्मबीजं धर्माधर्माङ्कुरमारभते, न तु तत्त्वज्ञाननिदाघनिर्णीतसलिलतयोषरायाम् (Vardhamāna, *Prakāśa*). This shows that there being no Ignorance in God (owing to His Omniscience), merit and demerit have no significance for Him.

Who were these Mahāpāsupatas ? Varadarāja and Śaṅkara Miśra say that they were those Pāsupatas who practised Mahāvratā (called Ugravrata in Ch. XIII. 24 of the Ahirbudhnya Samhitā).^{*} These may be identified with some probability with the sect whose tenets are embodied in the Atharva Śiras Upaniṣad. It is believed that Śiva as Ahirbudhnya fashioned the Pāsupata system (Ah. Sam., Ch. XI. 43 et seq). This system had eight kāṇḍas, viz. Pati, Paśu, Pāśa (of 5 kinds), Śuddha Charyā, Miśra Charyā, Deva, Dikṣā and Sāyujya. Its philosophical exposition is to be found in the

* In the Vāyaviya Samhitā of Śiva Purāṇa (II. 24.177) the Mahāvratadharas are the Kālāmukhas. 'Mahāvratā' means eating food placed in a human skull, besmearing the body with the ashes of human carcasses, &c. (See Rāmānuja on Brahma Sūtra, Pāsupata Adhikaraṇa). In the Com. on Mālatīmādhava Jagaddhara calls it the Kāpālikavrata, and Dr. Bhandarkar confirms it, saying that the ascetics in the Kāpāleśvara temple (Dt. Nasik), who were evidently Kāpālikas, are described in the grant as *mahāvratins*.

In the Vedic, Jain and Yoga literatures however the word Mahāvratā conveys a different sense.

(177)

Pañchārtha Darśana (in five chapters, called *Pañchādhyāyī*) attributed to Śiva and commented on by Rāśikara.

(5) The Śaivas are apparently different from the preceding sect. They name their object of worship Śiva which means 'one who is above the three guṇas and essentially benevolent.' In the Padma Tantra (1.1.50) Śiva is said to have been the author of Kāpāla, Śuddha Śaiva and Pāśupata systems.* The Śaivas are apparently those mentioned under Siddhāntamārga in the Śiva Purāṇa, Vāyaviya Saṃhitā (II. 24.177). One of the most important points on which they differ from the Pāśupatas is the emphasis they lay upon *adṛṣṭa* in the determination of the Divine Will. They hold that the Divine Body is absolutely pure, being free from mala and karma, and is made up of five mantras forming his five parts and five powers†.

(6) The Vaiṣṇavas are probably Pāñcharātras, Bhāgavatas and Tridaṇḍins. The word Puruṣottama is evidently reminiscent of the Gītā (xv. 16-18) where we find an account of three Puruṣas, viz. *Kṣara* Puruṣa i.e. "Prakṛti", *akṣara* Puruṣa i.e. "Puruṣa", and the third the Supreme Puruṣa i.e. Puruṣottama, otherwise called Paramātmā or the Supreme Self.

(7-8) The views of the Paurāṇikas call for no comment. But it is difficult to say what the term *Yājñikas* really means. That they were distinct from the Mīmāṃsakas is of course clear from the latter being mentioned separately in the same context.

* Schrader, Introduction to the Pāñcharātra, p. 112.

† Mādhavāchārya, Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, Śaiva Darśana ; Bhandarkar, Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, &c., pp. 124-127.

It is strange that of all the Śaiva systems Udayana speaks only of the Pāśupatas and the Śaivas. The Vīraśaivas as a distinct sect had not probably been in existence at that time. But why does he not mention the name of the so-called Pratyabhijñā system or the Trikādvaitavāda of Kashmir ?

(9) The term *Kṣaṇika Sarvajña* as used by Udayana is really God conceived as such. It is well known that Sarvajña is one of the names of the Buddha. The word क्षणिक implies that the doctrine was of those schools of Buddhism which upheld the theory of Universal Flux. The Nihilists are of course excluded.

In Mahayanism the nearest equivalent to the Deity is, as is well known, the Dharmakāya Buddha. The words Amitābha and Vairochana are generally used by the followers of the Sukhāvati Sect. Other names too are sometimes to be found. The Dharmakāya is conceived as a Being, a Spirit, with Will and Intelligence, and thus distinct from Suchness (भूततथता, निर्गुणब्रह्म ?) It is free from vāsanā and mala, and manifests itself in the world, responsive to the call of Karma. The Buddhist philosophers describe it as pure, universal, serene and eternal, as a homogeneous unity, unlimited and yet embodied in all bodily forms. It is said to have unrestricted freedom and infinite power of creation. Under the exigencies of Karma it assumes a material body and illuminates all. It is above all contradictions and is possessed of an inherent tendency to lead the entire creation to Nirvāṇa.

(10) There is no room for a Supreme God in the Jain religious philosophy.

The Digambaras believe that every soul passes through fourteen stages (गुणस्थान) on its way to final deliverance. The last two are known as सयोगिकेवली गुणस्थानक and त्रयोगिकेवली गुणस्थानक, and correspond to Jīvanmukti and Videhamukti respectively. The former represents the stage in which the soul gains eternal wisdom, unlimited insight, everlasting happiness and unbounded power, and becomes as a matter of course the Guru of the entire universe, including the devas. The third part of Śukla dhyāna is developed in this stage, the first two having been already perfected in

the preceding stage. Though the soul still resides in the body it reaches every part of the Universe. On this level of spiritual culture the Jiva is able to found sects (Tirthas) and thereby become a Tirthaṅkara* if only he is inclined towards it and preach the truths revealed to him. Such a Jiva, viz. a Tirthaṅkara, is the object of human worship. The fourteenth stage, called by the name of अयोगिकेवली, is the last in the series, and as soon as this is reached the soul realises Nirvāṇa and becomes a Siddha. The Siddha and freed soul, together with infinite others of a similar order, dwell for ever, above the Siddha Śilā, descending no more on the lower planes and taking no longer any interest in the affairs of the world. He has a formless existence, and a body which is neither light nor heavy.

The term निरावरण ('uncovered') as used in the text stands for the last two guṇasthānas, specially the fourteenth. All the ghātikarmans, viz. those which obscure the jñāna and darśana (ज्ञानावरणीय and दर्शनावरणीय) of the soul and those which infatuate it (मोहनीय and अन्तराय) disappear in the 12th stage, so that what are generally known as aghātikarmans (viz. वेदनीय, आयुः, नाम and गोत्र†) only remain in the thirteenth. These do not obscure the omniscience of the soul, but help to keep up the body, and as soon as these are exhausted the body falls off. The two kinds of mokṣa (सदेह and विदेह) are known as Bhāvamokṣa and Dravya-mokṣa respectively.

The above is a brief resume of the philosophical notions

* The word Tirtha means, 'सम्प्रदाय' 'line of spiritual succession,' and one who initiates such a line is aptly described as Tirthaṅkara.

† These aghātikarmans correspond to a certain extent to the so-called prārabdhā karmans which result in जाति (= नाम and गोत्र as named here), आयुः and भोग (= वेदनीय).

of the different sects mentioned by Udayana on the object of their worship, which in fact is identical with God.

Udayana says that there is no question as to जाति, गोत्र, प्रवृत्त & चरण—these are so universal; similarly he adds there is no doubt on God either, whose extraordinary powers are practically recognised by every sect, even by those who profess to ignore His existence. Jāti is caste, such as Brāhmaṇa, Kṣātriya, &c. Gotra is the progenitor of a line such as Kāśyapa &c. Pravara is the ṛṣi who is elected in a sacrifice. Charaṇa is a Vedic recension (Śakha)*. The question thus arises—what is then the necessity of setting forth the Nyāya in support of His existence, the rule being सन्दिग्धे न्यायः प्रवर्तते न निश्चिते नाप्रसिद्धे । The reply is that this न्यायचर्चा is of the nature of मनन and comes logically after श्रवण । It is therefore essentially upāsana or worship. The scriptures are full of descriptions of Īśvara and of His Powers and Functions. All these have been heard by us from them. But this much is not adequate. These must be ratified by reason. The intellect or the rational faculty must be convinced by demonstration of the logical grounds in favour of the theses stated in the holy books. Every philosophical work is from the orthodox Indian point of view an attempt at rational justification of the truths embodied in the scriptures†. Philosophy, in the true sense of the term, has no right to speculate independently, for mere speculation is incapable of leading to the truth. It must be faithful to the dictates of the higher authorities. Its only function consists in providing proofs for the truths which are already revealed in the Śruti, etc. and thus showing that they are not inconsistent with reason. It is therefore worship.

* This is how Vardhamana explains the terms.

† For details see our paper on "The View-point of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy" in the first volume of this Journal, pp. 29-34.

There is in brief a five-fold objection to this (अज्ञ), based on the following grounds: (1) absence of a supersensuous ground for the existence of life after death; (2) the possibility of otherwise (*i.e.* without admitting God) carrying out the means to another world (*viz.* sacrifice); (3) the existence of proofs demonstrating His non-existence; (4) His unreliable character as a *proof* or a source of right knowledge (अप्रमाणत्व) even on the assumption of His existence; (5) absence of proofs demonstrating His existence.

Of these the first alternative is untenable, since—

IV. The supersensuous ground exists by reason of dependence, beginninglessness, variety, universal belief, and the restriction of joy and sorrow to each individual.

Thus this world, full of miseries of various kinds, cannot be described as independent. In that case it would either *be only existent* or *only non-existent*, but would not have an occasional existence.

ANNOTATION.

It is desirable to say a few words about the five-fold *theoretical* objection to the existence of God. These five objections are supposed to come from five distinct sources which are identified by some with certain well-known systems. But this identification does not seem to me quite reasonable. [For this see Introduction]. It is better to hold that the author has classified all possible anti-theistic arguments under five general heads. These anti-theistic arguments presuppose a corresponding number of theistic proofs current in the schools (Ny. & Vaiś). The first objection with which we are just now concerned is evidently from the materialists or *Chārvākas* who deny the existence of *adr̥ṣṭa i. e.* dharma and adharma. The

theistic philosophers who believe in *adr̥ṣṭa*, which is a special quality of the self, find themselves compelled under logical stress to postulate the existence of a Supreme Self, all-knowing and all-powerful, to account for the working or fructification of *adr̥ṣṭa*, which cannot work by itself. The *adr̥ṣṭa* being denied, the existence of God as the supervisor of *adr̥ṣṭa*, at once falls to the ground.

The Chārvāka means to say that the whole argument in favour of *adr̥ṣṭa* centres round the assumption of the causal relation. But, adds he, it is a mere assumption having no foundation in fact. Causality cannot be known through perception, for even when the *aharmī* as such is perceived doubt may persist as to its causal character. It is sometimes held that the causal relation is ascertained by 'अन्वयव्यतिरेकानु विधानज्ञानसङ्कारिविरह' (Vardh., p. 12). But this much is in common with the व्यभिचारी । The elements of invariable character and relevancy (अनन्यथासिद्धिशून्यस्य नियतपूर्ववर्तित्व) cannot be assured, being points of dispute. It will thus be clear that perception cannot vouch for causality. As for inference the Chārvāka has no faith in its validity as a proof. The Chārvāka adds: तत्साधने क्वचिदसिद्धौ अन्वयिनोऽसम्भवात्तदप्रसिद्धौ व्यतिरेकाज्ञानात् केवलव्यतिरेक्यनवतारात् । To the Chārvāka, who assumes *asat-khyāti* for an object not rightly cognised, there is no difficulty on the ground that the object of denial is unknown.

The Naiyāyika would retort, saying that the alternative of the Chārvāka is not strong, because its object is imaginary (कल्पना or असत्ख्याति) । If the Chārvāka does not really believe in causality how is it that he uses words which are meant to result in the genesis of conviction in others (परप्रतिपत्तिफलकवचन) ? He is bound to land himself in contradictions (व्याघात), for the more he attempts to demolish causality the more is he entangled in its meshes,—the more strongly it asserts itself.

Having said so much the Naiyāyika proceeds to sum up the arguments in support of adṛṣṭa.

It cannot be urged that the world—the effect—proceeds from no cause (अकस्मात्).

V. This (statement, viz. the effect takes place without a cause) cannot mean denial of cause (हेतु) nor of production (भूति), it cannot mean affirmation of production (of the effect) from itself (स्व) or from something unreal (अनुपाख्य). It does not mean spontaneous origination either (स्वभाववर्णेन)—the reason being that the effect is definitely limited.

5

If the cause were denied it would involve that the production is independent (निरपेक्ष) and consequently perpetual, because (there being no cause on which the origin of the effect is to depend) the effect may equally appear at all times. If production were denied it would amount to non-production after origin as well as before it, for there is no difference between the two states. The alternative “from itself” is untenable, because the effect before its origin is itself non-existent and hence unable (अप्रभु) to beget itself. The relation of cause and effect is one of invariableness (नियम) in priority and sequence. One thing cannot be both antecedent and consequent. Sequence is possible only where there is difference. If the unreal (Void) were declared a cause (of production), it would involve the existence of the effect before (its production) and consequently the same perpetual being (सदातनत्वं) again.

It may however be urged : “By the expression ‘अ-कस्मात्’ it is not meant merely to deny the cause or production,

nor does it mean the affirmation of the effect being its own cause or being caused by the unreal—but we hold that the product is by nature associated with a fixed time, just as it is naturally associated with a fixed point of space.” The Naiyāyika replies : “We say ‘No’, because the denial of a limit (in time) or of fixedness of limit (in time) would be subversive of occasionalness (कादाचित्कत्व). For occasionalness does not consist merely in the existence at a succeeding moment, but such existence together with prior non-existence. In case the limit (in time) is admitted, this upper or prior limit is known as ‘cause’ (हेतु).

“Well”, (says the Chārvāka), “let prior non-existence itself be the limit sought.” To this it is replied (by the Naiyāyika), “No. Because others also (other positive things also) exist at the same time (with prior non-existence). If they did not exist it would not be possible to know the non-existence itself. Hence the effect has not that alone (prior non-existence alone) as its limit (because the positive entities also will be limits in an equal sense), there being no difference (between the two cases).

If prior non-existence, independent (निरपेक्ष) of anything else, is declared a limit, in that case it would imply the existence of the effect as being due to that limit even before. If it is held by the Chārvāka “let there be any number of limits, but they are not required or resorted to (अपेक्षिताः), and this is the meaning of the term स्वभाव”, the reply by the Naiyāyika is as follows—“What is meant by saying ‘they are not required’ ? Is it meant (i) that they are not invariable (नियत), or (ii) that though they are invariable they are not active (उपकारक) ? In the first case, there being no determinant, smoke could have donkey also as its limit, just as it has fire as its limit. In the second case, what is the use of another action, for the meaning of dependence is nothing but invariable character, and this again is of the nature of cause; and

such a doctrine of Svabhāva is favoured (by us)."

The Chārvāka says : " The 'Svabhāvavāda' which we hold has its analogy in the restriction (नियम) of the 'Svabhāva' or nature of eternal things. It is not proper to say 'why should not the nature (तत्त्व) of everything be accidental (आकस्मिक), just as the nature of ākāśa (viz. आकाशत्व) is accidental?" The Naiyāyika replies, "No. The word 'nature' (स्वभाव) would lose its peculiar sense if it were common to all. One thing cannot be of multiple nature, for this would involve contradiction." The Chārvāka—"Well, in the same manner in the present case also there would be contradiction by admitting occasionalness (कादाचित्कत्व) as the nature (स्वभाव) of a thing which is eternal (सर्वदा भवतः); thus the solution is identical." The Naiyāyika replies : "Not identical. Because there would be self-contradiction if the effect were assumed to be without any limit or without a fixed limit. The assumption of a fixed limit however is to fall back upon the theory of causality."

ANNOTATION.

The 4th kārīkā enumerates five reasons in favour of the existence of *adṛṣṭa*. The subsequent kārīkās take up each of them in turn and expand the ideas.

The first reason stated is "सापेक्षत्व" । It is said that the world which comes into existence occasionally cannot but have an extrinsic ground for its occasional character. Had it been self-dependent, so far as its existence is concerned, that is, if it had no relation with anything other than itself, it would either have an eternal existence or an eternal non-existence. But as a matter of observed fact we cannot say, in an absolute sense, that the world is or that it is not. Being or non-being is relative in it. In other words, the world, having no existence at first, springs into existence later, and returns to non-existence subsequently. Thus we can neither

affirm that it always exists (for in the past and in the future it does not exist) nor that it never exists (for in the present it does exist). Hence we say that it *sometimes exists*, meaning that *sometimes it does not exist*. This is the meaning of occasionalness or contingency of phenomena.

Now this contingency is a fact of observation and admitted by all. This proves that the world, every effect, depends upon something else for its existence. Then again it should be remembered that it has varieties (अनेकविध दुःखमय)* of painful experience involved. These varieties as well as the contingency are positive evidences to show that the world, i. e. the effect, is not निरपेक्ष or independent : that on which it has to depend is its cause.

We have noted before that the Chārvāka does not believe in causality. The Naiyāyika therefore sets himself at the very outset to the task of establishing the causal relation. This he does by a process of inference based upon the observation of change. Udayana's argument in this connection, especially his language, is reminiscent of Dharmakīrti. Udayana says: तदा (i. e. संसारस्य निरपेक्षत्वे) स्यादेव न स्यादेव वा न तु कदाचित्स्यात्। Dharmakīrti says—

• • • Vardhamāna observes that the use of this qualifying phrase is intended to create a sense of disgust (with the world) in the minds of those who are out for release (मुमुक्षुवैराग्यार्थं) or to emphasise the fact of varieties in product (कार्यवैचित्र्योत्पत्तयर्थं). These varieties are meant to point to variety in *adṛṣṭa*. Varadarāja notes that the reading is नैकविध and दुःखमय। नैकविध means 'ever changing' i. e. contingent, कादाचित्क; दुःखमय is meant to suggest that everything should be considered as miserable (दुःखमयस्वभावना); it is not used as a logical ground (साधन). Or it is intended to show that even the opponent must resort to causality (हेतुमत्त्व) so as to shun misery which is हेय। The reading अनेकविध also is known to him and he takes it separately from दुःखमयस्व and understands its significance as 'variety of products'.

नित्यं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वा हेतोर्न्यायपेक्षणात् ।

अपेक्षातो हि भावानां कादाचित्कत्वसम्भवः ॥

The opponent puts forward a different explanation of the fact of contingency (कादाचित्कत्व), so that the reasoning of the Naiyāyika is vitiated. Thus it is urged that the effect comes into existence (भवति) from no thing (अ कस्मात्).

Now the statement 'अकस्मात् भवति' which the opponent makes has to be analysed. The particle 'अ' may have a negative sense (प्रतिषेधार्थ) or a positive sense (पर्युदासार्थ). In either case it may be syntactically related to कस्मात् or to भवति । Thus, (i) taking कस्मात् in the sense of a cause and अ as a negative particle related to it, we have the meaning "originating (भवन) without a cause". (ii) Again, if we take अ as before and connect it with the verb भवति, we have the meaning "not originating at all". (iii-iv) If the negative particle is taken in the sense of पर्युदास, which implies the affirmation of something other than what is actually denied, and if it is related to कस्मात्, we have the meaning "originating from what is different from what is other than itself (i.e. the effect)" i. e. originating from what is identical with itself or from the Unreal. Now all these four meanings are etymologically possible—they may be derived in the usual manner. (v) But the word अकस्मात् may also be supposed to be an underived (अव्युत्पन्न) word, like अश्वकर्ण, conveying the sense 'by nature', so that it would be vain to hunt for an etymology.

These five interpretations of the word अकस्मात् represent indeed five distinct metaphysical positions in opposition to the causal theory. It should be remembered that there is no question as to the contingency of phenomena, but only to the way in which the fact is to be accounted for. The causalists set forth the principle of causality as the only adequate explanation of the dependence (सापेक्षत्व) in-

volved in the contingency, while the anti-causalists come forward with their own views on the question.

(i) At the very outset we are confronted with the school which holds that phenomena have no cause. These are the ahetu-vādins. Probably the doctrine discussed in the Ny. Sūtras IV. 1. 22-24 is an aspect of this wider view*.

(ii) The second school denies production altogether. It is difficult to supply the historical setting of this view, but we may probably trace it to a form of Sāśvatavāda or to the Satkāryavāda of Sāṅkhya.

(iii) The third alternative represents the view that there is no difference between the cause and the effect. Every effect is in fact its own cause.

(iv) The fourth view is that of the school which holds the असत् to be the cause. The text has अनुपाख्य which is supposed to mean 'unreal' (निर्धर्मक, अलीक), 'non-existent'. This doctrine is probably the same as the one discussed in Ny. Sūtras IV-1-14-18.†

* The denial of hetu and pratyaya is attributed to Gosāla and to Pūraṇa Kassapa in the Pali canonical literature. It will be of interest to note that हेतुनिषेध and स्वभाववर्णना (i & v) are both connected with Gosāla's Parīṇāmanavāda which sought to explain the variety in the world by (a) Niyati, (b) Saṅgati (= Paryāya) and (c) Bhāva (= Svabhāva).

† Udayana's sense of the word अनुपाख्य is pretty certain. But originally the word might have had, like the term 'Śūnya', a slightly different sense. The meaning of 'Śūnya' is 'free from the four possible modes of predication, viz. affirmation of being and of non-being, simultaneous affirmation of being and non-being and simultaneous negation of being and non-being (चतुःकोटिविनिर्मुक्त)', and if the sense of the word Anupākhya was similar it was the doctrine, prior to the rise of Mahayanic Buddhism, of Sañjaya Velatīhiputta who denied the possibility of all these modes of expression.

Regarding the first view nothing requires to be said at present. So with the second. The third view is rejected on the ground that since an effect cannot have existed before its origin, it cannot possibly be maintained as the cause of itself. The identity of cause and effect is an absurdity. And to admit causality of a non-existent thing is to admit the existence of the effect before its origin and after its destruction : and this would be inconsistent with the non-perception of the effect before and after. This identity would lead to a further contradiction in that it would be opposed to the testimony of causality as established by experience, viz-that those who are in need of an effect e.g. a cloth are found to take up, *not* the effect itself which does not yet exist, but the materials, e.g. the threads, etc. which are temporally antecedent to it. Whatever view one may hold of the causal notion it is beyond question that there must be some sort of time-sequence between the cause and the effect, and this sequence is absent in the unity of cause and effect.

(iv) The objections to the fourth view are (a) that the unreal (अनुपाख्य) can have no pragmatic efficiency (अर्थक्रियाजनकत्व) and (b) that it leads to the absurdity of perpetual existence of the product. Vardhamāna says : एतत्पटानुत्पत्तिक्षणः यद्येतत्पटोत्पादकानुपाख्योत्तरक्षणः स्याद् एतत्पटाधिकरणं स्यात् । This means that if the moment prior to the origin of the product were identical with the moment subsequent to the unreal (अनुपाख्य) which is maintained as the cause of this product, it would be the substrate of this product—which is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, extending this analogy we shall find that the product was always in existence in the past !

(v) The most interesting doctrine however is the view of the svabhāvavādins. Udayana gives a brief account of these philosophers' doctrines, though only to refute them. स्वभाववाद in a certain sense has to be admitted by all thinkers

in the last resort. It is well known that a product, e.g. jar, inheres in its material cause e.g. कपाल, according to Naiyāyika. But it may be asked—why does not the jar, for instance, inhere in the threads? In plain language, why is the effect produced from one kind of cause rather than from another? What is the inner meaning of उपादाननियम which is a fact of general experience? The Naiyāyika's analysis, acute as it is, fails to provide the right solution to this question. Another example may be taken by way of illustration. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Universals (सामान्य) are declared to be eternal and omnipresent. But how is it that they are not manifested always and everywhere? Of course there are certain conditions which determine and limit their manifestation. A universal for example in so far as it inheres in a whole (अवयवी) is revealed by the peculiar collocation of the parts (अवयवसंस्थानविशेष, आकृति) constituting that whole (अवयवी). In other words, as Ny. Sutra expressly states, the relation between a particular universal (सामान्य, जाति) and a particular collocation (आकृति) is one of व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभाव । Now the question arises—what determines this व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभाव ? To be plain, how is one जाति manifested through one आकृति and not through another? Why does not कम्बूरीवादिमत्त्व reveal गोत्व instead of घटत्व ? What is the root of the correspondence between a जाति and an आकृति ? The Naiyāyika cannot furnish an adequate rational answer to this question. Similarly on every problem and in every system the last solution is never to be found. Analysis, however searching, may go deeper and deeper, but it is hopelessly impotent in the face of the ultimate problems. The only answer, if answer it could be called, is to fall back upon the nature of the thing (वस्तुस्वभाव) about which no further question is permissible.—वस्तुशक्तेरप्यनुयोज्यत्वात् । Thus, says the Kandali, p. 317:

एष हि तन्त्वादीनां कारणानां स्वभावो यदेतैरुत्पाद्यमाने द्रव्ये पटत्वमेव समवैति नान्यत्, एष हि मृत्पिण्डादीनां महिमा यत् तैः क्रियमाणे द्रव्ये घटत्वमेव समवैति नान्यत् । Call it *Svabhāva* or *Mahimā* or *Sakti* or by any other name, it is the last irreducible surd in all causal analysis, philosophical or scientific. Elsewhere too Śrīdhara observes : अथोच्यते विषयेन्द्रियजन्य-विज्ञानं कथमात्मन्येव समवैति यद्यात्मा सहजज्ञानमयो न स्यात् तस्याचेतनत्वे हि कारणत्वविशेषादिन्द्रियादिष्वपि ज्ञानसमवायो भवेदिति । तन्न । स्वभावनियमादेव नियमोपपत्तेः । यथा तन्तूनामपटत्वेऽपि तन्तुत्वजातिनियमात् तेषु पटसमवायो न तुर्यादिषु, तद्वदचिदात्मकेऽप्यात्मनि आत्मत्वजातिनियमाद् ज्ञानसमवायस्य नियमो भविष्यति ।

(To be continued)

XI THE DEFINITION OF POETRY

BY NĀRĀYAṆA ŚĀSTRĪ KHISIE

It is generally admitted that poetry has its basis in certain characteristics of word and sense. But it must be remembered that the words as well as their imports which form an essential part of poetic expression have a special feature of their own, and the different views held by critics on the definition of poetry are all *mainly* based on the preponderance one attaches to the element of word or to sense or to both in the conception of poetry.

Thus Samudra bandha observes in his commentary on *Alaṅkāra Sarvasva*: इह विशिष्टौ शब्दार्थौ काव्यम् । तयोश्च वैशिष्ट्यं धर्ममुखेन व्यापारमुखेन व्यङ्ग्यमुखेन वेति त्रयः पक्षाः । The peculiarities of word and sense, on which the classification of poetry is based, are therefore of three possible kinds, viz those which originate (a) from *dharma*, (b) from function (व्यापार) and (c) from suggestion (व्यङ्ग्य). The 'Dharma School' is two-fold according as the *dharma* is (i) an *alaṅkāra* or (ii) a *guṇa*. The 'Vyāpāra School' has also a double sub-division, in so far as the function spoken of involves either (iii) a felicity of expression (भणिति वैचित्र्य) or (iv) an æsthetic pleasure (भोगकृत्व). The first two schools appear on closer analysis to represent four distinct view-points of literary criticism. The third school stands by itself and forms the (v) fifth point of view. Samudrabandha attributes these five views respectively to (i) Udbhaṭa, &c., (ii) Vāmana, (iii) Kuntaka, the author of *Vakrokti-jīvita*, (iv) Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka, and (v) Ānanda Vardhana. It must be pointed out however that Bhāmaha who was a representative of the *Alaṅkāra School* belongs to the first class in the aforesaid classification.

Bhāmaha defines Poetry as (IX. 16)—

by योग्यता and other attributes, we shall have to exclude certain excellent poems, in so far as they are not sentences in the technical sense of the word. By way of illustration we may point out the following two pieces which, being devoid of योग्यता, are not वक्त्या and yet recognised as types of good poems :

- (i) अस्य क्षोणिपतेः परार्द्धपरया लक्ष्मीकृताः सङ्गच्छया
प्रज्ञाचक्षुरवेद्यमाणवधिरश्राव्याः किलाऽकीर्तयः ॥
गीयन्ते स्वरमष्टमं कलयता जातेन बन्धोदरा-
न्मूकानां प्रकरेण कूर्मरमणीदुग्धोदधे रोधसि ॥ (Naiṣadhacharita)
- (ii) एष बन्ध्यासुतो याति खपुष्पकृतशेखरः । etc.

Another defect of Viśvanātha's definition is that a poem in which *vastu* and *alaṅkāra* predominate, but there is no *rasa*, would not deserve to be called काव्य, but as a matter of fact such poems, when intensely suggestive, are regarded as good poems.

These defects however are absent from Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha's definition — 'रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्दः काव्यम्,' because he lays emphasis *not* upon a sentence, but only upon the word. But his own definition too is logically inaccurate in that it unduly extends to such statements as the Vedantic Mahāvākyas, viz. अयमात्मा ब्रह्म, &c. Who can presume to deny that the substance (अर्थ) indicated by the words आत्मा and ब्रह्म is not what Jagannātha means by the expression 'रमणीय',—supremely beautiful and charming ?

Kavi Karpūra's definition, as given in his Alāṅkāra Kaustubha, viz. 'कविवाङ्निर्मितिः काव्यम्,' is indeed free from the defects referred to above but suffers from what in logic is known as अन्योन्याश्रय । Poetry is defined by him in terms of the poet, whereas no separate and independent definition of the poet being given it must needs be defined in terms of poetry.

Taking a survey of the field I find that all these definitions are far from being the general and universal definitions of poetry. They are at best mere descriptions, describing poems of different kinds.

I should prefer, though with a certain amount of diffidence, to set forth a new view of Poetry which may be expressed as 'चमत्कारजनकशब्दार्थसन्दर्भः काव्यम्' । In other words poetry consists in an arrangement of words and meanings calculated to give rise in our mind to aesthetic joy. The word कवि in Sanskrit means कान्तदर्शी, i.e. one whose vision penetrates into the supersensuous world. The *kavi* as thus understood attains to the level of the *Paśyanti Vāk* which is the eternal background of what the rhetoricians describe as *dhvani*; and to this level he is able to exalt the soul by means of the suggestive function (ध्वननव्यापार) of *dhvani* as belonging to poetry consisting in both word and sense and manifested from the genius of his inmost self. On this level there is nothing but Peace and ineffable Joy (चमत्कार)—

नादाऽन्तर्लीयमाने मनसि नवनवोन्मेषमाविर्भवन्त्यः

साक्षाद् द्राक्षास्पृक्षाः क्षरदमरधुनीलोलकल्लोलकल्पाः ॥

चिच्चन्द्रोल्लासलीलाप्लुतमिव विमलं विश्वमुद्भासयन्त्यः

सन्त्येता यत्र वाचः प्रथमरसमुचः "सा हि साहित्यरीतिः" ॥

XII.—SONDALA UPĀDHYĀYA

BY GOPI NĀTH KAVIRĀJ

Except the bare fact of Sondala's* priority to Gaṅgeśa who quotes his view in his Tattva Chintāmañi, often with disapproval, no surer indication exists to settle his exact time.

Mahādeva Puntārkar in his Nyāya Kaustubha attributes to him (तदुक्तं सुन्दलकारैः) the following couplet:

अत्यन्तासत्यपि ह्यर्थे ज्ञानं शब्दः करोति हि ।

प्रमावाध्याऽप्रमा तत्र ह्यतः प्रामाण्यनिर्णयः ॥

Benares Sanskrit Library Ms.

fol. 38, lines 5—6.

And as the first line of this is quoted in Bhaṭṭa Rāghava's Commentary on Nyāyaśāra of which a manuscript, dated 1352 A. D., exists in the Benares Sanskrit Library (तदुक्तं अत्यन्तासत्यपि ज्ञानमर्थे शब्दः करोति हि (fol. 10 a, lines 5—6) it might be fairly presumed that Sondala was much earlier than the middle of the 14th Century. But this presumption is invalidated by the reason that the premiss is unfounded. The Śloka, as a matter of fact, did not originally belong to Sondala, but to Vākyapadīya.†

* The name is variously spelt as Sondala, Saundala, Sondala and Saundala.

† It had been a famous and familiar maxim even in the past. The wording of the verse bears such a close resemblance to the style of Vākyapadīya that even without any verification one would feel inclined to set it down to the authorship of Bhartṛhari. But really confirmatory evidence is not altogether wanting. Thus Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his Laghumañjūsā (Chowkhamba Ed., p. 377) ascribes it in the plainest terms to Bhartṛhari. And it seems to be possible, on consideration of the logical context, that it occurred somewhere in the 2nd Kāṇḍa where many ślokas are missing in the printed text of Gaṅgādhara's edition (Ben. Sansk. Series).

Bālabhaṭṭa in his Commentary, called Kalā, on the Mañjūsā quotes the whole verse as in the Nyāya Kaustubha and assigns it to Khaṇḍana Kāra (Chow. Ed., p. 380). But in the Chowkhamba edition of the Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khāḍya (p. 168), though the reading of the first line is the same, the second line reads differently, thus: अवाधात् प्रामात्र स्वतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः. And in the Medical Hall Press edition of this work (p. 104) the 1st line too

But the fact that Gaṅgeśa refers to Sondala as a Navya in the 4th volume of his work (See Chintāmaṇi, Śabda Khaṇḍa, Bib. Ind. E d., p. 276, line I and Mathurānātha's note upon it, p. 276, line 12) and to Jayanta as the Jarannaiyāyika may be taken as proving that the former lived long after the latter, but *how long* there is no means of ascertaining. Personally I am disposed to believe that the distinction between the old and the new school in the history of Nyāya Philosophy dates from after Udayana and Śridhara. It stands to probability, therefore, that Sondala lived after the 10th century.

In Nyāya Sondala's name is associated with the introduction of a peculiar theory, so quaint in its implications that almost all the writers from Gaṅgeśa downwards made their best efforts to combat it and drive it out of recognition. It is technically called व्याधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नाभाव or more strictly व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभाव । To explain; it is generally admitted that only that attribute (धर्म) which exists in the counter-entity (प्रतियोगी) of a negation (अभाव) can legitimately be said to be the qualifying or limiting condition (अवच्छेदक) of its pratiyogitā, or in other words the qualifying attribute (अवच्छेदक धर्म) must be co-existent (समानाधिकरण) with the pratiyogitā; violation of this restrictive condition (समानाधिकरणनियम) would be subversive of the Naiyāyika's fundamental doctrine of Error, viz. अन्यथाख्याति । But Sondala does not admit this restrictive condition.

has a different reading, the same as in Bhaṭṭa Rāghava's Commentary. It may be further pointed out that this śloka is also found in Kumārila's Śloka Vārtika with the following reading of the second line (the first line being identical with that in Nyāya Sāra Vichāra, तेनोक्तमेव नित्ये तस्य दीपमावात् प्रमाणतः) (Verse 6 under चोदना सूत्र, Chowkh. Ed., p. 45). The above will serve to reveal the state of confusion existing in the minds of the older writers as to the original source of this octonary couplet. And I believe this was due to the fact that Vākyapadiya had even then gone out of general use.



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